2: August, 1919

<< 1: Introduction || 3: September, 1919 >>

August 7, 1919. Captain Gore, with myself and two orderlies, left Paris at 9.10 P.M. in Mr. Hoover's private car. Colonel Loree, my aide, Lieutenant Hamilton, and the rest of the detachment, remained in Paris and are to follow with the least possible delay. My other aide, Lieutenant Montgomery, was left in Paris with my Cadillac limousine and chauffeur, as my permanent liaison with the Supreme Council.

August 8, 1919. This morning we found ourselves just across the Swiss border, where we were held up for five hours while they were deciding whether or not our party, some of whom had no passports, could cross Switzerland. In any event they insisted that we wear civilian clothing. I therefore borrowed a blue coat of Mr. Hoover, a lurid purple tie from his stenographer, and a golf cap from somebody else, completing my demobilization by removing my spurs. Captain Gore did likewise, after which they decided we could proceed in uniform, under charge of a Swiss policeman, to the Austrian border. We arrived at the town of Buchs, very near the frontier line, about six o'clock, where we were joined by Captain Gregory, Mr. Hoover's representative in this part of the world, and where, after an hour, we were allowed to proceed on our way.

August 9, 1919. This morning we found ourselves in the town of Linz, Austria, and from there proceeded to Prague, where we arrived about two o'clock in the afternoon, Here Captain Gore and myself took a drive all over the city, which is most interesting and full of antiquities. We had a very good dinner at the Municipal Restaurant, and at nine o'clock joined Captain Gregory in his car, Mr. Hoover proceeding to Warsaw, and our train being headed towards Vienna.

August 10, 1919. We arrived at Vienna about noon, lunched at the Hotel Bristol, and then had a long talk with Admiral Troubridge of the British Navy, who is in command of the Danube River, and Mr. James, the American representative on the Danube Commission, both of whom gave me valuable information as to the situation in Hungary. In the afternoon Captain Gore and I took an automobile ride all over the city of Vienna, and at 9.10 P.M. I left with Captain Gregory for Budapest. I had previously sent a telegram to Colonel Yates, the American Military Attaché at Roumanian Headquarters, stating that I was leaving Vienna, that I hoped to arrive early the following morning in Budapest, and that I expected the Roumanian Commander to facilitate my progress and work, in every way within his power.

August 11, 1919. We arrived in Budapest at daylight and were met at the station by Colonel Yates and Lieutenant-Colonel Causey, who represents the Peace Conference, in charge of railroads. From the station we went to the Hotel Ritz where I opened an office in Room 17. Shortly thereafter I was called upon by General Gorton, the British representative on the Inter-Allied Military Mission. General Gorton and I planned a campaign, and word was sent to the Roumanian General Holban⁽¹⁾ that I would be at the Ritz Hotel at 4.30 that afternoon. He took the hint, called and was given some fatherly advice, At 5.30 in the afternoon the Archduke Joseph⁽²⁾, the temporary president of the Hungarian Republic, asked to see me and came into the room scared nearly to death, holding in his hand what purported to be an ultimatum from the Roumanian government requiring an answer by 6 o'clock, which meant within one-half hour. The ultimatum was to the effect that Hungary must yield to all Roumanian demands, giving up all of her war material and supplies of whatever nature, agree to back Roumania in taking away the Bánát country⁽³⁾

from the Jugo-Slavs, and, finally, that she must consent to political union with

Roumania, with the King of Roumania as ruler of Hungary, along the same lines as the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. He was told not to be afraid, and looking at me and trembling, he replied-"I am not afraid; I am a soldier just like you," which left-handed compliment was passed by without remark. He asked what he should do in regard to the ultimatum and was informed that in view of the fact that it had not been presented by the Roumanian Plenipotentiary he could send word to the sender to go plumb to Hell. This relieved the strain on the Archducal physiognomy to a great extent, and he retired in good order. After his departure I proceeded to the Royal Palace, which is on the Buda side of the river, and selected the best large suite in the building for Headquarters of the American Mission; and then suggested to General Gorton that he go over and take what was left for the British Mission. Later in the evening General Mombelli, the Italian representative, arrived, called upon General Gorton and myself, and agreed to the plans I had outlined as to the organization of the Mission.

August 12, 1919. The French General not having yet arrived, Generals Gorton, Mombelli, and myself met in my office in the Ritz Hotel and organized the Inter-Allied Military Mission on the basis of having daily rotation of chairmanship instead of allowing seniority to govern in the case, thereby securing national equality in the Mission. It was also agreed to make English the official language of the Mission. At the afternoon session, M. Constantine Diamandi⁽⁴⁾, the Roumanian Plenipotentiary, or High Commissioner to the Peace Conference, was introduced to the session of the Mission. In view of the fact that it was decided to run the rotation of chairmanship in alphabetical sequence, the American representative, myself, presided at this first meeting. M. Diamandi was read the instructions of the Supreme Council to the Military Mission, and asked if Roumania recognized them as valid and was prepared to follow the suggestions of the Mission. He replied that he could give no answer until he had communicated with his government. It was then intimated to him that much time had already been lost and it was expected that the Roumanian Government would proceed to comply immediately with the wishes of the Mission. On two different occasions he waxed furious, jumped up from his chair and started to leave the room, but, finding that his progress was not impeded, he calmed down and returned to his chair. He finally left apparently self-mollified, and promised to give us a reply as soon as possible.

Colonel Loree arrived this afternoon with a detachment of twenty-two men, and joined us at the Hotel Ritz, the detachment being sent to the Hotel Bristol.

August 13, 1919. General Graziani, the French representative, arrived last night, but was not seen until. this morning. He had come with the full intention of presiding over and dominating the Mission. He had prepared a message to be sent to each of the other Inter-Allied Generals, to report to him at Hotel Bristol at 10 o'clock this date, but it was suggested to him that he send no such message to the American representative as it might cause difficulty. He, therefore, came to our regular meeting room and introduced himself. Through the medium of General Mombelli, there was explained to him in French the plan under which the Commission had been organized prior to his arrival. He could not conceal his chagrin, and explained that he considered that seniority should govern in the question of chairmanship, adding that he had all kinds of that article to show, and that his government had undoubtedly expected him to be presiding officer. I told him that neither my government nor any other government had notified their representatives of anything of the kind, and that in my opinion it was not right that accidental individual seniority should outweigh the question of national equality in representation. He reluctantly agreed to the proposition, stating, however, that he must inform his Government that he was not to be permanent presiding officer. This, of course, was acceded to. Immediately thereafter M.. Diamandi, accompanied by General Mardarescu, the Commander in Chief of the Roumanian army, and General Holban, the Roumanian commander in Budapest, appeared before the Mission. General Gorton, the British representative, was President of the Day. They agreed to take steps immediately to alleviate the suffering from famine in the city of Budapest, and stated that they desired to coöperate with us as being allies. When they left, M. Diamandi asked if he could see me in the afternoon, was told he could do so, came at 3 o'clock and expressed supreme regret for his display of anger on the day previous, alleging that he thought I was prejudiced against the Roumanians. He told me, incidentally, that the Roumanian government was prepared to accept as valid the instructions of the Military Mission from the Supreme Council for the Peace Conference.

August 14, 1919. General Graziani, the French representative, was chairman this date. M. Diamandi, in view of his conversation with me on the preceding day and in view of the fact that he had made similar remarks to General Mombelli, was asked to appear before the Mission, and upon appearing was asked if Roumania was prepared to accept as valid the instructions of the Military Mission. He immediately resumed his policy of sparring for wind and replied that he was of the personal opinion that Roumania would acknowledge the Mission as the authorized representative of the Supreme Council, but that he could not as yet give the answer of his government.

In the afternoon all the members of the Mission went over to the Royal Palace, were shown the offices selected by the American and the British representatives, and took what was best of that left. Afterwards there was a short meeting at which I presented a memorandum requiring prompt action on the part of Roumania in complying with the instructions of the Military Mission. Part of it was immediately adopted and copies sent to the Roumanian commander.

Lieutenant Hamilton arrived about midnight this date.

