THE YEAR 1093 marked the opening of a flood tide of Norman conquest which,
within the year, had submerged all but the most mountainous and barren regions
of South Wales. Bernard of Neufmarché held Brecknock, Fitz-Hamon held
Glamorgan, the Montgomerys were in possession of Deheubarth, and Fitz-Baldwin
had constructed a royal castle dominating the vale of Towy. By the end of the
same year of 1093, the earl of Chester had succeeded in establishing Norman
outposts along the northern coast of Wales, and his garrisons controlled the
fertile island of Anglesey. Organized Welsh resistance had completely
disintegrated, and it appeared that the ancient traditions of Welsh
independence had come to an end
Such was not to be the case. In 1093 and 1094 a number of events conspired to
weaken the Norman cause considerably and to make possible a popular Welsh
uprising which altered the situation drastically. In the first place, Roger of
Montgomery, the earl of Shrewsbury, died, and was succeeded by Hugh, his second
son.1 Roger had been the most powerful lord on the Welsh marches,
and he had been, perhaps more than any other single man, responsible for the
massive conquest which was still underway. His armies had recently occupied
Deheubarth, but the honor of settling the conquest which he had begun was
denied him. The removal of his strong and directing hand at this critical time
represented a serious loss to the Norman cause.
1For the date of Earl Roger's death, see J. E. Lloyd, A
History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest, II,
403, n. 18.
The Welsh Reaction 113
Leadership of the marcher lords would have fallen to the doughty earl of
Chester, had this earl not chosen this time to return to the continent to
attend to his affairs there.2 The Norman conquerors were also denied royal leadership and support, since the king chose the critical year of 1094 to
wage war against his brother, Robert Curthose.3 The cause of Norman conquest in Wales had lost the leadership which might have been expected to give it proper direction. Norman power in Wales appeared everywhere to be at
its height, but direction and reserve strength were lost. Behind their appearance of power, the Norman invaders were critically weak.
This need not have been disastrous, had it not been for the fact that in the
same year in which the Normans lost their leadership, the Welsh regained
theirs. A daring plot succeeded in freeing Gruffydd ap Cynan, hereditary ruler
of Gwynedd, from the Chester prison in which he had languished for twelve
years.4 Allied with his energetic brother, Cadwgan, Gruffydd
gathered some forces, attacked the Norman fortresses on Anglesey and speedily
freed the island of its invaders. The uprising spread rapidly, and great
expanses of territory were returned to Welsh control. The great castle of
Montgomery itself was taken by a sudden Welsh attack. Once again Welsh raiders
were able to range freely, and they struck across the border to bring
devastation deep into the heart of Shropshire.5
The situation along the border deteriorated so rapidly that it soon became
apparent that royal intervention was necessary to stabilize affairs. It was not
until the fall of 1095, however, that Rufus was either willing or able to
attempt to restore Norman ascendancy in Wales.6 He realized that the core of Welsh resistance lay in the resurgent kingdom of Gwynedd and
accordingly directed his efforts toward that region. The Welsh replied by
employing tactics which had frustrated the effort of many previous expeditions
of a similar character. Falling back before the royal force, they transferred
their families and chattels to the mountain wilderness of Snowdonia. As
2The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, According to the Several Original Authorities, ed. and trans. B. Thorpe, Part I, p. 361, s.a.
1093.
3Brut y Tywysogion: or The Chronicle of the Princes of
Wales, ed. J. Williams ab Ithel, s.a. 1092 [sic], p. 57. One might note
that there exists a confusion in the Brut concerning the purpose of
William's trip to the continent
4The complete story of this romantic figure may be found in
The History of Gruffydd ap Cynan. The Welsh Text with Translation,
Introduction and Notes, ed. and trans. A. Jones.
5Annales de Margan, ed. H. R. Luard, p. 6
6The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1096, Part I, pp.
36-363.
114 The Normans in South Wales
the campaigning season drew to a close, Rufus was faced with the prospect
of leading his force into a region in which supply would be difficult and the
danger of ambush great. He had failed in his purpose of drawing the Welsh into
an open combat in which he could crush their power. Frustrated, he withdrew to
Chester and brought the campaign to an end.
