3: September, 1919

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September 1, 1919. Towards one o'clock yesterday afternoon, M. Heinrich called upon General Gorton and myself and showed a proposition for the reorganization of the government of Hungary, stating that he was authorized by Prime Minister Friedrich to get together a tentative cabinet. We told him to have Friedrich's signature attached to a minute of the meeting of the cabinet at which the discussion took place, and bring the same today at 10 A.M. when it could be laid before the Mission and suitable action taken. I then wired Paris so as to keep them in touch with the situation.

At ten o'clock this morning, M. Heinrich showed up exactly as agreed upon and submitted his list of a cabinet which was actually representative of all parties. He likewise delivered to us a copy of the resolution of the cabinet, which was attested by Friedrich. I immediately wired the American Commission of this fact and stated that the conditions attached to the organization of Heinrich's cabinet were: That the Supreme Council recognize and transact business with the new government as being representative of Hungary; that the Roumanians cease disarming and interning Hungarian officers; that the Roumanians evacuate all of Hungary west of the Danube; that the Roumanians cease cleaning out Hungary of supplies; and finally, that in case for any reason Heinrich had to leave the cabinet before the elections, Friedrich would succeed him. I added that the Mission at its session this morning recommended that the Supreme Council do everything reasonable towards recognizing and assisting the new Ministry. About two hours later the Mission's telegram in French was likewise sent off.

I then read General Rudeanu's reply to my letter of the twenty-seventh relative to evacuating immediately Hungary west of the Danube, and in which he was requested to give an answer either affirmatively or negatively. In the characteristic Roumanian style of begging the issue and of circumlocution, Rudeanu's letter was neither affirmative nor negative. I then drafted a reply to the effect that in view of the fact that our letter of the twenty-seventh required a positive answer, and as the Roumanian answer, though not being affirmative was not negative, we must interpret it, on account of the Roumanian Commander in Chief's repeated assurances of a desire to coöperate, as affirmative, and that we would accordingly proceed with the organization of the Hungarian forces west of the Danube. The Mission decided to send my letter.

We also decided to tell the Roumanian Commander in Chief that we were getting damned tired of the fact that they had not yet answered a single one of our questions definitely; that the organization of the Municipal Police of Budapest was of paramount importance; and, in effect, that if the present Commander could not comply with his promises, someone else ought to be put in his place.

The chief of police of the city of Budapest appeared before this Mission and showed that, although he had 3,700 men, the Roumanians had given them nothing in the way of arms beyond the original 600 carbines.

General Soós, the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, appeared before the Mission and explained his proposed plan for the organization of the Hungarian Army. His intelligence and knowledge of what he wanted to do was in startling contrast to the Roumanian ignorance and stupidity.

Last night we entertained at dinner Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge, his Chief of Staff, Colonel Stead, and General Gorton. Our chef is steadily improving and turned out a meal that would have done credit to Paris.

During the afternoon we received word that there was an American in one of the neighboring towns who was advising the people to decorate their streets and prepare for the reception of American cavalry, which was about to enter the town. I had two of my men sent out to locate any such American and bring him in if they found him. About one o'clock they showed up with a most nondescript and comic-opera artist. He maintained in excellent German that he was an American soldier belonging to the Seventh Cavalry, that he had spent several years in America -and there it ended. He had on a pair of gray woolen breeches, a coat that looked like a Roumanian soldier's coat, on the collar of which had been sewn a portion of the Stars and Stripes from an American flag handkerchief. His hat was an imitation of a French lieutenant's. We had previously received word that the Roumanians were endeavoring to stage some pictures for the cinematograph and this fellow had undoubtedly been dolled up by them to pass off as an American so that the townspeople would decorate their town. Then a body of Roumanian cavalry would enter and be photographed accordingly. We have the man jugged over in the barracks and propose to do some pumping⁽¹⁾

.

September 2, 1919. General Mombelli presided at today's meeting and very little of consequence took place.

A strong letter was drafted to be sent to the Roumanians, demanding that they immediately complete the organization of the police as promised, and complaining of subterfuge and procrastination. A similar letter was sent in regard to the evacuation of western Hungary.

Colonel Yates arrived last night from Bucharest, and from his report the Roumanians are pretty generally arrogant and haughty over what they consider their tremendous victory over Hungary, completely ignoring the fact that they could never even have touched Hungary had not the Allies first crushed both Germany and Austria-Hungary. All their talk is along the lines of having a Roumanian officer in a coordinate position on the Inter-Allied Military Mission, and demonstrates the fact that they feel that on account of their little private war with Hungary they are entitled to loot the latter absolutely in payment for their last little war, and leave the Allies to get indemnification from a prostrate nation for their share of expenses in the World War.

I have repeatedly telegraphed the American Commission at Paris explaining the necessity of keeping my present detachment until this matter ends, or at least of having substitutes sent, but all my requests and telegrams have so far been ignored.

The Hungarians also get cocky occasionally, and today, through their liaison officer, sent word to us that Austro-German aéroplanes were flying over western Hungary dropping propaganda, inviting the people to join Austria. They stated that they intended to fire on any such aéroplanes that might show up in the future and requested that we have all Allied aéroplanes marked plainly so that they would not be confused with the Austrian planes⁽²⁾. They were told to cut out all such monkeyshines or they would be punished.

September 3, 1919. Last night we entertained at dinner the Serbian Minister and Plenipotentiary, Doctor Lazar Baitch, and the Serbian Military Attaché, Major Body. Incidentally, the Serbian Plenipotentiary became quite mellow, cuddled up to me and imparted considerable information as to the Serbian point of view. He said in his opinion the Roumanians would stay in Hungary for at least a year, during which time the elections would be held, and that of course they would result as the Roumanians desired, and that they would bring about some sort of political or economic union of Roumania and Hungary, all with a view to the isolation of the Jugo-Slavs⁽³⁾.

It was my turn this morning to act as President of the Mission, and General Graziani stated that M. Diamandi called on him yesterday not knowing who was President of the Day. Diamandi was apparently much concerned over the probable elections, maintaining that in case they were run under Friedrich's régime, only Friedrich's tools could be elected to office. In leaving, M. Diamandi turned loose his usual threat, that it was about time the Roumanians left the country, in which they found only difficulties.

General Graziani also stated that he had had a visit from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Csáky, who likewise thought he was temporary President. Count Csáky's mission was to inform the Allied Generals that M. Garami had been accused of having received a large sum of money from Béla Kun, which was explained by saying that M. Garami desired to leave the country when Béla Kun was in power, but that the Communists would give him no passports except on condition that he go via Russia to Switzerland and there get in contact with the Italian Socialists. This Garami refused to do, but being of a timorous nature, and on being offered later an opportunity to go to Switzerland, he took seven hundred pounds sterling for the Communists which was delivered in Switzerland without being touched by him. Count Csáky added that in case the investigation should prove to be unsuccessful, M. Garami would be replaced in the cabinet by another Socialist.

It is quite noticeable that the Roumanians in particular habitually make the mistake of thinking that our French colleague, General Graziani, is the President of the Day, which rather strengthens the suspicion that the Roumanians and French are somewhat in touch.

Up to date, I have practically had no car, and we were just getting one in partial shape when it collided in the Palace entrance with Colonel Yates' car and smashed them both up.

To add to the joy of the occasion, there is as yet no word from the American Commission as to whether or not my detachment can remain with me or be replaced by others. Apparently about next week I shall be left flat on my back with six enlisted men to handle the whole American side of the question. As no remarks would do the subject justice, none will be made.

At the session of the Mission this morning, General Gorton produced a proclamation from the Roumanian authorities, directing that all motor vehicles bear certain numbers, and in general prescribing the regulations for same. It was decided to send a communication to the Roumanian Commander in Chief to the effect that this proclamation had come to the attention of the Inter-Allied Military Mission and, in order to avoid any misunderstandings, it was desired that instructions be issued immediately so as not to cause trouble with the cars of the various members of the Mission, which would bear either the colors or a miniature flag of the nation represented.

General Mombelli stated that he had sent two letters to Roumanian Headquarters, addressed to General Rudeanu, or whoever was acting in his place, and both have been returned, the Roumanians refusing to sign for same.

September 4, 1919. Last night my little Serbian friend, Doctor Lazar Baitch, called upon me and in his most unctuous and confiding manner imparted the important information that M. Lovászy was now organizing a cabinet to replace the Friedrich cabinet. This was apparently done without any knowledge on Lovászy's part of the Friedrich-Heinrich understanding, and in complete ignorance of the fact that the Mission had telegraphed a list of the Hungarian cabinet for action by the Supreme Council. For some reason or other, the Jugo-Slavs are afraid of the Friedrich régime and are determined to have Lovászy put into office.

Reports are now coming in that the Hungarians in their turn are toying with the truth, and that instead of having less than 10,000 men in their Transdanubian Army under Admiral Horthy, they have practically 38,000 men.

The Inter-Allied Military Mission is altogether too shy on accepting responsibility, has developed to a chronic extent the habit of passing the buck, and seems determined to refer nearly everything to Paris. It would be a fair assumption that the Generals sent down here are presumed to have ordinary human intelligence and to be willing to accept reasonable responsibilities without spouting hot air, going through calisthenic gesticulations, and then referring everything to the Supreme Council. On the other hand, and probably as a result of this passing the buck, the Supreme Council practically pays no attention to whatever is sent them, whether important or otherwise.

Prime Minister Friedrich today submitted a complaint of the attitude of the Roumanian Commander in refusing to allow the publication of proclamations designating September 28, 1919, as election day in all Hungary; the Roumanians reason, and a damned good one, being that as yet the territorial limits of Hungary had not been defined and, furthermore, that the

present government had not been recognized as such by the Entente. Friedrich also complained that the Roumanians would not allow his government to execute death sentences, alleging in this case the latter of the two above reasons. It is no wonder that he is peeved at this action, because, if left to carry it out, he would, in a short time and with all appearance of judicial legality, have been able to rid himself of many of his more dangerous opponents.

This day has really been a Friedrich day, because that gentleman capped the climax by sending information to each member of the Mission that, having heard of the atrocities committed by the White Terror, he had decided to take a special train and go out into the country to investigate. In order to prove the sincerity of his intentions, he invited each General either to accompany him or to send a representative, a like invitation being sent to the Roumanian authorities also. Of course any such investigation committee would run up only against prepared cases, but Friedrich's main object would be accomplished, because if he made a triumphal tour of the country accompanied by representatives of all the Powers, the Hungarians would naturally consider such action as tantamount to recognition.

I put through the Mission, at the session today, at which General Gorton presided, arrangements to place Colonel Yates in charge of the organization of the Hungarian Police along the same lines as the organization of the Hungarian Army with a French officer in charge. By this means, I hope we may be able soon to make progress in the police reorganization.

In regard to the case of the Roumanians holding one of my men several days out in the country, and concerning which I wrote and demanded that they state within thirty-six hours what they had done or intended to do in the case, it should be added that for once they came to time, and an apology was received with assurances that the matter would be immediately investigated and satisfactory action taken.