August 15, 1919. At 8 o'clock this morning, I found the Hungarian Foreign Minister and two others in my office stating that they had understood that I had authorized Captain Gregory to tell them that on account of the overthrow of the Socialist government in Hungary and the practical reestablishment of the Hapsburg dynasty by the assumption of the reins of government by the Archduke Joseph, there were in progress revolutions in both England and America, and to state that the Supreme Council could not stand for a moment for the continuation of the Archduke in power. They were old that Captain Gregory had been given no such authority and, furthermore, that he had said nothing of the kind. They were told, however, that the Supreme Council could not accept or acknowledge the de facto Hungarian government as sufficiently permanent in character to justify making a treaty of peace, and that he Peace Conference was most desirous of having a permanent popular government established in Hungary.

The Mission met at 10.30 A.M., with General Mombelli in the chair. The Archduke burst into the meeting, followed by his Foreign Minister, to submit a list of his new cabinet. As it seemed to be becoming a daily practice of the Archduke to come to the Commission for pap of some kind or another, I stepped over to General Mombelli and told him quietly that I must insist that the Mission continue with its session, instead of having its time taken up with Archducal oratory. His Highness was then invited to leave, and the Mission proceeded with its session. The Hungarian Minister of War was called in, and made a report on the former and present police organization of the city of Budapest. He was followed by the Roumanian General, Holban, who agreed to turn over to the Hungarians 6,000 arms for organizing a Municipal Police Force. When questioned, he stated that he at this time had 10,000 men in the city proper and 5,000 in the outskirts. He was told to make the reverse arrangement -to place 10,000 in the outskirts, and to place his 5,000 along the perimeter of the city proper, which he agreed to do. He admitted that, although there were at present 1 ,800 Hungarian police in Budapest, they had arms for only 600.

There was received this night from the American Mission in Paris a long telegram containing the Roumanian reply to the Supreme Council's ultimatum, and the reply of the Supreme Council to the same, to the effect that the Roumanian papers were interpreted as meaning a yielding on the part of Roumania to the demands of the Peace Conference.

August 16, 1919. I established my office this date in the Royal Palace, in the room which had been used by the Empress.

It being my turn to preside at the meeting of the Mission, I read to my associates the telegram from the Supreme Council, submitting to them likewise the draft of a paper which I proposed to place immediately before the Roumanian Commander in Chief. This was agreed to, and the latter, accompanied by General Mardarescu and his Chief of Staff, appeared before the Mission at 4.30. The text of the paper handed them was as follows:

1: (a) Cease at once requisitioning or taking possession of any supplies or property of whatever nature except in zones authorized by this Mission, and then only of such supplies as may be necessary for the Roumanian Army, and that this Mission be informed as to the kind of supplies which will be considered necessary.

(b) The Roumanian Commander in Chief to furnish without delay a map clearly showing the requisition zones, and also indicating thereon the disposition of his troops.

© Return at once to its owners all private property now in the possession of the Roumanians, such as automobiles, horses, carriages, or any other property of which the ownership is vested in individuals.

(d) To arrange for the gradual return to the Hungarian Government of the railroad, post and telegraph systems.

(e) Make no further requisitions of buildings, stores or real property and evacuate as rapidly as possible all schools, colleges, and buildings of like character.

(f) Cease at once all shipments of rolling stock or Hungarian property of any kind whatsoever, to or towards Roumania, and stop and return to Budapest any rolling stock or property already en route or held at outside stations.

(g) Limit supervision over public or private affairs in the city to such extent as may be approved by this Mission.

2: The Roumanian government to furnish this Mission not later than August twenty-third a complete list of all war material, railway or agricultural material, live stock or property of any kind whatsoever that has been taken possession of in Hungary by Roumanian forces.

The Roumanians received this, agreeing to carry out instructions, and formally acknowledged the Inter-Allied Military Mission as being the authorized representative in Hungary of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. While at the meeting they were told that not even Roumanian contact patrols could push on towards Szeged, and that they must not extend their occupation of Hungary. They were also given a few more bitter pills which they swallowed with apparent complacency. I wired the American Mission in Paris this evening that in my opinion the Roumanians were doing their utmost to delay matters in order to complete the loot of Hungary⁽⁵⁾

and that as far as I could see their progress up to date in complying with the Supreme Council's desires, was negative rather than positive.

This evening Colonel Loree, Captain Gore, Lieutenant Hamilton and myself moved to our new quarters, the residence of Count Edelsheim, where we have most commodious and almost palatial quarters, with a new Hungarian chef and butler. The Count, the Countess and their daughter occupy the rear portion of the building and give us complete sway over the dining room, the breakfast rooms, the parlors, our bedrooms, etc., and have only the entrance in common with us.

August 17, 1919. The Mission met this morning at 10.30 A.M., with General Gorton presiding. Yesterday afternoon we had sent word that we desired to have the Prime Minister⁽⁶⁾ and the Food Minister report to us at our meeting, but instead, the entire ministry came, -less any Food Minister. They explained that the position of Food Minister was at present vacant, that they

ad had four different Food Ministers during the past week or ten days, and that they were now seeking one who could speak correctly all known languages. They were told we did not care for a polyglotic minister, but wanted one with some nerve and intelligence, who could fill the job and use an interpreter. They were also told that we expected the Hungarians and Roumanians to collaborate and accomplish something, instead of spending all their time and the Mission's time over mutual recriminations. I prepared a letter to the Roumanian Commander in Chief, which was adopted by the Mission, directing him, beginning tomorrow, to submit daily a report of the progress made by the Roumanians in complying with the instructions received by them from the Mission.

August 18, 1919. To go back into the original history of the situation⁽⁷⁾: Shortly after the establishment of the Republic of Hungary in succession to the kingdom as part of the Dual Monarchy of Austro-Hungary, the bolshevists under Béla Kun obtained possession of the control of the Government and started a Reign of Terror. They painted red the windows and many of the statues of the magnificent Parliament buildings, and could have painted the roof had their supply of red paint not been exhausted. They arrested and executed hundreds and even thousands, confiscated for distribution everything of value, turned out a currency called white money on account of its color and to distinguish from the blue-colored currency existing prior to that time, and in general started to run things along the same lines as the Bolshevists in Russia. In order to keep up the national spirit, they started a war against the Czecho-Slovaks and beat them. They started another war against the Roumanians and were driving them back when, about the first of August, the Roumanians assumed the offensive, invaded Hungary and marched without opposition into and took possession of Budapest. Promptly after their arrival, the Soviet government was overturned by fifty gendarmes and the Archduke Joseph, a cousin of the Emperor Karl, appointed Governor⁽⁸⁾, which position he still holds. The Roumanians on their part immediately began to loot Hungary, removing all automobiles, locomotives, cars and other rolling stock, took possession of and shipped to Roumania all the arms, munitions, and war material they could find, and then proceeded also to clean the country Out of private automobiles, farm implements, cattle, horses, clothing, sugar, coal, salt, and in fact everything of value; and even after they were notified by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference to cease such requisitioning, they continued and are still continuing their depredations. They have taken possession of all branches of the government, all railroad, telegraph, telephone and postal systems, and at this date have all Hungary completely terrorized and at their feet. Their arrogance, however, has taken a turn and they are no longer treating the Military Mission with the same practical contempt as in the beginning.

Our offices located in the Royal Palace are gorgeous in extreme. This magnificent building must have cost millions to erect and furnish, and no pains or expense were spared. The walls of each room are covered with the same cloth with which the furniture of the room is upholstered, except the magnificent ball rooms, the walls of which are solid marble, and the details of which beggar description.

At this morning's session, Horthy⁽⁹⁾, who had been Admiral of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, stated he was prepared to reorganize a Hungarian Army and have an effective force ready within four days after he was given permission to proceed. The Roumanians have as yet made no report of any progress in complying with instructions from this Mission.

Last night Colonel Loree and I dined with Admiral Troubridge of the British Navy, and General Gorton.