He had done little harm to the cause of Welsh resistance. On the contrary, his
failure appears to have encouraged the Welsh insurgents. The men of Deheubarth
joined in what soon became a general revolt. By the end of the year virtually
all of the Montgomerys' conquests had been erased. The tide of revolt then
rolled inland to Brecknock and Gwent. Only Glamorgan appears to have been
untouched, though our reason for saying so lies mainly in our lack of
information concerning it. The open countryside lay at the mercy of the Welsh,
and the Normans were restricted to those castles which they had constructed
during the previous few years and which were relatively proof against the
assaults of Welsh raiders.
It was not until the spring of 1097 that Rufus could again gather forces to
lead against the Welsh.7 Once more he failed to force the Welsh into
open battle and to defeat them. Despite these repeated failures, large parts of
Wales were gradually brought back under Norman control in the next few years.
This success was accomplished by Norman pursuit of a new strategy, one based
upon a vastly expanded program of castle building. In the light of this fact it
seems possible that the major purpose of the royal expedition of 1097 was not
to defeat the Welsh in open combat, but to provide a screen for the
construction of additional castles in rebellious regions.8 Rufus'
failure in 1095 seems to have led the Normans to develop a castle-building
strategy which was to make of Wales a land dominated by
fortresses.9
To appreciate the effectiveness of this new strategy, it is necessary to
understand the two types of military organization which opposed each other
during the conquest of Wales. One was the Norman military machine, basically a
product of the plains of northern France and of the agrarian society which
flourished there. It was, like all
7Lloyd, A History of Wales, II, 408, n. 3.
8The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1087, Part I, p. 355;
also see E. A. Freeman, The Reign of William Rufus and the Accession of
Henry I, II, 69-71.
9See J. H. Peelers "Castles and strategy in Norman and Early Angevin England," Speculum, XXXI ( 1956 ), 581-401.
The Welsh Reaction 115
military organizations, designed to seize and hold the bases of power. In
this case, the bases of power consisted of arable land which produced the
wealth of this society, which in turn supported the professional soldiers who
composed its armies. The Norman military machine was, therefore, composed of
specialized, full-time, mounted men admirably adapted to fighting in that type
of terrain which it had been designed to control. The military organization of
the Welsh was very different. It had been produced in a mountainous region by a
nonagricultural society. The bases of power of this society consisted of tribal
and clan rights over grazing lands, and the cattle upon which the society
subsisted. The Welsh military machine was accordingly, a loosely organized,
part-time, infantry force primarily designed to pursue feuds, and to engage in
cattle raiding and looting expeditions.
By placing their primary emphasis upon castles, the Normans changed the way
warfare was carried on in Wales. Hitherto they had aimed at complete conquest
by devastation and the destruction of enemy field forces. This had proven to be
ineffective, since Welsh society neither produced nor possessed much wealth
which could be devastated or destroyed by the tactics available to the Normans,
and because the Welsh army was not the sort of organized field force which
could be crushed in regular campaigns. The tactics and organization of the
Normans, on the other hand, were not such as to allow them to carry on the
desultory and irregular warfare which was necessary to meet the Welsh on their
own terms.
It is important, however, to note that when the Normans began to emphasize
defensive works, they changed their military objectives from success in open
combat to success in positional warfare. The Welsh were both militarily and
socially incapable at this time of competing with the Normans in any such
struggle. Their economy and customs were those of a pastoral people, and it was
extremely difficult for them to maintain continuous occupation and control of
any given area. The practice of transhumance, for instance, made it necessary
for the normal Welsh community to relinquish control of its lowland meadows
each summer and to migrate to the uplands. In their temporary absence, the
Normans could quickly construct a castle which could then dominate the area and
deny it to its previous owners.
Furthermore, the Norman castles which began to dot the Welsh countryside struck
at yet another weakness in the Welsh social and military organization.