September 5, 1919. There was very little of importance brought before this morning's session of the Mission, at which General Graziani presided. Letters were sent to the Hungarian cabinet to the effect that this Mission concurred in the Roumanian attitude in regard to the matters presented by M. Friedrich at yesterday's session. A letter was written to the Roumanian Commander in Chief, stating that Colonel H. E. Yates, U.S. A., had been designated by the Mission on a subcommittee for the prompt organization of the police and gendarmerie in Hungary, and requesting that the Roumanian Commander designate some officer as associate to Colonel Yates. A like request will be made to the Hungarians.

Word was received from General Graziani that the Bratiano government in Roumania was about to fall, and that our not overly-bright friend, General Mardarescu, was to be Minister of War in the new cabinet⁽⁴⁾.

Incidentally, I notified the Mission that on Monday next three of my officers and 18 men would leave for Paris and that I could not thereafter furnish any guard at the Royal Palace, as I would have only six men left, whom I needed as orderlies and for ordinary duties.

Last night Colonel Loree, Captain Gore, Lieutenant Hamilton and myself went to the Orpheum Theater as guests of Captain Weiss. The performance began at 5.30 and ended at 9 o'clock, after which we were entertained at dinner in the restaurant attached to the Theater. The whole parquet of the theater was filled with small tables at which the audience could be seated and have tea or dinner served to them, thereby combining two pleasures, that of eating and that of seeing the play. The galleries were arranged in boxes, and along the back walls were likewise placed small tables for two, where meals could be served. The performance was a combination of a comic opera, in three acts, and vaudeville. Some of the singing was excellent and, judging from the applause of the audience, the comedians' jokes must have been of like quality. Besides ourselves at the dinner, Captain Weiss had three or four prominent Hungarians and two of the actresses; one of them accompanied by her husband. The other, after remaining about thirty minutes, said that she had an appointment with her lover, who was becoming insistent, and she must beg to be excused. This one was very pretty, and the other one was very bright. The pretty one spoke beautiful Hungarian, but blended her French and German to such an extent that it was almost impossible to follow her line of talk. The brighter one spoke English, in which she carried on flirtations with four different gentlemen at the same time under her husband's nose, as the latter's specialty in languages was limited to Hungarian.

September 6, 1919. Last night we entertained General Graziani at dinner.

At today's session of the Mission, General Mombelli presided, and there was practically no business except to write a letter to the Roumanians asking them to explain why they had established practically a state of siege in Budapest without advising us of their intentions.

Yesterday afternoon a telegram came from the American Commission, stating that none of my telegrams in regard to the necessity of retaining my detachment had been seen by any member of the Commission, and Mr. Polk⁽⁵⁾

stated that he would do everything possible to arrange matters. Another telegram came, stating that General Connor⁽⁶⁾ had authority to extend the time limit in such cases for a month. My detachment will, therefore, remain at least that much longer.

In view of the fact that there is practically nothing doing, I have arranged to go with Captain Gore to Bucharest. Colonel Yates, the American Attaché to the Roumanian capital, will accompany us and act as our guide and mentor. We plan to leave Budapest at 4 o'clock this date and return about the tenth of September.

September 7, 1919. Colonel Yates, Captain Gore and myself, accompanied by a Roumanian liaison officer, left Budapest on a special car and by special train about 4.30 yesterday afternoon. Our special car was about half the length of an ordinary American car, but was very well fitted out and had all conveniences except those for cooking. I know I slept on a hair mattress, because the hairs pushed up through the mattress, through the sheets and through my pajamas, and could be very distinctly felt. In addition to this, the mattress undoubtedly had a large and animated population. All of my traveling companions reported like experiences. Last night, while traveling through eastern Hungary, we saw large numbers of cars loaded with stuff, all en route to Roumania. We crossed the Szolnok Bridge, which had been originally a large double-tracked structure, but in the course of recent repairs had been left mostly single-tracked. We traveled through long stretches of level land in Transylvania and late in the afternoon got into the foothills of the Carpathians, and finally at 7.15 we arrived at Sinaja, where the summer palace of the King is located. We went direct to the Palace, and found that they had planned to entertain us all night and as long as we could stay. The summer palace of the King is called "Castel Palisor⁽⁷⁾," and is beautifully located in the Carpathian Mountains about seventy-five miles north of Bucharest. There are really two palaces here; one which was built for the former Queen of Roumania, the celebrated Carmen Sylva⁽⁸⁾

and which, although completely furnished, is not occupied by the present King, who instead, with the Royal Family, lives in the palace which was built for him when he was Crown Prince. This is neither so pretentious nor so commodious as the other, but apparently is better adapted to the present needs of the Royal Family. We met His Majesty at dinner about 8.30, and he had me seated at his left. The only other member of the Royal Family present was Prince Nickolai, neither the Queen or any of her daughters appearing during the evening. The King is of medium height with a full-pointed beard, and with a low forehead with the hair starting from not far above the eyes. He speaks English fairly well, although with a peculiar hissing accent.

After dinner, while waiting in the reception room, I talked with the King and other members of his staff, and stated that I hoped to leave early in the morning. His Majesty then asked me if I would not kindly step into his private office for a little conversation, which I did, and he kept me there about an hour and a half during which he went into details of the Roumanian grievances, especially referring to the fact that the Roumanians were considered to be robbers because they were looting Hungary, whereas the Serbs had looted the Bánát and had never been called to account. He also complained that the Serbs had received some of the Danube monitors, whereas Roumania had received nothing. But his main grievance seemed to be due to the "Minorities" clause in the Treaty of Peace⁽⁹⁾ which Roumania was to be called upon to sign⁽¹⁰⁾

. I explained to His Majesty that of course the Inter-Allied Military Mission had nothing to do with any such matters; hat furthermore its instructions were explicit and mandatory, and that we could discuss nothing concerning the same. I assured him that Americans had no ill feeling toward Roumania, and had nothing to gain financially or otherwise in treating her badly. The King then insisted that I remain until noon tomorrow, as the Queen desired to meet me. As a matter of fact, he did not have to insist, because our transportation away from Sinaia was entirely at his disposition, and I could not leave until he saw fit to let me go. I was assigned to a very comfortable suite of rooms and was able to get a good bath, sadly needed after a trip in a Roumanian private car.

September 8, 1919. We reported for breakfast this morning about 8.30, and I met Her Majesty, the Queen, and one of the Royal Princesses. Her Majesty habitually wears the Roumanian peasant costume, which is very becoming, and she is decidedly a handsome woman, showing that she must have been beautiful when younger. The Royal aide-de-camp informed me that I was to sit at breakfast at the left of Madame Lahovary, one of the ladies in waiting. So we entered the dining room in that order. However, immediately after entering, the Queen called out from the head of the table, "General, I want you to sit up by me." So I, in fear and trembling, approached the Royal presence and sat on her left, with the King on her right. Without any preliminaries, Her Majesty turned to me and said, "I didn't know whether I wanted to meet you at all-I have heard many things about you." I replied, "Your Majesty, I am not half so bad as I look, nor one-quarter so bad as you seem to think I am." She smiled and said that the King had told her that I wasn't exactly a heathen, so she had decided really to form my acquaintance. We spent a very pleasant time at the breakfast table, in which considerable repartee was indulged in, despite the Royal presences.

After breakfast we went out into the garden and I told Madame Lahovary that it was very apparent that the Inter-Allied Military Mission did not stand very high in Roumania. She said, "We have always heard that the four generals were very fine." I asked her if she hadn't heard that the American actually wore horns, or at least was somewhat of a devil. She said, hardly that, but that they had heard that the American representative was very difficult to handle.

After a little time in the garden, Captain Gore and myself took a long walk exploring the grounds about both the palaces, did some writing and had lunch about one o'clock. This time the King and Queen, instead of sitting at the end of the table, sat opposite each other at the middle. I was placed on the Queen's right, with the senior Roumanian General⁽¹¹⁾

, who it is understood will be the next prime minister, on her left. His Majesty had the Royal Princess on his right and Madame Lahovary on his left. During the conversation the Queen said that she felt keenly over the fact that Roumania had fought as an ally and was now being treated as an enemy; that all Roumania had been pillaged by the Huns, and why shouldn't they now retaliate and steal from Hungary, saying, "You may call it stealing if you want to, or any other name. I feel that we are perfectly entitled to do what we want to." The King butted into the conversation and said that anyway the Roumanians had taken no food stuffs. As it is bad form to call a king a liar, I simply informed His Majesty that he was badly mistaken, and that I could give him exact facts in regard to thousands of carloads of foodstuffs that had been taken out of Budapest alone. Her Majesty complained also that a Reparation Board had been appointed to investigate and look in Bulgaria for property that she had looted from other countries, and that all the Allies had been represented on this Board except Roumania. She added that similar action had been taken in regard to the German indemnification. It was apparent that all the Roumanians are rankling, whether justly or no, under a sense of injustice, and they insist on stating, and may be believing, that their present war with Hungary is separate and distinct from the big War, and entitles them to first choice of everything in the country.

After leaving the luncheon table, we spent a considerable time in the reception room, during which Her Majesty and I had much conversation usually on general lines and, when I explained to her that we were leaving early that afternoon, she said that now she would retain recollections of a very pleasant gentleman⁽¹²⁾, and added that she desired to give me one of her photographs, so that, whenever I felt hard towards the Roumanians, I could look at that, and she hoped it would make me feel more kindly. She then went upstairs herself and soon brought me down an autographed photograph. We then sent for my two orderlies, who were presented to the Queen, and could do nothing but stammer and say, "Yes, Ma'm" and "No, Ma'm."

We finally left Castel Palisor by automobile, with Colonel Yates, at 4.30. The first part of the trip down the mountains was very beautiful, but we soon struck a flat country through the oil Section of Roumania, and arrived in Bucharest at 7.30 P.M., completely covered with dust and pretty well tired out. Colonel Yates went to his quarters, as he is American Military Attaché at Bucharest; Captain Gore went to a hotel with the orderlies, and I went to the American Legation where I was guest of our Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Schoenfeld.