At this afternoon's session, there was quite a fight between the American and the Italian representatives over the question of having the Roumanian Commander himself attend our sessions or be represented by an authorized staff officer. General Mombelli insisted that this should be done by correspondence, the matter laid out in detail in a letter, and then sent to the Roumanian Commander in Chief, to await his reply. I told him, in view of the fact that all such letters had then to be translated either from English to French or French to English, and that no subject could be fully covered and explained in a communication, that I must insist that the Roumanian government be suitably represented at our Mission when we so desired. He said that it was very hard to require an army commander to stop his other most important work to attend a session. I replied that at present the Roumanian-Hungarian question was the most serious in Europe, that each of our governments had sent a general, accompanied by his staff and a detachment, to devote all their time to this question, and that I did not give a damn whether it were the Roumanian Commander in Chief or the Roumanian King, and I insisted that they be subject to call when needed. A letter was sent to the Roumanian Commander in Chief requesting him to come or be represented at tomorrow morning's session.

August 19, 1919. At this morning's session, matters were much more quiet, although the Roumanians, as usual, won a point by sending as their representative an officer who was authorized to give information on only two points, namely the question of food supply and the question of the organization of the Municipal police of Budapest. General Holban, the Roumanian

Commander of Budapest and vicinity, is the representative and apparently knows as much about the military game as does an Igorrote about manicuring. On the fifteenth, when he was before the Mission, he stated that he had 10,000 troops in the city and 5,000 in the suburbs. Today he insisted that he had only 5,000 all told. When called upon to explain his map relative to requisition zones, he could not explain it at all and admitted that he could not turn out a map that would be intelligible. The Serbian plenipotentiary showed up and presented his credentials to the Mission. He rejoices in the euphonious cognomen of Lazar Baitch. It was decided in the future to have morning sessions of the Mission, leaving the afternoons to the members for catching up with their work and making personal investigations. I then notified the Mission that I must insist that General Mardarescu, the Roumanian Commander in Chief, be himself directed to appear before the Mission tomorrow at 11 o'clock. This time there was no dissenting vote. Despite all their promises and instructions the Roumanians are continuing with their wholesale pillaging of Hungary and the Hungarians.

It is not possible to describe conditions in a city or country occupied by an enemy, but judging from conditions in Budapest and Hungary while occupied by the Roumanians, we Americans should promptly take every measure possible to avoid any such catastrophe. Universal training should be adopted without further parley.

Last night Colonel Loree, Captain Gore and Lieutenant Hamilton, Captain Weiss, who is a Hungarian by birth and speaks the language perfectly and whom I have asked to be attached to my office here, and myself called upon Count Edelsheim, his wife and daughter. They told us of the terrors of the Bolshevist régime. The house is filled with beautiful antique furniture and a most peculiar mixture of paintings, ranging from choice antiquities to rotten moderns. Our chef, having cooked for hotels in both London and Paris, is living up to his reputation, but our butler in his previous condition of servitude had undoubtedly been a hostler, and knows more about shoveling in fodder than he does about waiting on the table.

August 20, 1919. This morning's session, at which I presided, was one of the most interesting that we have had. In the beginning there was considerable discussion about our Board of Claims and Complaints. Then the Hungarian Minister of War was introduced and submitted a verbal proposition for the reorganization of the Hungarian Army. He was told to reduce the same to writing and submit it with the least practicable delay. A complaint has been received that the Hungarians have been making wholesale arrests and committing abuses in certain districts which had been assigned by the Peace Conference to Austria, and it was decided to ask the Supreme Council to give a correct definition of the present geographical limits of Hungary. Next, our old friend Diamandi came in with the Roumanian Commander in Chief, General Mardarescu, and a new star in the Roumanian constellation in the person of a General Rudeanu. General Mardarescu was put on the carpet and told in unmistakable terms that it was up to him to report what had been done in complying with the request from the Mission of August 16, 1919. He resorted to all sorts of evasions and circumlocutions, which may have been intentional or may have been due to his grade of intelligence, which appears to be about that of a comatose caribou. He finally agreed to be a good boy and carry out our instructions. Our friend Diamandi insisted that in the future, whenever we discuss matters of importance with a Hungarian official, the Roumanian government should be represented. His proposition was laid on the table and he received no reply, as we propose to use our own judgment in regard to such matters.

In the afternoon General Rudeanu, with Colonel Yates of our Army, called upon me at my office in the Royal Palace, and practically asked that we let bygones be bygones, stating that he is prepared to turn over a new leaf from now on. He appears to be possessed of almost human intelligence and it is hoped that some progress will now be made.

Later, General Pétain, who is a younger brother of the French Field Marshal of that name, called upon me at the office and spent an hour trying either to deter mine my exact attitude as regards the Roumanians, or to influence me in their favor⁽¹⁰⁾.

August 21, 1919. At this morning's session a complaint was submitted by the Roumanian government that the Archduke had been declaring martial law in certain places in Hungary and that they could not tolerate this as it was considered an infringement upon their prerogatives. Additional complaints were also received about acts of violence and other abuses committed by Hungarians in territory which had been given to Austria by the Peace Conference⁽¹¹⁾. Last night a telegram from the Supreme Council was received intimating that they were not satisfied with a Hapsburg as governor of Hungary. In view of all the foregoing, it was decided to send for our friend the Archduke and his Prime Minister and tell them where to get off. This was done. They promptly arrived and the Archduke was notified that he must immediately revoke his declaration of martial law in any place in Hungary. He and his Prime Minister obsequiously acquiesced and promised to revoke the order immediately. The Prime Minister was then invited to tarry in the antechamber while a little private conversation was addressed to the Archduke, which in effect was that it was our opinion that a government which could act in such an idiotic manner as his had been acting could inspire confidence in nobody, and he was then given the coup de grâce by being told that we considered it our duty to inform His Highness that the mere fact that the head of a state is a Hapsburg diminishes the possibility of feeling confidence in an administration, which furthermore had been established by a coup d'état during a foreign occupation. He maintained that he was the people's choice and practically the only available Moses to lead them out of their present political wilderness. He was informed that on this subject there was a great difference of opinion. At this the Archduke waxed furious, stated that his giving up the reins of government would mean a return to Bolshevism, and dashed madly out of he room without shaking hands with anybody.

The Roumanian General, Rudeanu, and the Roumanian High Commissioner Diamandi were then sent for, and the situation explained to them in order that hey might take the necessary precautionary measures.

August 22, 1919. Last night we entertained at our quarters General Rudeanu and M. Diamandi. They were given champagne and wine ad libitum but fought shy of it, apparently fearing there was a scheme on foot or inducing garrulity on their part. Being their host, I allowed no official matters to come up for discussion.

At this morning's session of the Mission, General Mombelli informed us that our old friend, the Archduke, called on him last night and stated that he was in such a twitter at our meeting yesterday that he could hardly speak, and went on to complain that we did not understand that he, as a Hapsburg, was working only or the best interests of Hungary, that he was remaining bravely at his post only to lead his country until the elections, when the wishes of his countrymen

would be sacred to him. He failed to add, however, that it would be no fault of his if any Hungarians were left to dare vote against him. He then asked whether our talk to him yesterday was inspired from Paris or was on our own initiative. He was told that gave him just two guesses. He then stated that he thought it was probably inspired from Vienna⁽¹²⁾, and was told that, as a supposedly intelligent human being, it was up to him to make his own interpretation.

We unanimously agreed that the Roumanians must immediately aid the Hungarians to organize a police force of 6,000 men in Budapest and that we would take up the reorganization⁽¹³⁾

of the Hungarian Army on a working basis of 30,000 men. Everything seems to indicate that the Bolshevists have about 100,000 arms still hidden and we have decided to make the Roumanians, aided and abetted by the Hungarians, get hold of these arms and place them at our disposal. We decided furthermore to tell the Roumanian Commander in Chief hat he would be "skinned" for being off limits whenever he came west of the Danube except at Budapest. Our gallant Roumanian allies turned in a complaint about the Czecho-Slovaks invading a portion of Hungary, and it was suggested that the Czecho-Slovaks had damn sight better ground for complaint of the Roumanians for having done the same thing. I called the attention of the Mission to the fact that our noble allies were still playing the same game and that no report of progress had yet been made. I insisted that there be incorporated in our telegram to the Supreme Council information to that effect. We then discussed the present political situation in Hungary, upon which we were required to make a report, and I have attached hereto my memorandum on that subject which was then submitted.