Contemporary Welsh sources make it clear that
116 The Normans in South Wales
the primary objective of their military activity lay in the acquisition of
booty. The Brut y Tywysogion, in describing the failure of the royal expedition
of 1095, states: ". . . and William returned home empty, without having gained
anything. The phrase "empty, without having gained anything,"10
appears again applied to an unsuccessful Norman expedition of 1096. This
characterization of failure must be compared with the manner in which the Brut
describes the successful expedition of the Welsh against Pembroke in the same
year of 1096. The words of the Brut are that they "despoiled it of all its
cattle, ravaged the whole country, and with an immense booty returned
home."11 This emphasis upon the success of a military operation
being reflected primarily in the plunder gained is reiterated in entries for
1095, 1100, 1102, and succeeding years. The Brut thus makes it clear that Welsh
military efforts were primarily directed at the seizure of booty. Other
instances illustrate that when any Welsh leader failed in this aim, his
following quickly dispersed to less dangerous and more profitable pursuits.
The Norman strategy of castle building played upon this peculiarity of Welsh
military tradition. In the first place, the castle not only provided a refuge
for men, but also a place for the safekeeping of chattels. In any case other
than a surprise attack, all movable wealth could be placed within the castle.
In order to obtain any appreciable amount of plunder, the Welsh would have to
carry at least the outer works of the castle. Since they lacked the
organization and technology for effective siege operations, this was anything
but an easy task. The expansion of castle building slowly brought to an end the
possibility of quick and profitable raids on the part of the Welsh.
The castles which the Normans constructed also acted as a defense for the rich
lands to their rear. The way in which they performed this task is not apparent
at first glance. In terms of guarding the exits from the Welsh uplands, the
castles were relatively weak and ineffective. Welsh raiders who cared to strike
into the comparatively unfortified heartland of Norman holdings no doubt found
it an easy task to bypass the Norman fortresses by stealth, celerity, or a
simple diversion of route. On the return trip, however, such raiders found that
the castles also guarded the entrances to the hills. Burdened with captives,
cattle, and other booty, the raiders were now denied evasive
10Brut y Tywysogion, pp. 56-59.
11 Ibid., pp. 56-59.
The Welsh Reaction 117
action. In order to gain the safety of the uplands, they had to move slowly
along a practicable route. This was a course which inevitably brought them
under the walls of a Norman fortress. This fact meant that the choice of
battle, which had hitherto lain with Welsh raiders, now belonged to Norman
garrisons. This was an advantage which quickly brought a much greater measure
of security to the lowlands of Wales
In the long run, the Norman policy of castle building succeeded in
consolidating most of the conquests which the invaders had made. At the same
time, however, it set a limit on that conquest, for in adopting it the Normans
admitted their incapability of meeting and defeating the Welsh in the upland
plateaus where they made their home This first successful Welsh revolt
presented the embryonic Cambro-Norman society with a real challenge. It
challenged the Normans to produce a military machine capable of waging
successful mountain warfare, and to develop social and economic institutions
able to settle and exploit the wilderness which lay above the six hundred foot
contour line. The Normans failed to meet this challenge. At this crucial point,
they gave up the initiative which had been so brilliantly seized by William
Fitz-Osbern and his immediate successors. This Norman failure set the pattern
for the next century and a half of Welsh history.
By 1100, then, Norman occupation of the fertile valleys and rolling plains of
southern Wales was essentially complete. The tide of Norman conquest had washed
up to the six hundred foot contour line, and had come to a halt. The history of
the area for the next 150 years was to be one of transient political hegemonies
established across this line by one side or the other. It was also to be the
story of the complete failure of Anglo-Norman society to establish itself in
the highland moors. A society which was based on the mounted knight and the
manor was incapable of adjusting to an environment where the horse brought no
power, and the manor brought no profits.
As the eleventh century drew to a close, an era of opportunity and high hopes
came to an end for the Normans along the Welsh frontier We have already
remarked that the last decade of the century saw the end of the dynamic
flexibility of the Normans in this region. Contact and interchange was to
continue, but largely on Welsh terms. In the years to come, it was the backward
Welsh society of the uplands which was to derive the greater benefit from the
stimulation of the frontier environment. The Welsh were to develop a culture
not only.