September 9, 1919. After a delightful night's rest at the American Legation and a fine American breakfast, I went with Mr. Schoenfeld, and, by appointment, called upon the Prime Minister, M. Bratiano⁽¹³⁾

, at 9.30 at his home. He received us very pleasantly, and after I had told him that I had come to get in closer personal touch with the Roumanian leaders, feeling that I could thereby more clearly visualize the situation, he launched into his tale of woe, which in more detail was the same as that of the King and Queen, but which included quite a lengthy history of Roumania. He stated first, however, that he was pleased to have an opportunity to meet me as an American, who would probably have influence with the American government, and he stated that he deplored the fact that the United States was so far away as to be in pretty general ignorance of Roumania and things Roumanian. He added that it was unfortunate that the American officers sent there after the War had been selected from those who had formerly been in Roumania, and who had not liked the country. He took up the question of Roumanian grievances in general, and in particular inveighed against the "Minorities Clause" in the Treaty, explaining that some fifty years ago, as a result of the pogroms in Russia, a great Jewish migration to Roumania had taken place; that these immigrants belonged entirely to the middle classes, without trades or professions, and came into a country where commerce had hitherto been almost nonexistent. In the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the Powers had imposed upon Roumania certain conditions in regard to the Jews, but that when Roumania bought over the railroads which had been built by German capital, these restrictions had been removed, and Roumania was left as independent as any other nation. He added that the Jewish question was not the only one concerning the "Minorities"; that they had acquired about one million Transylvanians, as well as many Bulgarians and Slavs, by their recent acquisition of territory, and that he felt it was administratively wrong to have these "Minorities" come into a government without any obligation on their part of assimilating themselves to the new nation, but on the other hand with a feeling that they were being protected, in any opposition they might make, by the strong powers. He considered it to be the part of wisdom to allow the Jews and others perfect liberty, but that no independent and sovereign state could accept the conditions which were being imposed on Roumania. He complained that General Smuts had been sent on his fruitless errand to Budapest⁽¹⁴⁾

without informing the Roumanians, who could at the time plainly have told the Allies the uselessness of such a procedure. M. Bratiano said in conclusion that he had hoped the war would equalize all nations that had participated among the Allies, although he could understand why countries like Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, just recently emerging from vassalage, should be treated somewhat differently from the others. He excused himself then, stating that his wife was coming by train, that he was obliged to meet her, and asked if he could not see me again in the after-noon. It was arranged that he call at the American Legation at 5 o'clock. This he did, almost on the dot, and without preamble resumed the discussion where he left off. He first explained how Roumania had been guaranteed by Germany all of the territorial acquisition she has acquired, but that nevertheless she joined the Allies, who had failed to keep their promises to her in regard to war material, as well as to the strategic arrangements for launching an attack from Salonika synchronously with the Roumanian offensive. As a result, the Roumanians were obliged to meet forty-two German divisions, and were gradually forced to evacuate their country. After the Armistice, he stated, the Roumanians, when told to stop at their proper boundary, had done so; that they had not attacked the Hungarians, but that they (the Hungarians), after being recalled from their attack on the Czecho-Slovaks, had attacked her, and the result was of course a violation of the Armistice, and therefore the present was an entirely different war from the Great War. He explained that he knew it had been Béla Kun's intention to create an ocean of Bolshevism in eastern Europe, which would afterwards inundate Italy and western Europe, and he felt that Roumania had saved civilization from Bolshevism. He stated that Roumanian action in Hungary was an action similar in every respect to that of every other victorious army. She was short of rolling stock and very naturally took it where she found it; that this rolling stock was indispensable to her life in the coming fall and winter, and that she had no alternative. I then explained to M. Bratiano that any statements I might make were purely personal, although I felt that my colleagues shared my opinion. I then recounted to His Excellency several cases of a total lack of coöperation on the part of the Roumanians and also several instances in which they had told the Mission untruths, among which I gave instances of requisitioning supplies not needed for troops in the field, which General Mardarescu had stated was the only cause for requisition. I also called attention to the fact that General Mardarescu had said that the Roumanians were not occupying western Hungary, whereas they were in many of the towns, and had been interning Hungarian officers and officials. I explained to M. Bratiano that above all it was necessary to organize a police force and an army in Hungary, and that the Roumanians should with the least possible delay evacuate western Hungary, Budapest and then eastern Hungary by successive zones, according to the plans of the Inter-Allied Military Mission. His Excellency said he was willing to do all this on one condition, namely, that the Roumanians be secure from Hungarian attack. I replied to him that of course nothing of this could be done until the evacuation began, and that if this took place I would be glad to recommend to my colleagues, who in turn could recommend to the Supreme Council, that the Hungarians be instructed not to attack the Roumanians under such circumstances. This seemed to impress His Excellency favorably, and he said he would be glad to act in accordance with those plans. After mutual expressions of pleasure at our personal acquaintance, we separated after a two-hour conversation. On both occasions after our interviews with M. Bratiano, Mr. Schoenfeld and I went to his office, a stenographer was called in, and he repeated from memory our entire conversation. This was reduced to memorandum form and signed by both of us.

About 11.30 o'clock in the forenoon, accompanied by Colonel Yates, I called upon Lieutenant-General Vaitojano, the Minister of War, and we held a conversation, all of the points of which had been covered in my talk with their Majesties and subsequently in my talk with the Prime Minister.

After lunch, I took Captain Gore, and we explored the city of Bucharest, returning in time to go with Mr. Schoenfeld to tea at the British Embassy. Here I found Mr. Rattigan⁽¹⁵⁾, the British Chargé d'Affaires, and his very charming wife. The relations between the British and the American Chargés d'Affaires are along the same satisfactory lines as those of General Gorton and myself

In the evening, Captain Gore and myself dined at the American Legation and retired early to bed to get in shape for our start tomorrow.

September 10, 1919. We left Bucharest about 8 although the train was scheduled to leave at 7.30. My private car and the first-class coach assigned to the orderlies and the Roumanian liaison officer, were attached to the Simplon Express, which took six and three-quarter hours to reach Sinaja, the same distance we had covered by automobile two days earlier in three hours. Fortunately on this train we were able to get our meals in a dining car, although, as there was no train corridor, we were obliged to make connections at station stops.

September 11, 1919. Our special car was detached from the Simplon Express at Arad, and from there we went as a special train across the Szolnok Bridge to Budapest, where we arrived at 12.15. After lunch, I went to the office and found that the American Commission had been very much, and in my opinion, unnecessarily, exercised over my having gone to Bucharest. I found two telegrams -one asking me to delay my departure and the other suggesting that I engage in no diplomatic discussions. I immediately sent them a long code message descriptive of everything that had been said and done, explaining that I had understood when in Paris that I could make a trip to Bucharest whenever I thought it advisable, but nevertheless I regretted having done so without having obtained specific permission. As a matter of fact, the permission probably would not have come and I would not have had a trip which I know resulted in much good. While in Bucharest, Mr. Schoenfeld told me that conditions in Roumania, as far as Americans were concerned, were worse than rotten. Apparently the French who felt that Roumania came within their sphere of influence and in anticipation of possible rivals, had done everything they could to make the Roumanians dislike the Americans. This was frequently referred to in my conversations with the high officials, and Mr. Schoenfeld told me when I left that in all the time he had been in Roumania, he had never seen M. Bratiano so pleasant and affable as he was with me, and that never before had he made a two-hour call. He said that, on the contrary, the gentlemen in question had been most haughty and arrogant towards all Americans⁽¹⁶⁾.

During the afternoon I called upon Generals Gorton, Mombelli, and Graziani, and read them the entire memoranda which had been dictated by Mr. Schoenfeld covering our interview with M. Bratiano.

September 12, 1919. On account of my previous absence, I was President of the Day at the session this morning, at which the Mission unanimously approved all that I had done in Bucharest. About 10.30, Genrals Mardarescu and Holban and M. Diamandi were presented and, after being photographed and cinematographed with them in the courtyard, we returned to the council room for business. I brought up, as urgent, the police question, during which we showed that that officer and gentleman, General Holban, had lied about the arms question. He had originally said that he could easily furnish 4,000 pistols for the Hungarian police, while he now maintained that it would be necessary to get these pistols from the Hungarians. Before finishing this question, our friend Diamandi asked that it be laid on the table to make way for other important matters. He first stated that the Roumanians did not agree with the Mission that nothing should be taken from the museums, adding that Roumania had now Transylvania and was therefore entitled to such portions of the museums as belonged to Transylvania. General Mombelli had quite a little set-to with his rotund Excellency, who then again changed the subject and stated that Roumanians had unearthed a terrible Hungarian conspiracy which, disguised as an anti-Bolshevist proposition, was really also aimed at the Roumanian Army of Occupation. Our hirsute friend Holban then produced a bundle of documents that would have filled a cart, and proceeded to give us the horrible details. The noon hour, however, arrived before he had finished his song and, as we had all been invited to attend the Roumanian review of a division, we adjourned to meet again tomorrow.

We plowed our way through clouds of dust out to the review field, and saw what was supposed to be a division of about 10,000 men. By careful count and close approximation, I figured that this division was less than 5,000 men and therefore not much larger than an American war-strength infantry regiment. As the distances between the units of this division were so great that it looked as though the review would last all afternoon, I excused myself at 1.30 and left with Colonel Yates and Colonel Loree. I also noted that some units passed in review twice.

During the afternoon, my little friend, the Serbian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Doctor Lazar Baitch, called upon me, apparently to give me some information, but really to find out what I had been doing in Bucharest. Before leaving, he had given a little more than he had received.

At 8.30, accompanied by Colonel Loree, I attended gorgeous spread at the Hotel Gellért, as the guest of the Roumanian Headquarters. General Mombelli and some of his officers were also in attendance.

September 13, 1919. It seems good to be back again where fruit has some flavor. The muskmelons of Hungary being delicious, we naturally thought that those of Roumania would be likewise and, as they were exceedingly cheap, we bought from the car window about dozen fine-looking melons which we thought would be a good investment. After opening all twelve, one at time, we discovered that the Roumanian melons are about as juicy as a can of oatmeal, and have the flavor an immature pumpkin. In fact everything Roumanian makes a sad comparison with Hungarian equivalents. The city of Bucharest compared to Budapest would be like a tadpole by the side of a rainbow trout. At the meeting this morning, General Graziani presided, and our Roumanian friends showed up, as usual, about twenty minutes late. The bewhiskered Holban started to make excavations in his mountain of documents in proof of the Hungarian conspiracy, which I endured for about half an hour, and then told the Mission I saw no reason why we should waste our time hearing all proof of something that was already known exist, but which did not prove that there had been any conspiracy directed against the Roumanians. Little Diamandi then put up the proposition that, because Friedrich, the Hungarian Prime Minister, was directly implicated in this affair, they could now handle him as they saw fit; that whether it were a conspiracy or not, the meeting and the organization were certainly in contravention of Roumanian orders and regulations. He wanted to know whether or not the Mission desired to get rid of Friedrich. Apparently the Roumanians do, anyway. He thought it would not do to arrest and make martyrs of any of the ministers, but he could put sentinels over all the offices and prevent their entering, and he desired to know whether or not the Mission wished this done. He said that in view of the imminent departure of the Roumanians from Hungary and the length of time it would take to get a reply from Paris, they must have an immediate affirmative or negative answer. We cleared the council room, said good-bye to our Roumanian guests, and then held a closed meeting. I stated that ever since we had been on this duty, we had tried to get the Roumanians to expedite matters, but never before had they been in any hurry. I added that in view of the fact that they were going to dine with me tonight, and that I was going to dine with General Holban and others tomorrow night, and that the Roumanians were going to dine with the British Monday night, they apparently could not leave before Tuesday, and we could certainly get a telegram to Paris and a reply before that date. I said that invariably when we put anything up to the Roumanians, they said they would have to telegraph to Bucharest and get a reply. I said that their threat of immediate departure was simply a bluff. The Mission was unanimously of the opinion. So we drafted a telegram along these lines be sent to the Supreme Council this date. The Roumanians stated that the Mackensen material, which is located south of Pressburg, instead of consisting of 4,200 carloads, is now understood to consist of 10,000 carloads. It was noted in General Holban's report of the dangerous anti-Bolshevism organization that this organization was composed of 10,000 ex-soldiers and 13,000 civilians, with 600 mixed arms for the whole 23,000, most of the arms being sabers.

September 14, 1919. I spent all the morning in my office working, but at noon I was interrupted by Colonel Yates, who insisted that I accompany him and a party Hungarian nobility to a lunch on one of the high hills overlooking Budapest, and then go to the races. I went to the lunch and rather enjoyed it because the party of Hungarians, who were the Colonel's guests, could all speak English. I afterwards went for a while it to the races, over a miserable dusty road, and didn't enjoy myself at all.