The question of claims and complaints is so serious and becoming so complicated that I stated that Colonel Loree could no longer be spared for that exclusive work, and it was decided to lay the matter before the Supreme Council, requesting that a suitable number of officers with proper equipment be sent to Hungary for that purpose.

Memorandum on the Hungarian Political Situation

To consider the present political situation one must start in at least with the assumption of the reins of government by the Archduke Joseph.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Socialist government had been started but a few days and that an enemy was in possession of the city, a coup d'état was pulled off by about fifty gendarmes with the accessory passivity of the Roumanians. The Archduke himself has shown that when it comes to diplomacy, political matters and the administration of a government, he is still a babe in swaddling clothes. This is demonstrated by the seriousness with which he took an anonymous ultimatum, and by the various ridiculous administrative stunts he has pulled off. He is probably, when all is considered, quite popular in Hungary, but his popularity is neither so extensive nor so deep-rooted as he seems to imagine. It is believed that he has been misled by his intimates, who have lured him into believing that he is the almost unanimous choice of the people of Hungary. However, either independently, or influenced by his advisers, he is believed to have been taking measures to perpetuate his office by declaring martial law with the announced intention of arresting Bolshevists. This is undoubtedly a transparent camouflage to conceal the real intention of disposing of all political opponents and of assuring his ultimate election.

The Hungarians had barely disentangled themselves from the meshes of Bolshevism when the present weak régime came into existence. It would be a calamity if either Bolshevists or the Hapsburgs were allowed to control Hungary. To prevent this, it is important that some strong man of real popularity and influence among all classes be placed in charge and given every assistance in reorganizing a semi-permanent government. To restore a Hapsburg at this time, when it is in the memory of everybody that that unfortunate dynasty was the intentional or unintentional cause of the World War, would seriously afflict all the Allies and would give an impulse to Bolshevism,

In brief, the Hungarian political situation is believed to be critical, but not beyond remedy. If the Roumanian government will shift its gear from first to second, up to third, and do it's best to facilitate the organization of a government and the creation of a police force and an army of suitable size, and to arrange for gradual but prompt withdrawal behind its own recognized boundary, it is believed the present deplorable condition in Hungary can soon be brought to an end.

Before adjourning, a telegram was received from the Supreme Council authorizing the Mission to send detachments wherever necessary to prevent the Roumanians from getting their Hungarian loot over into Roumania, and it was decided to wire the Supreme Council that this would not be feasible either with the means at our disposal or with any force that could arrive in time for the purpose. It was furthermore recomnended that additional officers be sent to watch over he points of egress and take inventory of what the Roumanians were making away with.

In the afternoon, after sending a telegram to the American Commission posting them to date on the situation, I took a car and investigated a few of the complaints concerning Roumanian seizures, etc., and found them to be true. I then called upon General Rudeanu, told him I had found his people were removing 4,000 telephone instruments from private houses and were about to take the remaining half of the supplies of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, which hey had not taken in first requisition; that they were seizing the few remaining Hungarian breeding stallions; that they had sent word to the Ministry of Agriculture to deliver to them all maps, instruments, etc.; and that I could give him only too many instances of like character. I told him that his government had repeatedly promised to carry out the Mission's instructions, but that I had been here twelve days, during which the Roumanians had continued their seizures and had not returned a single thing despite their repeated promises. I added that we were all most anxious to coöperate, but that I should like for once to telegraph my superiors that the Roumanians had shown any indication of an intention to play the game according to the rule. He replied that in my place he would feel as I did, that he would confer with his colleagues tonight, and would tomorrow let us know whether or not the Roumanian government really intended to stop requisitioning and return any property already seized. All of this looks like an admission that they had all along intended to pursue the even tenor of their way regardless of the wishes of the Supreme Council.

In the evening Count von Edelsheim called upon us and continued his stories of Bolshevist atrocities.

August 23, 1919. At this morning's session, after disposing of several routine matters, the Mission prepared to receive M. Diamandi and General Rudeanu, who had faithfully promised to be in the antechamber at 11.30. As a matter of fact, they were only twenty minutes late, which is the closest any Roumanian has yet come to keeping his promise with us⁽¹⁴⁾. Diamandi seated himself with his unctious diplomatic smile, and stated that he had received advices from his government at Bucharest, and first proceeded to regale us with information that was already six days old and which we had read to him ourselves at one of our sessions. He was politely informed of the fact and then proceeded to other matters, prefacing his remarks by the usual statement that the Roumanian government desired to work in complete accord with its allies, but that we must consider the deplorable transportation conditions in Roumania and the fact that the Roumanians found here in Hungary many supplies taken from their own country, in proof of which he displayed two first-aid packets, two iodine tubes, and one or two other matters with the Roumanian mark. We were overwhelmed with this incontrovertible evidence, but in time sufficiently recovered to let him proceed, which he did by adding that all Roumanian property found in Hungary must naturally be subject to unqualified seizure, that the seizures would be limited to what was actually necessary for the Roumanian forces, but that this government must insist that they pick up an additional 30 per cent to replace articles taken from Roumania during the German invasion; that formerly Roumania had had 1,000 locomotives whereas they now had only 6o; that they would be very glad to pay for all private automobiles and other property seized in Hungary, but must insist on doing so with their government bonds along the same lines as the Central Powers had done in Roumania. Then he wished to know, in case Roumania did not take things from Hungary, who would guarantee that the Roumanians got their proper share, and he added that it certainly would be much better to leave all such property in the hands of faithful and truthful allies like the Roumanians, than to leave it with the Hungarians, who were known never to keep their promises. He would probably have gone on indefinitely with similar sophistical persiflage, had I not intervened and stated that on three separate occasions our truthful allies, the Roumanians, had faithfully promised to carry out our instructions, but that up to the present time there was no tangible proof that a single one of the promises had been kept. Certain it was that they were continuing their requisitions and more boldly than ever, that no property had yet been returned, that they had submitted no reports as promised, and that I personally must insist on some proof of the perfect accord that I had heard so much about. M. Diamandi stated that he could say nothing more than was contained in his instructions, and any question whatever that was put up to him would need to be referred to Bucharest for decision, the natural inference being that he could never answer a question inside of about five days. Our little friend Diamandi has always been in the diplomatic service, having served at Rome, Vienna, Paris, and Berlin. He was Roumanian minister to Petrograd when the Boishevist régime started, during which he was arrested by the Bolshevists, and I shall never forgive them for having afterwards released him. He typifies perfectly the Roumanian policy of procrastination with a view of absolutely draining Hungary before it can be stopped.

While the Roumanians were present, a telegram was received from M. Clemenceau, which, after repeating the opinion held by the Supreme Council of our friend, the Archduke, wound up by insisting that "Archie" resign tout de suite. The Roumanians were informed of this, gave evidence of great glee, and it is believed sent word to "Archie" as soon as they left the building. In any event, the first thing that was brought up at our afternoon session was how to handle his Royal Highness. Finally we drafted a letter to him, in which was enclosed a copy of a telegram received from the Supreme Council, stating that:

The Allied and Associated Powers have been further considering the information, derived from your report and from other sources, as to recent events in Budapest. Their conclusions are as follows:

They are most anxious to conclude a durable peace with the Hungarian people but feel that this cannot be done while the present Hungarian government is in power. That government has been brought into existence, not by the will of the people, but by a coup d'état, carried out by a small body of police during the occupation of a foreign army. It has at its head a member of the House of Hapsburg whose policy and ambition are largely responsible for the calamities from which the world is suffering and will long suffer. A peace negotiated by such a government is not likely to be lasting nor can the Allied and Associated Governments give it the economic support which Hungary so sorely needs.

If it be replied that the Archduke Joseph is prepared, before approaching the Allied and Associated Governments, to submit his claim to the test of popular election, we must reply that this procedure cannot be a satisfactory election if carried out under the auspices of an administration which the Archduke himself controls. The difficulties in obtaining by election a faithful reflection of the popular will are, in the present unhappy state of Hungary, of the most serious kind. They would be overwhelming if the election were carried out under Hapsburg influences. Even if the assembly elected under such circumstances were really representative, no one would think so. In the interest of European peace, therefore, the Allied and Associated Governments must insist that the present claimant to the leadership of the Hungarian state should resign and that a government in which all parties are represented should appeal to the Hungarian people. The Allied and Associated Powers would be prepared to negotiate with any government which possessed the confidence of an assembly so elected.

After dispatching the letter to the Archduke, we took up the Roumanian situation, and it was decided, in view of Diamandi's statement that in case he were called he could add nothing to what he had already said, there would be no use in sending for him. I therefore insisted that a telegram be sent from us to the Supreme Council, informing them of all of M. Diamandi's statements and adding that in our opinion so far as the Roumanians were concerned the time of this Mission had been wasted, and that it would be useless to continue its relations with Roumanian officials who apparently were determined to carry on a reprehensible policy of procrastination, and who had repeatedly broken their solemn promises. General Graziani said he

would draft this telegram at once, provided he could take a recess of about an hour. When he returned with his draft it contained only the bald statement in regard to M. Diamandi's remarks. I insisted that my reference to our waste of time be incorporated in the telegram. Thereupon I was asked to draft the telegram. I complied with this request and handed the telegram to Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli, General Mombelli's secretary. He made a very good French translation of it, arid it was then handed to General Graziani's aide to add to the telegram. Just as we were leaving, I saw this aide hand General Mombelli my draft, Colonel Romanelli's translation, and another slip of paper, and asked him what the third paper was. He said that it was for the purpose of putting part of Romanelli's translation into better French. I insisted on seeing that part. He showed it to me, and then General Mombelli said that, as handed to him, it was understood that this new slip of paper was to replace entirely Colonel Romanelli's translation. At this I thumped the table two or three times and said that I absolutely insisted that the statement in regard to the futility of hoping for anything from the Roumanians be incorporated. This was then agreed to. Evidently our French colleague was trying to play a skin game and got caught at it.

At 8 o'clock the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs showed up with a letter containing the resignation of the Archduke⁽¹⁵⁾

and the entire Ministry. He also stated that everything was now in the hands of the Inter-Allied Military Mission. We then sent for the Prime Minister and told him that this Mission did not mix in the internal affairs of Hungary, except to such an extent as it might be definitely instructed by the Supreme Council; that the notice to the Archduke was sent as directed by our superiors, but that it was not within our province to organize a new government. We added that it was the duty of the members of the present cabinet to continue temporarily in office until a new government could be organized, which we hoped would be within a few days. General Rudeanu, our Roumanian liaison officer, was sent for and informed of the Archduke's resignation.

August 24, 1919. For the first time since my arrival at Budapest, there was no session of the Mission today. This resulted from the almost piteous appeals of both the French and the Italian representatives to have a day off.

About 10 o'clock I was called upon by two representatives of the British press, and I gave them the dope in regard to the official demise of our friend, the Archduke, and filled them full to overflowing with complaints and proofs in regard to the rapacity of our gallant Roumanian allies⁽¹⁶⁾

.

I then prepared and sent a long telegram to the American Mission, to the effect that yesterday our suave friend Diamandi, accompanied by General Rudeanu, had called upon Admiral Troubridge, apparently on the verge of tears because we had not sent for them the day before. They both intimated that probably their usefulness in Budapest was over, in which they were just about right. The rotund and diplomatic Diamandi was undoubtedly thus affected because he had been sent here to pull off a coup in the shape of forcing Hungary to make a separate peace with Roumania practically amounting to annexation, which coup had been demolished by a bomb in the shape of the Supreme Council's handing the Archduke his hat and telling him not to be in a hurry. I also received word that on the twenty-first the Crown Prince of Roumania, as the future King of Hungary, received a number of kowtowing Hungarian aristocrats.

The day before yesterday I sent Colonel Yates, formerly of the Thirtieth Infantry, U. S. A., and now American attaché at Bucharest, to investigate conditions in Hungary west of the Danube. On his return today he reported that Admiral Horthy had about 8,000 well- disciplined, well-trained, and well-armed troops, including machine guns and nineteen field guns under his command.

I also wired the American Mission in regard to the incident of last night, when our dapper French colleague tried to put one over on the American and British representatives by not including all that should have been included in the telegram to the Supreme Council. General Gorton, the British representative, read over and concurred in all of my telegram, asked me to say so, and to add that he requested that a copy be furnished the British Mission.

Upon leaving the Palace about 1.30, I was met by a delegation of about 200 Hungarians who said that they were small landholders and wished to see the Inter-Allied Military Mission in regard to their proper representation on the government. I told their spokesman and interpreter that the Mission could do nothing in regard to this, as we did not meddle with internal affairs, but that in case they desired to send any petition to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and would present the same in writing tomorrow, I would submit it to the Mission for consideration.

This morning I found on my desk two magnificent bouquets of purple orchids, and I am getting so accustomed to the Royal Palace life and surroundings that it will be pretty difficult to come down to the life of an ordinary American citizen.

August 25, 1919. Yesterday afternoon, accompanied by Colonel Loree and Lieutenant Hamilton, I visited and inspected the State Railway shops, and found that the Roumanians were gutting the place strictly in accord with the Hungarian reports. In a neighboring freight yard there were 120 freight cars loaded with machinery and material, and in the yard of the shops there were 15 cars, likewise loaded and more than 25 others partly loaded or in the process of being loaded. I then went through the machine shops and saw many places where machinery had just been removed and others where it was in the process of being removed. The workmen stated that the Roumanians had been busy there, despite the fact that it was Sunday, until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and that they were obliging the Hungarians to do all the work connected with taking out the machinery.

In the evening, at about 9.50, we heard a racket outside of our window, but we did not pay much attention to it at the time because a discussion of Roumanians and Hungarians, none of whom understands the others, usually sounds like a ladies' tea party. This morning I found out, however, that the trouble was all caused by a Roumanian patrol of one officer and eight or ten men who had arrested a British Bluejacket and had declined to examine his pass. One of my men, thinking the rumpus was all due to the fact that the Roumanians did not understand the Britisher, went to try to explain in German, and met the fate of the peacemaker. He was pricked by a bayonet wielded by a Roumanian soldier. At this, becoming disgusted with the role of peace maker, he yelled to the American soldiers and British sailors across the street. They came tearing to the rescue of their comrade who was promptly abandoned by the Roumanians.

The Mission met at the usual hour, i.e., 9.30, this morning, but there was nothing of great importance. This was mainly due to the fact that the Archduke was now out of the way, and also to our decision to have no more transactions with the Roumanian officials, on account of their lying propensities.

Our officer who had been sent to the bridge over the Theiss [River Tisza], reported that the bridge could not be completed inside of three weeks and that it would take about the same time to complete any of the other bridges.

During the morning a delegation, claiming to represent 600,000 industrial workers, asked to see the Mission, and when they announced that they desired to insist upon suitable representation in the new government, they were told that this Mission could not mix in the internal affairs of Hungary.

August 26, 1919. Yesterday afternoon a verbose but rather stiff telegram came to me, containing the text of an ultimatum from the Supreme Council to the Roumanian government. I told them in unmistakable terms that in case they persisted in looting Hungary, alleging as an excuse that they were simply reimbursing themselves for what they had lost during Mackensen's invasion, it was all bosh; that they must abide by the decision of any reparation commission the Peace Conference might appoint; and that in the meantime this Mission of Inter-Allied Generals would be authorized to appoint such a commission temporarily. It was added that in case they did not immediately and affirmatively make a Statement that they would abide by all their past agreements, the Allied and Associated Powers would be obliged to make them pay in full any claims against Transylvania and other portions of Hungary which had been given to Roumania by the Peace Conference. The foregoing telegram was followed up this morning by another one preëmptorily notifying those sons of Ananias, the Roumanians, that drastic measures would immediately be adopted if they would not come to time.