Last evening I entertained at dinner M. Diamandi, General Mardarescu, General Holban, and General Sorbescu, who is in charge of Roumanian requisitions. We gave them a sumptuous feast, after which they parted, more or less mellow and verging on the affectionate.

September 15, 1919. At our session this morning, General Mombelli presided and we were not afflicted by the presence of any heel-clicking Roumanians. After discussing the matter, we decided to send a telegram to the Supreme Council to the effect that, despite our repeated and strenuous efforts to start the organization of a police force and an army for the maintenance of order in the interior on the evacuation by the Roumanians, we had been able to accomplish practically nothing, all due to the fact that our so-called allies not only disregarded all of our requests and instructions, but that they constantly were placing stumblingblocks in our way; adding that the Roumanians were giving as a reason for their delay in helping the police their lack of confidence in the government of Prime Minister Friedrich. We also stated that there were strong rumors to the effect that the Roumanians intended to leave Hungary on short notice, in hopes that such disorder would ensue that they would be promptly requested to return.

In the afternoon, three of the new ministers of the Hungarian cabinet called upon me, and I told them all practically the same thing; that they themselves were to blame for the unfortunate condition in which Hungary found herself; that it was all due to the fact that they had allowed Bolshevism to take root and spread over the country for a period of several months; that, if Bolshevism had not been allowed, there would have been no Roumanians; but, as there was no use crying over spilt milk, it was now up to them to make the best of their horrible situation and show the world that, should the Roumanians evacuate precipitately, Hungary was still able to demonstrate that she possessed civilization to an extent that would not admit of her again falling into the abysm of Bolshevism. I also advised them to be careful about allowing their reactionaries to go beyond reasonable limits. I added that though I sympathized with men of education, refinement and means, whose comfortable homes had been taken charge of by a lot of anarchists, and whose families had been confined to one or two rooms and forced live in close contact with a lot of filthy, ignorant and fanatical Bolshevists, this was no reason why they should not handle the situation with decency and decorum.

On Saturday, a Colonel Nathan Horowitz reported me, despite the fact that I had previously telegraphed in code to Paris that it was inadvisable to send an officer of Jewish faith to Hungary at this time. In writing General Bliss about the matter, I explained to him that although all Bolshevists were not Jews nor were all Jews Bolshevists, nevertheless Béla Kun, the Hungarian Bolshevist leader, practically all his lieutenants, and most of his followers, were Jews, and as a result the people of Hungary were simply furious and determined to rid themselves of the Semitic influence.

We have also heard reports about the Hungarians arting pogroms in several places.

The following is a copy of a letter which has been received from General Bliss⁽¹⁷⁾

and which is one of the most encouraging things I have had since arriving here:

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Hotel de Crillon, Paris

My dear Bandholtz: September 4, 1919.

I take advantage of the fact that an officer is leaving here tonight for Trieste and thence to Budapest to send you this hasty line.

First of all I want to tell you how very much pleased the entire Commission here is at the splendid work you have been doing in Budapest. By word of mouth from various sources we have full confirmation of what appears in your own reports, namely, that you have been working in full accord with your British colleague even though the representatives of other nations may not have shown the same spirit of cooperation. We have every reason to think that you are the strong man of the Mission. It is to be regretted, - but it cannot be helped, of course, - that your hard and excellent work has not been more fruitful in making our Roumanian friends work inside the traces. Today (I think) Sir George Clerk, one of Mr. Balfour's personnel, leaves for the purpose of delivering in person to the Roumanian Government a final note of the Allied and Associated Powers. If this is not promptly effective and if the Entente then shows inability or unwillingness to apply further pressure upon the Roumanians, I think it very likely that our Government may relieve you from the Mission of Generals at Budapest, although it may leave you there as an independent observer. We all think that the time has come to make everybody in Europe understand that if they expect further coopertion and assistance from the United States they must play the ame properly or we will show them at once that we intend to withdraw completely and leave them to their own resources.

I have been trying to get for you an automobile in anticipation of those which have been ordered to be sent to you from the Morgenthau Mission in Poland. Unfortunately, the American Delegation has none that it can send. All of ours have belonged to the American Army and have been sold to the French, and as rapidly as we have no use for one here it has to be turned in to the latter government. But Captain Smythe, who arrived here yesterday with dispatches from Budapest, told me that your own automobile and chauffeur were, as he understands, here and doing nothing. I asked him to go at once and see the proper officer and tell him that it was most desirable that this be at once made available for you. Captain Smythe said that if he could get it he would himself drive the machine Budapest. In that case I will have time to send you a further and fuller letter.

Meanwhile, I again congratulate you for myself and the American Mission for the excellent work you have been doing in Budapest, I remain

Cordially yours,

(Signed) Tasker H. Bliss

Last night we entertained Baron Jean de Cnobloch, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German-Austrian Republic, at dinner.

During the evening, General Gorton came over and informed me that Baron Perényi had been to see him tell him that he had been approached by the Roumanians with a view of being Prime Minister of a new cabinet, and that they had offered to return to Hungary all the stuff they had removed on condition of certain territorial and other concessions. Baron Perényi was told that he would be a fool to pay attention to any such propositions, that Hungary in the past as her history proved, had suffered far more than at present and had nevertheless risen above her ruins, that it would be foolish for any of them to consider any offer the Roumanians might make, and that he as a man of intelligence ought to know that the Roumanians would not return one-tenth, if any, of what they had taken away. I sent a telegram immediately to the American Commission, advising them of the information we had acquired, and also stating that the evening paper, which is under the control of the Roumanians, had stated that the Friedrich cabinet had fallen and that the Perényi cabinet had taken its place. There was, however, no confirmation of this up to noon today.

September 16, 1919. General Gorton left this morning to go out and inspect Admiral Horthy's white army at Siófok, so I was President of the Day one day in advance of my turn.

A letter was read from the French postal authorities requesting the Hungarian government to make postal arrangements between the two countries, and this was given to the French representative as being a matter peculiarly his own.

We had many unimportant letters submitted, among them a plea from a bunch of Hungarian suffragettes. This was tabled.

I repeated to the Mission the gist of the conversation I had held yesterday with various cabinet officials, and then read them the report from Major Borrow, the British officer, who is watching the bridge across the Theiss River. He reports that up to date the following as been sent across that river: 684 locomotives, 231 saloon and private cars, 946 passenger coaches, 2,900 empty box and flat cars, 1,300 mixed carloads of grain, cattle, etc., 1,300 carloads of munitions, 298 cannon, 3 autos, 56 aeroplanes, 1,400 oil tanks, 2,000 carloads of railway material and agricultural machinery, 1,435 of war material, 4,350 contents not visible; also many miscellaneous cars, making a total of 17,319 locomotives and cars.

Just as we were adjourning, a Roumanian colonel came in and stated that they had located another depot of Mackensen supplies, and he was authorized to return there with his committee, investigate and make report.

This afternoon M. Diamandi called upon me and showed me a telegram from the Roumanian Prime Minister, stating that His Majesty, the King of Roumania, had conferred upon me the Grand Cross of the Roumanian Crown, and that the same would be rewarded without delay. His Excellency denied the reports that were current, to the effect that the Roumanians were evacuating the country, but told me confidentially that he had decided to give rifles to the municipal police of Budapest.

This afternoon the Hungarian liaison official, M. Pekár, came in to protest against the increasing Roumanian seizures, and I told him if he had any small and valuable articles, he could bring them to my office. In the evening, we had Count von Edeisheim, his wife and daughter to dinner with us, and found them to be very charming. During the month we have occupied their house, we have seen practically nothing of them, although they have lived all the time in the back portion of the building.

September 17, 1919. This morning I sent for Colonel Horowitz and had one of the head porters, who belongs to the Royal Palace guard, brought in under the charge of having denied admittance to a person who wanted to see Colonel Horowitz, giving as his reason that the latter was a Jew. He tearfully denied this and the matter was dropped.

General Gorton being absent on his inspection trip of Admiral Horthy's army, General Graziani presided at the Mission's session. I first brought up before the Mission the question of having someone sent to identify museum property which the Roumanians desire to remove, and which action had been requested by General Serbescu. The Mission decided that, in view of the fact that the Roumanians had been told to take nothing, there was no reason why a representative should be sent.

I also informed the Mission what M. Diamandi had said yesterday in denial of the reported evacuation of the country by the Roumanians.

General Graziani read a telegram from M. Clemenceau, gain giving us the already oft-repeated instructions not to mix in the internal affairs of Hungary, but directing us to urge upon both Hungarians and Roumanians the necessity of immediately organizing a gendarmerie.

I then submitted to the Mission the Hungarian financial question, which is getting into acute stages, and which shows that our Roumanian allies have business ideas which would do credit to the Buccaneer Morgan. While the Bolshevists were in power, they issued three and one-half billion kronen worth of money, which, on acount of its color, has been called white money. Previous to this, the paper currency of all Austro-Hungary was blue in color, so this currency which is still being used in Austria, Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia, is called blue money. At the present time, one krone of blue money is worth five kronen of white money. Our good friends, the French, looking out for their own interests, obliged the Hungarian government to pay three hundred thousand kronen blue money for the same sum of white money in the hands of French subjects. As a result the Roumanians then promptly came forward with the demand that the Hungarians give them tenty million kronen in blue money for that amount white money. This was finally agreed to, partly because it was hoped thereby to give the Roumanians only blue money with which to make payment whenever they paid at all. As matters resulted, however, this was only an opening wedge, and the Roumanians demand today that they receive immediately fifty milion kronen blue money for that sum in white money,and that within three weeks they receive a total of one hundred and fifty million kronen of blue money for that amount of white money. If this is done, they will undoubtedly continue the procedure, because a man could start out with a few kronen of white money and by a rapid succession of changes make himself a millionaire in a few days. We protested to the Roumanian Headquarters against their thievish propensities, and I reported the matter to the American Commission in Paris.

This date Captain Shafroth reported. and I assigned him to duty with Colonel Loree.

This afternoon when returning to the office from lunch, Colonel Loree and I found a whole company of Roumanian soldiers with their guns on their backs, milling up the entrance to the Palace courtyard. Without any preamble, I took my riding crop in hand and, ably seconded by Colonel Loree, we expelled the intruders into the street outside of the Palace entrance. I then inquired if there was a Roumanian officer about, and they said he had gone into the Palace. I chased him up, dragged him up to my office and asked him what the Hell he meant by insulting the Inter-Allied Military Mission by bringing a whole company of armed soldiers into our precincts. He stated at first that he had heard that there were subterranean passages in the Palace which he wished to explore, and later changed that to saying that he had heard of the Palace and wished his soldiers to see it before they left. I told him that Roumanians would hardly expect a company of American, British or French troops to go over to Genral Mardarescu's Headquarters and, without saying a word to him, proceed to explore the premises. I further informed him that he had committed a serious and gross breach of etiquette, and that we couldn't let one Roumanian company in here without letting the whole army come in, which we did not propose to do. He was most abject, in his apologies and beat it.