I had drafted a telegram, which was sent in the name of the Mission, stating that in our opinion the Roumanians were looting Hungary as rapidly as possible so that they might suddenly evacuate the country, and at the same time they were disarming everybody and refusing to reorganize the police, and in general that, intentionally or unintentionally, every move they made was in the direction of turning Hungary over to Bolshevism and chaos.

There were several more delegations out in the Palace courtyard today, all representing the so-called Christian Socialists; all clamoring against the Jews, and practically demanding control of the government. One delegation, consisting of four balatant and bellicose females (none of them pretty) and three Bolshevistic-looking males, got into the Council Room, frothed at the mouth in Hungarian, English, and French, and were told that the Mission could not mix in the internal affairs of Hungary.

Major Borrow of the British Army, whom we sent to inspect the Szolnok⁽¹⁷⁾ Bridge, reported that it would take two or three weeks to get that or any other bridge across the Theiss River so that it would support loaded cars, but that he found at the bridge, ready to cross, 150 locomotives, 200 to 300 empty freight cars, 4 aeroplanes on cars, 200 to 300 tank cars and, between Szolnok and Budapest, many hundreds of carloads of merchandise.

For the past three days we have been having fairly warm weather; in fact the warmest that any of us have ever seen in Europe, but at that it was not much over 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Today it has turned cool again, and with the clouds and threatening rain, reminds me more of "Sunny France."

August 27, 1919. This morning's session of the Mission, with General Graziani, the French representative, in the chair, was very quiet and orderly, all due to the fact that we have very little coming in now on account of our strained relations with the Roumanian Commander in Chief. Each one of the representatives had received a basketful of telegrams, nearly all of which came from the so-called Christian Socialists. This party should be more properly called Anti-Jews, because most of their petitions are devoted to a tirade against their Semitic fellow countrymen. They seem to be a blatant minority, but more thoroughly organized than any of the other parties.

Yesterday afternoon I was called upon by Mr. Lazar Baitch, the Jugo-Slav Plenipotentiary to our Mission. He is built along the line of the blonde and bland Roumanian Diamandi, except as to complexion, which is distinctly brunette. Among other things, he stated that his country greatly feared an Italian, Austrian, Hungarian, and Roumanian combination, which would cut the Jugo-Slavs off from the rest of Europe, and that they, therefore, preferred to see a strong and friendly Hungary. He promised to report to me any developments as rapidly as they came to his attention. Then he came to the main object of his visit, which was to ask that I give him the permanent loan of an automobile. I suggested that he apply first to the Hungarian government, knowing damned well that the Roumanians had swiped all they had.

Later on in the afternoon I learned that the fine Italian hand had attempted to get in its deadly work, even during the Bolshevist régime; that the Italians had then bought the magnificent Hungarian Breeding Farms, which are now being seized by the Roumanians; that they were now as mad as a nest of hornets because they cannot stop the Roumanian seizures, as it would give away their rather reprehensible relations with the Bolshevists. I also learned that the Italian Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli, who has been in Budapest for some time, is understood to have been sent with a mission to induce the Hungarians to accept the Duke of Savoy as their king. This is rather confirmed by the intense hostility towards Romanelli of the Roumanians, who wanted the Crown Prince Carol to be elected King of Hungary⁽¹⁸⁾, and also that most of the Hungarians are sore on Romanelli.

Yesterday afternoon a British correspondent, named Hamilton, representing a Manchester paper⁽¹⁹⁾, called me up over the telephone and said that the inevitable Archduke, accompanied by his former Prime Minister, Friedrich, who is now supposed to be reorganizing the Hungarian government, butted into the Press Bureau at the Hotel Ritz and announced that M. Clemenceau had sent a telegram to Friedrich directing that three Hungarian plenipotentiaries be sent to the Peace Conference to represent Hungary. Hamilton further stated that Friedrich had publicly announced practically the same thing to delegations in front of his house. All of this is, of course, a damned lie and is the line of propaganda spread to delude the Hungarians into the belief that the Archduke's pet, Friedrich, is persona grata with the Peace Conference.

The Roumanians are proceeding merrily with their seizures and general raising of Hell, All this cannot last indefinitely and something is sure to pop up before long.

August 28, 1919. Yesterday afternoon, accompanied by General Gorton, the British representative, I visited some of the places where reports have been received from Hungarian sources that the Roumanians were making seizures. It is remarkable that, so far as we have been able to verify, not a single Hungarian complaint has been exaggerated. At the warehouse of the Hungarian Discount and Exchange Bank, we found that up to date the Roumanians had seized and removed 2,400 carloads, mainly of provisions and forage, and were daily carting away great quantities. At the Central Depot of the Hungarian Post and Telegraph we found seven cars already loaded, two with shoes and five with carpets and rugs. In this connection, it should be remembered that the Roumanian Commander in Chief said that he had never taken anything that was not absolutely necessary for the use of troops in the field. At this place we also found the Roumanians removing the machinery from the repair shops. At the works of the Ganz-Danubius Company we found the Roumanians busily engaged loading five freight cars with material, under the charge of Lieutenant Vaude Stanescu. At the Hungarian Military Hospital Number I, the Roumanians had ordered all the patients out and there remained only 57 patients in the hospital, whose capacity was 800, and these 57 could not be removed on account of the serious nature of their wounds. Next we visited the Hungarian Central Sanitary Depot and found that under Major C. Georgescu, a medical officer, the Roumanians were absolutely gutting the establishment. In all the places we visited, the manual labor is performed by Hungarian soldiers under Roumanian sentinels.

Last night, accompanied by my aide, Lieutenant Hamilton, I dined with General Graziani, who is billeted in the magnificent home of Count Széchényi. His wife was formerly Gladys Vanderbilt. The other guests were the General Mombelli and his aide-de-camp.

At this morning's session, General Graziani reported that he had received a call from the Hungarian General Soós, Admiral Horthy's Chief of Staff, who said that he would submit to the Mission today his plans for the reorganization of the Hungarian Army. This memorandum was received later and is very excellently prepared and arranged. General Graziani then read a telegram he had received from M. Clemenceau stating that there was no objection on his part to the rotation of the chairmanship in the organization of the Mission. General Mombelli then reported that he had had a call from the Hungarian liaison officer, Colonel Dormándy, who explained that Hungary needed a strong government as quickly as possible, adding that he thought that the Allied Powers should have a force here. General Mombelli reported further that he had had a call from our special bête noire, the Roumanian diplomat Diamandi, during which the latter stated that his government could do nothing with the Hungarian government under Friedrich, and that they could not consent to the reorganization of the police under Friedrich because they knew that such an organization would be used for political purposes. M. Diamandi then tried to pump General Mombelli in regard to what information we had received from Paris, but he got no reply.

Yesterday afternoon, when General Gorton and I returned from our inspection trip, we found Heinrich, Minister of Commerce, awaiting us. He wanted to know if the Entente had stated that they wanted Friedrich at the head of the government, and also what the Entente's attitude would be toward a cabinet formed either with or without Friedrich. We gave him the stereotyped reply that we could not mix in the internal affairs of Hungary. Later a newspaperman came in and told me that he had verified the fact that Friedrich was the organizer of the Christian Socialist party and that although this party had never had over 10 per cent of the membership in Parliament, it was now the only party that was organized and the only one, therefore, able to make itself conspicuous. The newspaperman also stated that Friedrich was determined to remain in power, with the idea of ultimately accomplishing the Archduke's election and return to the head of the government. I wired all this information to the American Commission.

On arrival at my quarters a little before 8 o'clock, I found General Gorton awaiting me, and he gave me the substance of another ultimatum of a somewhat anonymous character, delivered through the Roumanian Ardeli, who had sent the first ultimatum to the Archduke. This one was along similar lines and included demands for immediate peace between Hungary and Roumania; the occupation of Hungary by Roumania for one year; the cession of practically all the strategic points, and then the annexation of Hungary to Roumania. This was coded and ciphered and sent to the American Commission in Paris with a request that a copy be sent to the British Commission.

Early this morning I sent another coded and ciphered message to the American Commission, to the effect that the Roumanians certainly could not continue their arrogant and haughty attitude unless backed by someone, and that I believed it was the French and the Italians who were trying to accomplish some kind of political or other union between Roumania, Hungary, Austria, and Italy, with a view to isolating entirely the Jugo-Slavs.

August 29, 1919. At the meeting this morning, there was the usual discussion and gesticulatory machine gun French on the part of our Latin members, especially after I suggested that the Mission, owing to the attitude of the Roumanians, had accomplished less than nothing since its arrival here, and that we should consider whether or not the time had arrived for notifying the Supreme Council that in our opinion our prolonged stay only subjected us to humiliation from the Roumanians, and our governments to steady loss of prestige with both the Roumanians and the Hungarians. After considerable discussion and playing the fine old game of passing the buck, they invited me to prepare a memorandum on the subject, which I agreed to do.

Last night we had General Mombelli to dinner, and our chef surely did spread himself. He sent in course after course of unknown concoctions, but fortunately all of them came in an inviting manner and tasted good.

This morning I drafted a long memorandum on the subject of the Mission's work in Hungary and sent it by courier to Vienna for transmission to Paris.

August 30, 1919. At the session of the Mission today, at which General Gorton presided, I submitted a memorandum arranged on the basis of the deadly parallel, prefacing the same as follows:

1. This is the eighteenth day that the entire membership of the Mission has been present in Budapest, and unfortunately it must be said that, but for one or two negligible exceptions, practically nothing has been accomplished by the Mission as regards the carrying out of the instructions given it by the Supreme Council. As this has been entirely due to the action of the Roumanian officials in ignoring the Mission's requests, in declining to accept the Mission's instructions as authoritative, it is believed that the time has come when the case should be plainly laid before the Supreme Council and a statement made that, unless there is an immediate change in the attitude of the Roumanian government, it would be useless for the Mission to attempt to function at Budapest. In substantiation of the foregoing, there are presented in chronological order the more important requests made by the Mission to the Roumanian government, and in a parallel column the action taken on the same.

After this there were arranged in parallel columns the requests made on the Roumanian Commander in Chief by the Inter-Allied Military Mission and the action taken on the same by the Roumanian authorities, and in conclusion I added:

2. It will be seen from the foregoing that this Mission has been unable to make any progress whatever in the performance of the duties expressly assigned to it by the Supreme Council. It is difficult to understand what motive can inspire the Roumanian government in following its long-continued line of conduct, but whether the same is due to deliberate intent, to inefficiency of subordinates, or to any other cause, the result is the same. It is recommended that the Military Mission seriously study this matter and consider whether or not it should immediately telegraph the Supreme Council to the effect that it is the unanimous opinion of the members that a continuation of the Mission in Budapest could result in nothing but humiliation for all of us and a loss of prestige for our governments. We shall lose prestige with the Roumanians because they seem to feel that they can treat us with contempt, and with the Hungarians because they can plainly see the treatment we are receiving from the Roumanians.

There was a unanimous opinion that the Roumanians had done nothing to aid the Mission, but on the contrary had ignored it, but in view of the fact that an ultimatum had recently been sent by the Supreme Council to Roumania, it would be advisable to await action on the same before further stirring up the question.

General Mombelli stated that the Archduke Joseph came around to see him last night and explained that Hungary wanted a real monarchy, and that this was the only form of government suitable for these people. He stated that there was some talk of the return of the Emperor Karl as King of Hungary⁽²⁰⁾

; that he himself was personally very fond of his cousin Karl, but that he hardly thought that Karl could fill the bill. He then continued that he felt that he (the Archduke Joseph) was popular in all Hungary, that the people were clamoring for him, and that he should be invested with the royal dignity. General Mombelli stated that he allowed the Archduke to talk, but that he gave him no reply beyond stating that all such matters were for the decision of the Supreme Council, and not for this Mission.

Our beloved Roumanian allies are continuing merrily with their requisitions and seizures, and apparently have not the slightest intention of letting up until they have cleaned Hungary out of everything worth taking.

August 31, 1919. Yesterday one of my agents came to see me and reported that he himself had just had a talk with the Prime Minister Friedrich, who said that he had decided to make peace with Roumania on her own terms inside of seventy-two hours, unless something were done in the meantime by the Entente to alleviate the condition. I immediately sent this by enciphered code to Paris. Later in the afternoon I received word that Friedrich had been to see the British Admiral Troubridge, and had repeated to him practically what he had said to my agent, saying that the Hungarian cause was hopeless, the country was prostrate, the Roumanians were pillaging them right and left, and the Entente was doing absolutely nothing. I repeated this also to Paris. Friedrich is apparently a bullheaded brute who is either in the pay of the Archduke or the Roumanians, or both, and who proposes to run things his own way regardless of all others. He is backed by a powerful minority, which is powerful on account of being organized, and his tendencies are decidedly reactionary. It is believed that he proposes to start a reign of white terror which will make Béla Kun's red terror look like a billy goat by the side of an elephant. They have been beating and maltreating Jews in Budapest and now we have definite information that many wealthy and prominent men have been killed in the country. It is not enough for Hungary that the Roumanians are gutting her, but apparently she now insists on cutting her own throat.

I received word today that Lovászy, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was dropped from Friedrich's last cabinet, has now organized a cabinet of his own and proposes to oust Friedrich inside of twenty-four hours⁽²¹⁾. Business is decidedly poor in Hungary, if we do not have from three to five cabinets per week.

The Roumanians are paying not the slightest attention to the last ultimatum sent them and are going right along with their looting, which has become a habit.

On the twenty-fifth, one of my men, going out with two chauffeurs for an automobile, was held by the Roumanians, and no report about it was ever made to me. For three days he went without food or lodging except such as he could pick up himself. His companions were robbed, and when they were all eventually released, because I took the matter up with the Roumanian Commander here, they were short changed when their money was returned, and for their good blue money they were given worthless Bolshevist money. I had the man's statement prepared and sent a curt note to the Roumanian Commander in Chief that I wanted to know, not later than September second, what he had done or intended to do in this case. I am not sure that some of the Roumanian conduct is due as much to ignorance and stupidity as it is to hostility.

It is difficult to realize how European money has depreciated. The French franc, which was formerly worth nearly twenty cents and which was ordinarily rated at five for a dollar, is today about worth twelve cents. The Austrian and Hungarian krone, worth formerly a little over twenty-one cents, is today worth about two cents.

1. General Holban, who is frequently mentioned unfavorably by General Bandholtz, committed suicide on the eve of the investigation ordered by the Roumanian government after Sir George Clerk had come to look into the situation.

2. Archduke Joseph was a distant relative of the late Emperor~King Karl. He was born in 1872. During the world war he had commanded first a division and later an army corps on the Italian front and had been a popular and capable military leader. He had always considered himself specifically a Hungarian. During the Károlyi and Bolshevik regimes he remained in Hungary, living quietly on his estate under the name of Joseph Hapsburg. On Aug. 6, 1919, he resumed the position of Nádor, or Regent allegedly conferred upon him by Emperor-King Karl. After he was forced by the Allies to resign, he returned to private life and from then on took little part in public affairs.

3. Part of the Bánát was given to Jugo-Slavia by the Peace conference. The Roumanians claimed that it should belong to them and felt very bitter towards the Jugo-Slavs.

4. Diamandi, or Diamandy, was Roumanian Minister in Rome from 1911 to 1913. From there he was transferred to St. Petersburg, where he remained during the world war. Later on he was Roumanian Minister to France. Before the world war he was considered friendly towards the Triple Alliance. See the report of the German Ambassador in Rome, von Flotow, to Bethmann-Hollweg, Nov.13, 1913. "Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette," 1871-1914, Berlin, 1926, Vol. 39, p. 456.

5. This is the first mention of the looting of Hungary by the Roumanians. Other examples are found on pages 38,43, 46, 112, 113, 212, etc.

The following are some opinions of writers familiar with this aspect of Roumanian occupation of Hungary.