This afternoon, accompanied by Colonel Yates, I paid calls upon the new Roumanian Commander for Budapest, General Mosoiu, upon General Holban, who just being relieved from command of Budapest; and upon General Serbescu, who has charge of the requisitions. We were so fortunate as to find that General Josoiu was sick in bed and could not be seen, and the other two were out.

This evening we entertained at dinner Colonel Horowitz, of the regular Army, Captain Weiss, who has just been demobilized, and Mr. Zerkowitz, the Hungarian gentleman who has been acting as my guide and mentor as regards relations with Hungarians in the city.

September 18, 1919. At this morning's session, General Gorton presided, and I related to the Mission my experience of the day before, in having, accompanied by Colonel Loree, assaulted a company of Roumanian infantry with riding crops and driven them out of the Palace courtyard.

A communication was read from the Swiss consul describing the horrible condition of Hungarian prisoners of war left in charge of the Roumanians in their prison camps.

A report was read from the British officer, Major Borrow, which showed that, up to date, 759 locomotives and 18,495 cars had crossed the Theiss River eastward bound, since we had been able to keep track of them. The total cars reported missing by the Hungarians amount to over 31,000. Major Borrow also showed that, within the past week, twenty-one troop trains had crossed the Szolnok Bridge and seventeen troop trains, containing a division of cavalry, had crossed the Csongrád Bridge, all headed towards Roumania. Everything indicates that our noble Roumanian allies intend actually to pull out of all of Hungary except Budapest and a thin line some distance west of the Danube. This will enable them to prevent any reorganization of the Hungarian police or Army, and will carry out their apparent design of leaving Hungary like a beautiful rosy-cheeked apple, but rotten at the core.

Colonel Yates was brought into the Mission, and from a memorandum showed how the Roumanians had practically done nothing along the line of police organizaticn except to turn loose the usual supply of broken promises. Things have all along been in such a rotten condition that no superlatives can do the subject justice. The Mission finally decided to send again for the Roumanian Commander in Chief to appear before us tomorrow at 10 o'clock, to answer affirmatively or negatively a few questions which will be propounded to him.

I received a telegram from the American Commison in Paris, wanting to know if newspaper reports the effect that Italy and Germany were mixed up a deal with Roumania and Hungary were true. I replied that the same rumors had come to my knowledge, but that they were not verified, had not yet been proved to be true, and therefore I had not inflicted them upon my superiors.

Apparently the opera season is on, and I received tickets for the Royal box, to hold twelve occupants, with additional boxes for twenty-four more. They run their shows and operas from 6 in the afternoon till about 8, after which the audience can go to dinner.

A report came in today that a French major had gone to the State Railway's offices and demanded a report in regard to the management and expenses of the railway for the past year. As the Hungarians were not certain whether this was the individual action of the French or the joint action of the Mission, they sent up here to ascertain, and we told them that no such action had been taken by the Mission. I reported the matter to Paris.

At the present rate of Roumanian seizures of cars, this country, with 6,000 kilometers of railroads, will have only 4,500 cars available. As it takes 4,000 a day feed Budapest alone, which contains one-fifth of the population of Hungary, it is not difficult to imagine hat the result will be when winter sets in.

September 19, 1919. Last night, accompanied by my staff, I attended the opera, occupying the Royal box. As a matter of fact, I had three of these boxes, all of which were turned over to me -myself and staff occupying the center one and soldiers of my detachment occupying the others. After the Opera, Captain Gore and I attended a dinner party at the house of Captain Weiss's brother. There was too much to eat and the rooms were stuffy, so we did not stay overly late.

This morning we had a prolonged and hot session of the Mission, with General Mombelli presiding. He first read a memorandum of questions he proposed to propound to the Roumanians, covering the question of when they were going to evacuate, when they were going to organize the police, and a few other things, which sounded most preemptory in character, especially when accompanied by his flashing eyes and resounding fist. As given to us, it was an oriental typhoon, compared to the gentle little zephyr with which he turned it loose on them when they arrived later, which they did at 10.20 A.M., as usual twenty minutes late.

When directly informed that we knew that at least two divisions of Roumanian troops had already left Hungary, General Mardarescu admitted it and went one more, saying that two infantry divisions and one cavalry division had already left; and it was not a case of evacuation of Hungary, but that these troops were being sent to the Bánát, where they were concentrating in considerable force to avoid possible trouble. He said that this was not to be interpreted as a beginning of the Roumanian evacuation, and that whenever they begin to evacuate, he would notify us in regard to same and keep us posted daily.

It was next pointed out to General Mardarescu that, on the twenty-fifth of August, they were requested to evacuate the country west of the Danube and that they replied then that they would take it under immediate consideration, but that so far nothing had been done. General Mardarescu stated that he wanted to be sure the Hungarians would not attack him, and he could not withdraw until he was positive in this respect. This made me un peu fatigué, and I told him, that, as a soldier, he should know that the troops that had west of the Danube, scattered as they were, were in far more danger of an attack from the Hungarians than they could possibly be if withdrawn to east side of the Danube and the Budapest bridgehead. General Mombelli then proposed that our committee which is working on the organization of the army, investigate conditions in the zone occupied by Hungarian troops and report upon the same, so that General Mardarescu could know whether or not his organized and valiant army, of which he so loudly boasted, was in danger from about ten thousand poorly-armed Hungarians. It was finally agreed, by both the Mission and the Roumanians, that steps should be taken immediately towards the Organization of a Hungarian army consisting of two divisions and some auxiliary troops, to a total number of 12,500. The police question was then taken up, and considerable discussion ensued. Colonel Yates had insisted on 22,000 police, and the Roumanians were willing to give only 10,000. Finally, however, they agreed to turn over to us, the Inter-Allied Military Mission, 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns for us to deal out to the police when we saw fit, and with the understanding that a provisional gendarmerie of 10,000 men might be started.

M. Diamandi then brought up the question of Hungarian prisoners of war. He said that they had 27,000 Hungarian prisoners of war, many of whom had been formerly Bolshevists, and whom, of course, they would not care to take back to Roumania with them. He made the point that, in case they were turned over to the Hungarian government, the latter would be given an opportunity to persecute and probably execute great numbers on account of their having belonged to the Bolshevist army, whereas their service had been entirely compulsory. It was decided to discuss this matter at further length later on.

M. Diamandi then stated that the Hungarian government had applied for authority to issue fifty million kronen in small notes, depositing as security an equal sum of large notes. I opposed this on two points: the first being that there was no government as yet recognized, so that the issue would not be legal; and the second being that, even if there were, there would be nothing to prevent their shortly after turning loose the fifty million on deposit and thereby again depreciating the currency. It was decided not to allow the Hungarians to make any such issue.

M. Diamandi showed a telegram from Roumanian headquarters directing him to investigate in the case child mortality, saying that it was understood that e Roumanians had been held responsible for deaths infants in hospitals. I reminded my colleagues of hat had been brought before them at one of our earliest sessions. M. Diamandi said that they had letters from the hospitals saying that all these reports had been unfounded. It was then proposed to send a committee consisting of a French doctor and an Italian doctor, but I insisted on including an American officer.

M. Diamandi then showed a memorandum stating at several wagonloads of Roumanian documents, seized and removed to Budapest by the Hungarians, were in the cellars of the Palace. It was decided to instigate this.

The question of a probable shortage of cars, resulting from the excessive Roumanian demands, was then ought up and given to the Roumanian officials, who promised to investigate this immediately.

They started to leave us, but I insisted on settling the question about the evacuation of western Hungary, and we actually split on this, the Frenchman and the Italian thinking that this could be discussed later, and General Gorton and myself insisting that it be done at once.

As they started to leave again, a note was brought to me from Colonel Loree to the effect that the Roumanians had demanded that the Hungarians turn over them, before 5 o'clock this afternoon, one hundred millions worth of blue kronen for a like sum of white kronen, threatening to revoke the decree which had placed the two at the rate of five white for one blue, unless this demand was complied with. General Mardarescu stated that the facts were that some time ago the Hungarians offered to replace one hundred million of white money, then in the hands of the Roumanians, by blue money, provided they were allowed to import ihree hundred million kronen of blue money from Vienna. This was done and they now tried to avoid keeping their bargain.

After they left and we were alone, I told the Mission that I wanted them to understand exactly where they stood on the evacuation question; that I did not and would not agree with them; that I felt sure that they were wrong, although I might be the one in error. I said it had taken the Roumanians since August 25 to arrive at no decision whatever, and now we were giving them another delay for like purpose. I added that we were all supposed to be officers of common sense and experience, and not one of them could look me in the eye and say that there was a particle of danger to the Roumanians, should they evacuate western Hungary, but on the contrary that it would add to their security. They could not do it. I then added that, so far, the Mission had been unanimous, but now we appeared as a divided house before the Roumanians. They then proposed writing a letter to the Roumanians again calling upon them to evacuate western Hungary. As they looked like licked dogs with their tails stuck between their legs, I let it go at this, and we therefore decided to send our third ultimatum on is subject. This ultimatum business is getting to be quite a habit.

Reports from western Hungary indicate all kinds of atrocities on the part of the Hungarians, who are torturing and butchering the Jews, and having their will on the population. These people down in eastern and central Europe would make Ananias look like George Washington.

In the afternoon I called upon M. Diamandi and, during the conversation, he asked my advice as to what they should do in regard to the Friedrich cabinet. I told him that in my opinion any form of persecution usually resulted in making martyrs of the victims, and at any persecution of Friedrich would result only in his increased popularity.

This evening, Captain Gore and I were entertained dinner by Admiral Sir Ernest T. Troubridge, the her guests being the Roumanian Chief of Staff, Co1onel Vasilescu, a fine fellow, and his French wife.

September 20, 1919. Today being the grand Italian national holiday, General Mombelli appeared all dol led with his various decorations, medals, etc., and our meeting did not last long. As a matter of fact, it never does when I am President of the Day, which I was today.

We first considered several questions which had been left over from yesterday's meeting, including the money question and the handling of prisoners of war. This all brought about a discussion on the present seriousness of the situation, and I insisted that the time had come for us to lay before the Supreme Council in unmistakable terms the necessity for recognizing some form of government in Hungary. My colleagues agreed to this and I drafted a telegram of which the following is the substance:

Unless there is quickly organized in Hungary some government which is recognized by the Entente, the situation will with increasing rapidity, as winter approaches, get worse. The Military Mission cannot carry out plans for the reorganization of the Hungarian gendarmerie and police, for the release of Hungarian prisoners of war, and for the evacuation of Hungary, with a government which has no standing. Furthermore, such a government cannot carry out satisfactory financial transactions, as it properly has no authority to levy or collect taxes; such a government cannot contract for future delivery of fuel and food supplies for the winter, without which disorder and dire suffering are certain to ensue; and such a government cannot make a treaty of peace or perform any of the various functions necessary to a sovereign state. At the present rate of progress, the Roumanians will continue indefinitely with their occupation and attendant looting in which they are daily becoming more expert. The Hungarians, on the other hand, are becoming more and more discouraged and famine, suffering and disorder are approaching. It is recommended that either the Friedrich cabinet be recognized or that explicit instructions be given as to what will be recognized.

The Roumanians are continuing right merrily with their looting, and we have already scheduled over 800 locomotives and 19,000 cars which they have removed.

This morning several letters came in from Roumanian Headquarters, stating that they had located various papers and documents in government offices and in the cellars of the Palace, which had been taken from Roumania by the Austro-Germans, and which they desired to have returned, This was the first time so far that they have proceeded along such polite lines.

September 22, 1919. At our meeting this morning, the cat came out of the bag with a loud yowl. I again brought up the subject of the Roumanian delay in evacuating Transdanubia and told my Latin colleagues that I considered that their yielding to the Roumanian asinine demand, that they defer any evacuation until was shown that there was no danger from a Hungarian attack, made this Mission responsible for a continuation of the present rotten conditions in western Hungary with all of its consequences; adding that there would be a considerable delay before the committee sent investigate, could report, and asking when the committee would have its report ready. This forced the issue and the French representative admitted that the committee had not yet started and would not start until the twenty-third of September. As the start could have easily been made early in the afternoon of the nineteenth, this will have caused a delay of nearly five days. As reports have been received of engagements beeen Hungarian and Roumanian patrols, General Gorton mentioned that an officer be sent to remain th the Hungarian Army to avert as much as possible any of these minor engagements and to investigate them mediately and fix the responsibility whenever they occurred. The French member bitterly opposed this, and was carrying on the discussion indefinitely when I proposed that the committee on army organization, of which a French lieutenant colonel is chairman, have charge of this investigation. This he consented to, and then I proposed that the British officer be placed as an additional member on this army committee, and stated that I would furnish an American officer also, and that really the committee should assume an Inter-Allied aspect. He was obliged to swallow this proposition, and eventually the Italian representative stated that he would send an officer also.

Although the occurrence cannot be well described, it gave convincing proof to both General Gorton and myself that the French member was working hand in glove with the Roumanians and was helping them in their policy of delay.

The Italian Colonel Romanelli, who investigated present conditions in Budapest prisons, submitted a report today indicating that they had been simply rotten. Political prisoners had been thrown in with criminals; many of them were badly beaten up, and all the prisons were crowded beyond all reason, with one exception, in which conditions were good. The Hungarians have been called upon to explain why this condition exists and to state how they propose to remedy it.

A Roumanian officer showed up at the Palace this morning, to swipe property from the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was expelled by Colonel Loree.

The Countess von Edeisheim and her daughter, with a maid, are leaving today for their estate in Czecho-Slovakia, and Captain Gore, not very reluctantly on his part, is in charge of the arrangements for their departure. They had been trying for two weeks to get passports for two servants viséd at the Czecho-Slovakian Ministry, and could not do it. Captain Gore had the thing settled in a few minutes this morning.

Admiral Troubridge reported today that there were only five days' food supplies left in Budapest, and these will not last long at the present rate of Roumanian seizures.

September 23, 1919. At this morning's session of the Mission, General Graziani presided, and we cleaned out a whole mountain of accumulated unimportant respondence. It is now getting so that both the Roumanians and the Hungarians endeavor to use this Mission as a liaison bureau.

One letter submitted was rather important, in that it was a report from the Hungarian Chief of Police to the fact that the Roumanians had authorized the Socialists to hold meetings on the twenty-fifth, and that the police, being unarmed and almost unorganized, would not be able to handle any serious situation. We decided therfore to notify the Roumanians that it was reported that they had given such permission, and that they would be held responsible for anything that happened.

Yesterday afternoon the Roumanians arrested an undersecretary of the Hungarian War Office because he had delivered to us a memorial addressed by the Ruthenian party of Hungary to the Supreme Council. General Mardarescu has been called upon to explain why he took such action.

Colonel Yates was called before the Mission and explained how despite all the beautiful promises of the Roumanians on the nineteenth to give us 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns for use of the municipal police, they had, when it came to a show-down, surrounded this munificent gift with such conditions as to make it practically worthless. The Mission instructed Colonel Yates to go to Roumanian Headquarters and tell them that he was ready to inspect the arms they proposed to turn over to us, and then incidentally to bring up the question of the distribution of these arms, and let them know that it was understood that they were under our orders without any Roumanian conditions attached, except that the Roumanians would be informed from time to time of the disposition of these arms.

While before the Mission, Colonel Yates reported this morning that he had learned that the Roumanians were starting to take the fire apparatus out of Budapest, and that he himself had driven away the Roumanian officer in charge of the looting party.

I shall send, in a day or so, recommendations for the D.S.M. for my various colleagues, and shall suggest that we establish an Order of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves so that our Roumanian friends can also be properly decorated.

This afternoon the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Somssich, called upon me and, with more bluntness than is characteristic of these people, asked me when the Roumanians were going to leave. I told him that I could give him no more definite information on that point than I could have given six weeks ago; that I did not know. He then said:

There is apparently nothing else left for us; we will have to ake terms with the Roumanians because at the present rate my country will be absolutely ruined, and it behooves us to save as much as we can from the wreck. The Entente either cannot or will not help us, and so far as I can see there is absolutely no alternative but acceding to the Roumanian terms.

I told him that I thought he was very foolish for two reasons: the first being that the Roumanians would demand so much that it would ruin Hungary in perpetuity; and secondly that they, for their part, would not carry out any contract that they made.

He said he realized these facts; that he had been bought up as a gentleman, always hoped to remain a gentleman, but that one had to fight fire with fire, and at when one was dealing with liars and thieves like Roumanians, the only thing to do was to fight them th their own weapons, agree to give practically all they ask for, and then give them nothing. I told him, course, this was rather reprehensible, and that while ould not blame him for feeling sore at the way the Hungarians had been neglected and been treated, I was positive that in the long run she would win out and that Roumania would pay dearly for all the pleasures she had derived from looting a fallen enemy.

I asked him how he proposed to negotiate with the Roumanians, and he stated that M. Ardeli, the same gentleman who had acquired the ultimata habit with the Archduke Joseph, was going to see him tomorrow to discuss terms. He finally said that he would listen to the terms, find out just what they were, and let us know, but agree to nothing until he had seen me.

I then asked him if he had been approached at all by the French, and he said no, but that the Hungarians knew that the French were winking at the Roumanians in all they had been doing.

I then asked him if he had had any transactions with the Italians. He said yes, that General Mombelli himself had suggested that the Hungarians come to terms with the Roumanians. He said his reliance was upon the Americans and the British, and that he would be glad to have me talk the matter over with General Gorton. This I did, and we shall now hear what terms M. Ardeli has to offer. Captain Gore and Colonel Loree had planned to go to the opera tonight, but at the last moment did some backsliding and we had a very quiet and satisfactory dinner.

September 24, 1919. Late yesterday afternoon, Colonel Yates was sent by me to see General Mardarescu in regard to the arming of the Hungarian police. He returned later; said that he had had a talk with General Mardarescu, who told him that they could not establish a depôt for the arms inside of a week or ten days, which means of course that they never intend to furnish any

euipment whatever. Later in the evening I called upon General Mardarescu, but the call was essentially social, and no business was discussed. He told me, howver, that he was leaving the next night for Bucharest, instead of on Thursday as originally contemplated and he also stated that the French Minister to Roumania had called on him during the afternoon. The question naturally arises then -what in Hell is the French Minister doing here!

At the meeting of the Mission this morning, General Mombelli presided and, after dispatching a little routine business, a letter was read from General Mardarescu, stating that he had found it impracticable to stablish the arms depôt at Monor and had decided to put it at Czegléd, parenthetically twice as far away; that all the firearms they had, had been shipped to Roumania and, therefore, it would be necessary to ship them back again before being delivered, all of which would take considerable time. He then said the understanding was that the arms would then as needed be turned over to the Hungarians by the Roumanians, assisted by the Entente, but that he must insist that no arms be delivered until he had an accurate report on the number of arms in the possession of the Hungarians, and that all arms in excess of what was absolutely required or the police be turned back to the Roumanians.

I then read Colonel Yates' memorandum of his conversation with General Mardarescu, and I reminded my colleagues that this was just the result that might have been expected from our interview with the Roumanian high officials on the nineteenth, and I recalled to their memories that when I was fighting for the evacuation of western Hungary, Diamandi had made the argument that he thought that for one day we had accomplished a great deal; therefore, why bicker over the evacuation of Transdanubia, adding: "You have already secured 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns; that certainly is enough for one day." I told my colleagues that the Roumanians were treating us just the same as a teacher would handle a class in kindergarten, and that we deserved it. They asked if I had any suggestions to make, and I said that I certainly had; that I wanted a letter written to General Mardarescu repeating that on the nineteenth we had explained to him, and he had admitted, that the organization of the Hungarian police was an immediate and urgent necessity; that he had promised to have 10,000 arms and 40 machine guns ready by the twenty-third; that these were to be handled by the Entente assisted, if necessary, by the Roumanians; and that now he had broken his promise; that it looked to us as though there was no intention on the part of the Roumanians to help in the organization of the police, and that we should hold them responsible for any disorders or other troubles that might ensue as a result of a lack of properly-armed and organized policemen; and that we would advise the Supreme Council accordingly.

General Graziani suggested that, in addition, we say that if the Roumanians wanted to demonstrate their good intentions, they would now give us two or three thousand rifles. I did a little table thumping and said that I would positively refuse to have anything to do ith any such idiotic transaction; that I would not face myself or my country in the position of bickerig with the Roumanians for such a paltry trifle, and that I thought it was a disgusting spectacle to see the presentatives of France, Italy, Great Britain, and America down on their prayer bones and supplicating the Roumanians for two or three thousand rifles. General Graziani's suggestion was turned down, and the letter was drafted by General Mombelli, as I had suggested. I then telegraphed the American Commission the text of the same.

This afternoon Colonel Yates brought in the Countess Juliska Szirmay, who is a relative of Count von Edelsheim. She craved our protection for her five sisters and her uncle's family on their estate about two hours' automobile drive from here, stating that the Roumanians had threatened to send on the twenty-sixth and remove all their stock. As these people are furnishing us with some supplies, I went myself to General Serbescu and made him write me out a safeguard for their farms.

September 25, 1919. Last night we entertained at dinner General Mosoiu, who is General Holban's successor in command of Budapest, his Chief of Staff, and Colonel and Mme. Vasilescu. General Mosoiu is a tremendously fat old fellow, but he is a decided improvement over the hirsute Holban.

This morning I presided at the meeting of the Mission. We had but few matters to discuss. First, two communications from Major Body, the Serbian military representative in Budapest, complaining that the Roumanians would not allow him to use his own language, either by telephone or telegraph, in communicating with Belgrade.

A letter was received from M. de Pekár, stating that the Roumanians had now requisitioned 900 of the remaining 4,500 closed cars still in Hungary, and that enforcing that requisition would leave the country in a most serious situation. As this matter had been brought to Minister Diamandi's attention at the meeting on the nineteenth, and he had promised to give it his immediate attention, the Mission authorized me to send him a communication stating that it was not believed that such a thing could have been done with the knowledge and consent of the Roumanian Commander in Chief, and we trusted that remedial action would immediately be taken.

I brought to the attention of the Mission the fact that a company of Roumanian soldiers had taken station in the Royal Riding Hall, right near the entrance to the Royal Palace, and that their commander, upon being interrogated, had stated that he understood he had been sent at the request of the Inter-Allied Military Mission for the purpose of preserving order near the Royal Palace. This was undoubtedly a delicate touch of sarcasm from our Roumanian allies in return for our communication of yesterday, when we told them that their refusal to arm the police would make them esponsible for any disorders that might occur. The Mission authorized me to write a communication to the Roumanian commander thanking him for his courtesy and thoughtfulness, asking him to withdraw the guard immediately, telling him that we were perfectly competent to maintain order about our Headquarters, and adding in conclusion that the presence of such a large force might result in friction between them and the Inter-Allied guards.