"The story of the pillaging by the Roumanian army in Hungary is Homeric. It equals anything of the kind done in the war.-A member of the English Mission, sent into the East of Hungary to investigate the facts, said epigrammatically, that the Roumanians had not even left the nails in the boards!"-John Foster Bass, The Peace Tangle, New York, 1920, p.193.

"The Roumanian invasion was more like an old-time Highland cattle foray than a war."-L. Haden Guest, The Struggle for Power in Europe, London, 1921, p.195.

"The Magyars detest the Roumanians on account of their looting during the occupation following the Béla Kun régime.-They are accused of having stolen everything movable - plate, pictures, carpets, linen, furniture, even down to the cloth of billiard tables. They took the best thoroughbreds and let them die in the train for want of food. They took twelve hundred locomotives and left the Hungarians only four hundred. In my hotel Béla Kun had done five million crowns' worth of damage. The Roumanians did seven million worth. They took literally everything, and the rooms are still without telephones as a result of their brigandage. This, of course, is all the Hungarian account of what happened."-Charles à Court Repington, After the War, Boston, 1912, p.165.

Even E. J. Dillon, the most ardent defender of Roumanian interests, says: "They [the Roumanians] seized rolling stock, cattle, agricultural implements, and other property of the kind that had been stolen from their people and sent the booty home without much ado." The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, p.230. How far his statement is correct is left to the reader to judge from the facts given in this diary. Dillon calls the action of the Roumanians "wholesale egotism."

"Hungary has suffered a Roumanian occupation, which was worse almost than the revolutions of Bolshevism."-Francesco Nitti, The Wreck of Europe, Indianapolis, 1912, p.171.

Louis K. Birinyi, The Tragedy of Hungary, Cleveland, 1924. Especially Chapter XX, "Hungary Fleeced during the Armistice." It is somewhat rhetorical and not always accurate. This is particularly true of his account of the occupation of Budapest by Horthy's troops and the evacuation of Budapest.

On the other hand Cecil John Charles Street, in Hungary and Democracy, London, 1923, states "To Roumania was assigned the task of restoring order, and in her execution of it she displayed an ability and a restraint which will forever redound to her credit" (p.200). Mr. Street makes it appear as if the aim of the Roumanians in invading Hungary with their "well disciplined forces" was principally to save the world from Bolshevism. From Street and Jászi is taken the account of Hungary by C. Deslisle Burns, 1918-1928, A Short History of the World, New York, 1928. Consequently it is entirely one-sided.

We may also refer to the statement in the standard short history of Roumania by N. Jorga, A History of Roumania. Translated from the second edition by Joseph McCabe, London, 1925. "For several months the capital of Hungary was in possession of the Roumanians, and a day will come when the baseless charges which are made against the commander of the army will be judged at their proper value. Light is already breaking, in fact, upon these unjust charges" (p.263). Charles Upson Clark, Greater Roumania, New York, 1922. Mr. Clark was an American newspaper correspondent. He is a great friend of Roumania. His views are admittedly one-sided. He says: "Relying in general on Rotimanian sources, I shall try to check them up so as not to give too partial an account" (p.242). Of special interest for us is Chapter XIX, "The Roumanians in Budapest." In this chapter he makes the statement that he is "trying to get at the truth - with a strong Roumanian bias, I admit, but anxious to do justice on all sides" (p. 257). "Doubtless few situations have ever combined more complex factors than did Budapest under the Roumanians. - No historian will ever clear them up fully" (p.258).

6. Mr. Stephen Friedrich had originally been a democratic Republican and an ardent personal follower of Michael Károlyi. During the Bolshevik terror he changed his opinions completely and became one of the most active counter-revolutionists and an anti-Semitic nationalist. He is still a member of Parliament and considers himself now a Fascist.

7. Cf. Introduction.

8. Obviously a mistake on the part of General Bandholtz. Cf. Introduction, p. xxvi.

9. Nicholas Horthy de Nagybánya. Born in 1868, belongs to an old family of the landed gentry. He entered the Austro-Hungarian navy. During the World war he distinguished himself greatly and at the end of it was appointed Commander in Chief of the Austro~Hungarian fleet. He helped to organize the anti-Bolshevik counter-revolution and was made Commander in Chief of the army of the new government. On March 1, 1920, he was chosen Governor or Regent, which position he is still holding today.

It is the same title with which two other Hungarians have been previously honored, John Hunyadi in the fifteenth, and Louis Kossuth in the nineteenth century.

10. See other pro-Roumanian actions of the French on pp. 32, 35, 57, 79,105,110, 125,331.

11. The Ödenburg or Sopron district, the so-called Burgenland, in the western part of Hungary.

12. While the Hungarians were returning to monarchial institutions and showed no dislike for the Hapsburg dynasty, the government of Austria was decidedly socialistic-republican and violently anti-Hapsburg.

13. This is the first statement in the Diary pertaining to the important question of the reorganization of the Hungarian police or gendarmerie, which, on Sept. 5, the Inter-Allied Military Mission put into the hands of colonel Yates, U.S. Army. The Roumanians tried to prevent such a re-organization. References to their policy in this respect may be found in statements of Sept. 1, 2, 18, 22, 24, 29, Oct. 3, and 6. Upon completion of the work Colonel Yates was, on Nov.19, officially congratulated by the Inter-Allied Military Mission.

It was undoubtedly the firmness of the Inter-Allied Military Mission which brought about the desired result, and not the good offices of Mr. Vopicka. Charles J. Vopicka was U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Roumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. In his book, Secrets of the Balkans, New York, 1921, he assumes some credit for the compliance of the Roumanians with the demands of the Allies.

"Polk," he says, "told me what was demanded by the Allies from Roumania, and stated that unless she complied with this request, the Allies would sever relations. I first spoke to the Roumanian members of the Peace Commission in Paris, and then I sent telegrams to the Roumanian Prime Minister. Within ten days the Roumanian government complied with the first request of the Commission, to supply 10,000 gendarmes in Hungary with arms and ammunition, and also complied with the other things which were required, with the exception that they refused to sign the treaty between Roumania and Austria" (p. 306).

14. I found an amusing laconic footnote by Lieutenant-colonel Repington in his After the War, A Diary, Boston, 1922. "Roumanians are not remarkable for keeping promises or appointments" (p. 327).

15. His proclamation on leaving the government may be found in Malbone W. Graham, New Governments of Central Europe, New York, 1924, p.583.

16. Public opinion in the principal Allied countries and in the United States concerning the situation in Hungary was divided. On page 748 of the New International Year Book for 1919, New York, 1920, we find the following summary: "A portion of the American press complained that in France among the official class as well as among the Italian representatives there was a tendency to blame the United States and to a less degree Great Britain for what was considered the harsh treatment of Roumania. As Italian and French representatives on the Supreme Council had approved its action, there seemed to be no color to these accusations, but in the French and Italian press there was a disposition to find excuses for Roumania in every instance, and to oppose any effort toward keeping her within bounds." In this same article, War of the Nations, may he found a moderate and critical explanation of the Roumanian viewpoint by a French journalist. The commentary on the disregard of the Allied demands by Roumania was very severe in the United States. Read also the articles by Frank H. Simonds, "Hungary, the Balkans, and the League," in The American Review of Reviews, Sept., 1919, and in the October issue of the same Review, "The European Reaction." Another summarizing article is contained in the Literary Digest, April 23, 1919, "Roumania's Invasion of Hungary." Dillon says, in the book previously referred to, that the French papers applauded the action of the Roumanians, and also the English; but he gives no example of the latter. In fact, liberal public opinion in England was absolutely opposed to it.

17. Szolnok, a river port on the right bank of the Theiss. Population not quite 29,000. An important market and railroad center.

18. Compare statement to this effect in the entry of the Diary on Aug. 11.

19. Obviously the Manchester Guardian.

20. The Allies would never have permitted Karl to be King of Hungary. At the end of March and Oct., 1921, he made two unsuccessful attempts to seize the throne. He died at Madeira on April 1, 1922.

21. This did not materialize.

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