A report was received from the subcommittee which ad been sent to Admiral Horthy's army to investigate as to the danger of an attack from the same upon the Roumanians, and the result was absolutely what we new it would be. The committee unanimously conurred in the opinion that the Hungarian Army could not in any manner whatever be considered as a menace to the Roumanians, and that there was neither the intention nor the possibility of its attacking the Roumanian forces. The committee found out that Horthy was arrying out to the letter his instructions as regards organization, that even now he could maintain order in Transdanubia whenever the Roumanians evacuated, and that in eight days his entire organization would be practically effected. The Mission authorized me to write to the Roumanian Commander in Chief, repeating the substance of the committee's report, stating that we concurred in the same, asking him immediately to evacate Transdanubia, and to let us know not later than the twenty-ninth instant his decision in regard to the matter, so that we could notify the Supreme Council. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Somssich, came to see General Gorton and myself and stated that Minister Diamandi himself had been over to the Foreign Office, instead of his go-between, Ardeli; that Diamandi had stated that the Roumanians had all along wanted to leave Hungary, but that the Entente would not let them. Diamandi did not at that time press his terms, but they were discussed and he is preparing them.

Later in the day General Gorton came in with an intercepted wireless message that was being sent by the Roumanians to the Eiffel Tower in Paris, to the effect that yesterday there had been meetings of 150,000 socialist workers; that these meetings were harmonious, well conducted and gotten up in opposition to the Friedrich government, stating that all the workers who attended were most eulogistic of the Roumanians, and expressed their thanks to the Roumanian Army for having, during the period of its occupation, given them political liberty. General Gorton and I sent a telegram to Paris, stating that such message had been intercepted and to the effect that it was a damned lie.

Captain Andrews, who has been one of Colonel Yates' assistants at Bucharest, arrived today with his bride, en route to the States. Lieutenant-Colonel Causey, who now represents the Food and Railway Missions, is also here, and we entertained Captain and Mrs. Andrews and Colonel Causey at dinner tonight, after which they will leave on the evening train; and I am taking advantage of this, the first opportunity in weeks, for sending off a little mail and my reports to Paris.

September 26, 1919. At this morning's session of the Mission, General Gorton presided and introduced the question of the intercepted radio from the Roumanians the Eiffel Tower, Paris. It was decided by the Mission to telegraph to the Supreme Council a statement the effect that the workmen's union, instead of turning out 150,000 men at nine different meetings, had turned out less than 20,000, and that one-half of these left before the meetings were through with, and in general that the Roumanian report was a gross exaggeration.

We next received the report of the amount of material shipped by the Roumanians to the east. Up to midnight of September 23-24, and since the last report, 7 train loads of troops with the usual cattle and forage had gone eastward, and our records up to date cover 1,046 locomotives, and over 23,000 mixed cars.

The question of the organization of the subcommittee on army organization was brought up, and it was decided to make that committee permanent, with a representative from each Mission. General Graziani stated that it would be necessary then to relieve Colonel Horowitz by another officer if it was desired to retain Lieutenant-Colonel Berthon as chairman, but I told him that we would waive the rank and leave the committee as it is.

Owing to the small amount of business brought up before the meetings of the Mission, it was decided in the future to have regular meetings on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and on other dates at the call of any member.

September 27, 1919. Yesterday afternoon I was called upon by Mrs. Hegeman of New York City and her daughter, the Baroness Virginia Podmaniczky. The ladies just recently arrived from Switzerland and were to be in Budapest a few days to get some clothes and other things together and then to return to Switzerland. They made urgent request for just a little food and a little fuel. I therefore invited them to an informal dinner and also sent them enough to last them until their departure in three days.

Pursuant to our arrangements of yesterday to have meetings only on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, unless called by some one member, there was no meeting today, and I spent most of the forenoon going over the situation downtown. Although the stores do not display much, yet there is far more activity than ever before. The jewelers have nothing of much value but, if you wish to make special arrangements, they will get their better pieces out of hiding and put them on private exhibition, and make special sales. The depreciated value of the krone makes almost anything ridiculously cheap. Colonel Loree this morning bought for the equivalent of $ 30 a large sterling silver cigar box which would hold about twenty-five cigars and one hundred cigarettes. The box had a solid gold rim on the front with a genuine sapphire set therein.

As the American Commission has given me no further intimation as to what is to happen to me, I this date sent them a four word telegram as follows: "Funds exhausted. Instructions requested."

Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges, of the British Army⁽¹⁸⁾, arrived yesterday and will be here for two or three days. I met General Bridges at the Toronto race course in the spring of 1917. We have invited him and Admiral Troubridge to dinner tomorrow night.

September 28, 1919. I spent most of the morning today working at the office and the afternoon working at the house. In the evening, we entertained at dinner General Bridges, Admiral Troubridge and his son, and Major Foster of the British service. Major Foster is now assisting Colonel Loree on the Claims and Reparations Committee.

General Bridges at dinner mentioned that he understood that General Pershing would not have lasted much longer had the War continued, and he then stated hat he had it from General Foch's Chief of Staff⁽¹⁹⁾

that the American Army was very poorly organized, had called loudly for French divisions to assist them, that supplies were short and, in general, that the American offensive was very poorly managed, if not actually mismanaged. I told General Bridges that I had either been a participant in command of a unit at the beginning of the general offensive, or Provost Marshal General of the American Expeditionary Force, and I did not care who his informant was, that to put it mildly, that gentleman was badly mistaken. General Bridges said that he had known General Graziani and General Mombelli before, and that the latter was considered to be one of the astutest diplomats of the Italian Army, and was always given their more important semi-diplomatic military missions.

September 29, 1919. At the meeting of the Mission this morning, General Graziani presided. A letter was received from the Roumanians stating that they would agree to begin the evacuation of Transdanubia promptly, that as soon as the Hungarian forces had arrived within thirty kilometers of the cities of Gyôr, Veszprém and Székes-Fehérvár they would then within forty-eight hours evacuate such cities and retire on a line at a mean distance of thirty-five kilometers from Budapest. They desired to have forty-eight hours advance notice given of the contemplated march of the Hungarians, so that, all told, their movement should begin within four or five days after receiving such notice. We turned this over to the military subcommittee for the arrangement of all the details connected therewith.

Colonel Horowitz, who is a member of the Committee on Army Organization and who had visited western Hungary, turned in a report on the general conditions there, and in particular concerning the Jewish persecutions. He stated that in his opinion Admiral Horthy's army had done everything within reason to prevent any such persecutions, and that he considered hat no more atrocities had been committed than would ordinarily happen under the stress of such circumstances. He stated that a great many rascally Jews under he cloak of their religion had committed crimes, that here really was a great deal of anti-Semitic feeling on account of so many Jews having been Bolshevists, but as to there being a real White Terror, there was nothing of the kind, and this danger was a figment of the imagination of politicians. He stated that Jews and Gentiles alike should unite in maintaining order, and that hey could feel absolutely sure that there was no danger from the Hungarian National Army. It was decided to have this matter published in the local newspapers, in order that it might have a quieting effect upon the excitement of the people of Budapest.

It was also decided to send a letter to the Roumanian headquarters, stating that the Mission desired to have Colonel Yates appointed as supervisor of all police and gendarmerie, requiring the Roumanians, before taking any action against the police, to take it up first with Colonel Yates.

Mrs. Hegeman and her daughter, the Baroness Podmaniczky, called on me a few minutes this afternoon to say good-by.

September 30, 1919. Last night we had Major Moffat of the American Red Cross informally to dinner. The Major recently arrived here to take charge of Red Cross work in Hungary. He is expecting a train of thirty car-loads of supplies in the near future. This train is supposed to have left Paris over a week ago, but so far has not been heard from.

He is out of patience with the performance of Colonel Anderson, the Red Cross representative in the Balkans, who has devoted all his time and attention to Roumania. It is the common report that Colonel Anderson is very much under the influence of the Queen of Roumania and practically everything sent to the Balkans was distributed as she desired⁽²⁰⁾. Certainly there is no more pro-Roumanian advocate in the world than Colonel Anderson, who, however, in his arguments seemed to think that a loud noise was better than logic. In his interview with me yesterday afternoon, he seemed to have undergone a considerable change, and I understand has really given the Roumanians much excellent advice. The next thing is to see whether or not they will follow it.

There was no session of the Mission this date, but I drafted two letters for the President of the Day; one covered the question of the publication of Colonel Horowitz's report on the anti-Semitic agitation in western Hungary, and the other was a recommendation to Roumanian authorities that Colonel Yates be designated as Inter-Allied supervisor of police, gendarmerie and frontier guards.

N. Mavroudis, the Greek Envoy Extraordinary J Minister Plenipotentiary to Serbia, came in to pay respects to me this afternoon, and after the usual effusive compliments and ornate persiflage, wanted to know just what the situation was here and what the Rumanian plans and intentions were⁽²¹⁾

. I gave him whatever information I had, which was practically public but which to him seemed to be in the way of news. This afternoon Colonel Loree had difficulty with the Roumanians over the release of a Bolshevist prisoner. Some time they have been having former Bolsheviks, who were known to be murderers and cutthroats, released without trial, undoubtedly as the result of bribery. Two Roumanians went to police headquarters today with the wife of a man who is being held under various charges, including that of torture, and with-any proper papers a Roumanian detective tried to throw a big bluff which was called, and it is trusted he will receive the punishment he deserves.

1. Here we have an example of propaganda in the making. About American propaganda, consult George Creel's How We Advertised America; about that of Great Britain see Sir Campbell Stuart's The Secrets of Crew House. An excellent summary and indictment of propaganda is Arthur Ponsonby's Falsehood in War Time, London, 1928. See also the account of the wireless propaganda lie, told in this Diary, Sept.25, 26, and Nov. 13.

2. This statement refers to propaganda in the Ödenburg or Sopron district. This part of old Hungary, inhabited in the majority by German-Hungarians, was handed over to Austria in the treaty of St. Germain. It has frequently been suggested that this was done in "compensation" for the transfer to Italy of Southern Tyrol - a country entirely inhabited by German people and belonging to German Austria for a thousand years - as well as for the purpose of driving a wedge between Austria and Hungary. No matter how one may look at the transfer of this territory to Austria, the motives of the Allies were low and sordid. The alleged purpose of embittering the Hungarians against the Austrians has been accomplished. The attitude of a majority of the Hungarians in this respect is reflected in the following passage from Cecile Tormay's An Outlaw's Diary: The Commune, New York, 1924: "Our quarrel with Austria has lasted for centuries, and she brought us hard times, yet there is no people on earth to whom her fate causes as much pain today as to us. We have fought and fallen together on the battlefield. Now they hang a beggar's satchel round the neck of unfortunate, torn Austria, and out of irony, with devilish cunning, send her to take her share with her own predatory enemies, in the plunder of Hungary, with a piece of land that promises endless revolts and is meant to act as a living wedge to prevent forever an understanding between the two despoiled peoples. It is a devilish plan, the most perfidious part of the terrible Peace Treaty. It pretends to be a present, but it is a curse and a disgrace."

3. As a matter of fact, the opposite happened. The tension between Roumania and Jugo-Slavia over the division of the Bánát subsided, and in April and June, 1921, Roumania signed conventions with Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, which had entered into an alliance on Aug.14, 1920. Thus the so-called Little Entente was created, an alliance directed against Hungary. See A. Y. Toynbee's Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23, London, 1926, pp. 287-303.

4. Bratiano resigned on Sept. 13. Mardarescu, as well as Mosoiu, were political followers of Bratiano and became later on ministers in his new cabinet.

5. Frank Lyon Polk, Undersecretary of State of the United States. A lawyer by training, he became Counselor of the Department of State on Aug. 30, 1915. This position he held until July 1, 1919, when he assumed the title Undersecretary of State. From Dec. 4, 1918, until July 18, 1919, he served as Acting Secretary of State at Washington, while Lansing was in Paris. On July 17, 1919, he was appointed Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States to negotiate peace. From July 28 to Dec. 9, 1919, he was the head of the American delegation at Paris. Obviously he gave General Bandholtz his full support. Charles Vopicka, U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Roumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, reports that "Mr. Polk was very much dissatisfied with the inactivity of the Roumanian Government. He said that this government promised everything and did nothing." Secrets of the Balkans, p.305.

6. General William Durward Connor, U. S. General Staff Officer, Service of Supply, Nov.12, 1918, to May 26, 1919.

7. Or Castel Pelishor.

8. In 1866, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was called to Roumania to govern this country, which had secured its autonomy after the Crimean war in 1856. Roumania's complete independence was recognized in 1878 in the Treaty of Berlin, and in 1881 Charles was crowned King of Roumania. He was married to the noble Princess Elisabeth of Wied, who as a charming writer and poetess was known by the name of Carmen Sylva. Their only child, Marie, died in infancy. Charles died in 1914, shortly after the outbreak of the world war. Being without male issue, his nephew Ferdinand became his successor to the throne. He had in 1893 married Marie, daughter of the late Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The membership of the Royal Roumanian family is as follows:

Ferdinand I (b. 1865, d. 1927), m. Marie (b. 1875)

|

King Carol II (b. 1893), m. Princess Helen of Greece, 1921

|

Michael (b. 1921)

Elisabeth (b. 1894), m. Crown Prince (now former King) George of Greece, 1921

Marie (b. 1900), m. King Alexander of Jugo-Slavia, 1922

Nicholas (b. 1903)

Ileana (b. 1909) m. Archduke Anton of Austria-Tuscany, 1931

Mircea (b. 1912, d. 1916)

On Dec.28, 1925, Carol renounced his right of succession to the throne. On Jan. 4, 1926, his son, Prince Michael, was declared heir to the throne. In 1927 he became King under a regency. On June 8, 1930, Carol was again proclaimed King by Act of Parliament and ascended the throne.

9. Treaty of St. Germain with Austria.

10. The problem of the protection of minorities in Europe is not new. The first to receive special protection were religious groups. such as the Christians and Jews under Turkish rule, the Protestants in certain Catholic countries, and vice versa.

Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin of July 13.1878, contained the following provision in regard to Roumania: "The difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments. functions, and honors, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any localities whatsoever." F. de Martens, Recueil général des traités, 2d series, Vol.111, p.345.

In spite of this treaty obligation, the Jewish minority in Roumania continued to be discriminated against as previously.

Even before the war, the treatment of religious, cultural, and racial minorities had received the attention of the liberal and socialistic element all over the world; and during the world war the right of self- determination became one of the powerful slogans. The tenth of the Fourteen Points of President wilson demanded "the freest opportunity of autonomous development 'for "the peoples of Austria-Hungary." Several drafts of the League of Nations Covenant contained this principle, as applying to all members of the League. In the final version, such a provision was left out, probably because of the tremendous dangers to the imperialism of the victorious Great Powers.

However, it was realized at the Peace Conference that the transfer of large alien populations to new or enlarged states, especially when such people were of a much superior culture, would be a constant source of irritation and would prevent the stabilization of Europe, unless such minorities were protected against undue persecution. Therefore these States - Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Greece, and Armenia - were required to sign special treaties guaranteeing certain rights to the minorities living under their rule. Similar provisions are contained in the peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and in the defunct treaty of Sèvres with Turkey. Roumania signed a minority treaty very reluctantly on Dec. 9, 1919. Doubtless the pressure of the very influential Jewish element in the United States had a great deal to do with the insistence of Wilson on these treaties, as suggested on page 170 of Fouques-Dupara's book: "Le président Wilson par sentiment libérale, peut-être aussi par sympathy pour un groupement éthnique, dont la puissance électorale ne peut-être négligé, suivit l'exemple de ses illustres devanciers."

All the minority treaties, which, with the exception of those with Armenia and Turkey, are in effect today, are according to their own terms placed under the guardianship of the League of Nations, and cannot be changed except with the consent of the majority of the League Council. The text of he Roumanian Minorities Treaty may be found in Current History of March, 1920. Statistics of the different minorities in Roumania and their distribution in the different parts of the country may be found on page 384 of Jacques Fouques-Duparc's La Protection des minorités de race, de langue et de Ia religion, Paris, 1922. See also Marc Vichniak's La protection des droits des minorités dans les traités internationaux de 1919-1920, Paris, 1921; and, Leo Epstein's Der nationale Minderheitsschutz als internationales Rechtsproblem, Berlin, 1922.

For the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in Roumania, Crecho-Slovakia, and Jugo-Slavia, see Sir Robert Donald's Tragedy of Trianon, London, 1928.

The making of the minority treaties may be followed in David Hunter Miller's My Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. XIII. (The Appeal Printing Co., 1925.) Only forty copies of this valuable set of diaries are in existence. See there especially the letter of Bratiano of May 27, 1919, protesting against the special obligations imposed upon Roumania (p.89). Also he report on July 16, 1919, concerning Roumania.

11. After Bratiano's resignation, a new government was formed, in October, which was headed by General Vaitoanu and consisted of military men and officials. After a short time, general elections were held and a democratic government succeeded. From November, 1919, to March, 1920, Alexander Vaida-Voevod was the head of the government. See n. 34 below.

12. Compare with these words the actual feelings of the Queen, as given in the statement of January 4, 1920.

13. Ionel I. C. Bratiano (or Bratianu), born 1864, died 1928. He was heir to great wealth and power. His father had led the uprising against the Turks in 1848, and had been instrumental in placing King Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen on the Roumanian throne in 1868. The elder Bratiano became Roumania's first prime minister. Through the control of oil and other mineral resources, the family was immensely wealthy. Originally liberal-minded, the Bratianos later turned to conservatism. lonel became he successor of his father in the control of the so-called Liberal party. He "as virtually the political dictator or boss of Roumania. whenever popular ndignation over his autocratic régime became too loud, or when there was oo much corruption in his government, he resigned temporarily to make room for some other leader. Unlike Také Jonescu, Bratiano was not originally a pronounced anti-German. Later on, in the course of the world war, he turned towards the Allies.

At the Peace Conference of Paris, he presented very ably Roumania's interests, but he was practically ignored by the so-called Big Four. (Read the account by E. J. Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, New York, 1920, p.500 passim). He protested vigorously against the minority clauses contained in the treaties of St. Germain and Neuilly, which imposed upon Roumania the obligation of treating her minorities fairly. His reasoning, as presented in his speech at Paris on May 31, 1919, is contained in these pages of the Diary.

Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson, a well-known anti-Hungarian, explains the hostile attittide of the leading men at Paris as follows: "If the Paris Conference showed but scanty sympathy for Mr. Bratiano, it was, above all, the result of his rigid and intransigeant attitude on every subject of foreign or internal politics. Unfortunately 'liberal' writers in the west often seem unable to distinguish between the Bratiano family and Roumania." (In his London magazine, The New Europe, Oct. 2, 1919. In the issue of Sept. 18, 1919, of the same magazine, he said: "As long as he [i.e., Bratiano] remains in office, there is but little prospect of a real understanding between Roumania and the west.")

Bratiano started the prime-ministership, held by him during the time described in the Bandholtz Diary, on Dec.14, 1918, and he resigned on Sept. 13, 1919, as a protest against the minority clauses of the peace treaties. The new elections, held on Oct. 3, gave a large majority to the Peasant Party and the National Democrats. On Dec. 9, 1919, a cabinet of the democratic parties, with Alexander Vaida-Voevod and Dr. Lupu as the outstanding members, came into power. It was forced to resign on March 19, 1920, and a cabinet formed by the leader of the nationalistic People's Party, General Alexander Averescu, took its place.

14. In April, 1919, General Smuts arrived in Budapest to examine the situation in Hungary. He remained in his special train, received Béla Kun and some other members of the Bolshevik government, and left Budapest on the following day.

15. W. F. A. Rattigan, First Secretary of the Legation. Compare with this statement Mr. Rattigan's confidential report and Bandholtz' critique in Appendix V.

16. It must be remembered that Bratiano was treated very badly by the Americans in Paris, and particularly by Wilson, whom Dillon accuses of disliking Bratiano personally. No doubt Bratiano's governmental system did not appeal to him. It is well known that Clemenceau also disliked Bratiano.

17. General Tasker H. Bliss, one of the leading members of the American Peace Commission at Paris, was a liberal-minded man and opposed to many the harsh and stupid provisions of the peace treaties. The action of the Allies in regard to Hungary was most severely criticized by him. He de clared as "politically unwise" the action of the Council of Ten, taken on Feb. 16, 1919, while President Wilson was away, establishing a neutral zone between the Roumanian and the Hungarian Armies, a zone which extended far into territory of solidly Magyar population. He called it an unfair proposal which "caused the Bolshevik revolution" and said that "it cannot he justified morally before the people of the United States." He recommended a peace with Hungary on the principles advocated by Woodrow Wilson on Jan. 8, 1918, and in subsequent addresses, in contrast to one based on the secret treaty concluded between the Allies and the Romanians on Aug. 18, 1916. See: Ray Stannard Baker's Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, New York, 1922-23, three vols. II, 29-30; III, pp. 238-45.

18. Lieutenant-General Sir (George) Tom (Molesworth) Bridges. During he world war, he was several times wounded and served with distinction. He was the military member of Balfour's mission to the United States in 1917 and head of the British war mission to the United States in 1918. From 1918 to 1920, he acted as head of the British Mission of the Allied Armies of the Orient

19. General Max Weygand. At the outbreak of the world war, he was colonel and chief of the staff of an army. In 1916, he was made Brigadier General. From the beginning of the war, he served as assistant to Foch, whom he succeeded as the French representative on the Inter-Allied General Staff in 1917. In April, 1918, he resumed his work as Chief of the General Staff under Marshal Foch. This position he held during the remainder of the war. See also p. 160 for a repetition of this statement.

20. On p.275 of the strongly pro-Roumanian book by Charles J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, a picture may be seen showing Queen Marie at the Canteen of the American Red Cross in Jassy with Colonel Henry W. Anderson.

21. On April 18, 1919, a treaty of amity and friendship had been concluded between Greece and Jugo-Slavia.

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