118 The Normans in South Wales
capable of maintaining itself, but even of expanding in the face of
Anglo-Norman influences. The Cambro-Norman culture which developed in the
lowlands tended to isolate itself from Welsh influences and, except for a few
exceptions, remained relatively passive and derivative. Cultural initiative had
clearly passed into the hands of the Welsh. Norman loss of cultural initiative
was coupled with a loss of political initiative which, in the early years of
the twelfth century, set a seal upon the failure of Norman hopes of conquest
and expansion into all of Wales. This was in part the result of the revolt of
Robert of Bellêum;me; an uprising that called forth a revised royal frontier
policy which radically altered the situation along the border.
It happened in the following way. In the summer of 1098, during the Welsh
rebellion we have been discussing, Earl Hugh of Chester and Hugh, second earl
of Shrewsbury, had joined forces in driving the Welsh from the fertile isle of
Anglesey. At the height of their success, however, their forces were attacked
by the fleet of Magnus Barefoot of Norway, who happened to be cruising in the
area. A battle ensued in which Hugh of Shrewsbury was killed, and the Normans
were forced to retreat in disorder. Magnus made no attempt to hold the island,
and departed, leaving Anglesey to be reclaimed by Gruffydd ap
Cynan.12
With Hugh of Montgomery dead, the earldom of Shrewsbury now fell to his eldest
brother, Robert of Bellêum;me, by all accounts the most vicious and
ambitious man the Welsh marches had yet seen. By this inheritance, his earlier
acquisitions, and an advantageous marriage, a great amount of wealth and power
were concentrated in his hands. Shropshire, with its great castle of Shrewsbury,
was his, as were extensive tracts in Sussex, together with the great castle of
Arundel in that shire. His possessions in Normandy included the lordships of
Montgomery and Alençl;on, the vicecomtes of Argentan and Falaise,
and the wardship of a number of castles along the Norman border. Finally, through his marriage into the house of Talvas, he held the entire county of Ponthieu.
Thanks to these holdings, Robert was something more than a vassal of the king;
he was the equal of many of the princes of Europe.
His power did not end with his personal holdings since his brother Arnulf was
lord of the newly acquired region of Pembrokeshire and of the strong fortress
which had been constructed there. The latter
12Brut y Tywysogion, pp. 60-63.
The Welsh Reaction 119
was also allied with King Murtagh of Ireland, whose daughter he had
married.13 He also had a second brother, Roger of Poitou, holder of
great estates in the region of Lancashire. In addition to these family ties.
Robert sought to increase his power yet further by reaching a modus vivendi
with his Welsh neighbors. He granted Powys and Ceredigion to a rebel, Cadwgan
ap Bleddyn, in exchange for this grant the sons of Bleddyn-Cadwgan, Maredudd,
and Iorwerth- became his vassals.14 He allowed Gruffydd ap Cynan
peaceable possession of Gwynedd, probably as part of a general armistice. It
seems clear then that in a very short time after 1098 Robert was able to
restore order along the Welsh border, and, if not to reoccupy the Montgomery
conquests, at least to maintain a nominal sovereignty over them.
His ambition was not such as to be satiated with the power and wealth which
were already his, and he soon found a possible means of increasing them. On the
second of August in 1100, William Rufus died of an arrow wound received while
hunting in the New Forest. The king's younger brother, Henry, quickly seized
upon the confusion, took control of the treasury at Winchester, and, only three
days after Rufus' death, was crowned king at Westminster. Henry's succession
did not go unchallenged, however, for a large number of the Norman nobility
would have preferred to see Robert Curthose, duke of Normandy, take the throne.
It may be that these dissidents saw in Robert a weakness and permissiveness
which might have allowed them to gain the same unbridled liberty in England
which they had come to exercise in their Norman possessions. At any rate,
Robert of Bellêum;me was prominent among those who pledged their support of Robert's claim to the English crowned
So when in July of 1102 Robert invaded England with a sizable force of Norman
adherents, he was soon joined by many of the nobles of England. He quickly
proved, however, to be an ineffectual leader. A personal confrontation of the
two brothers was arranged, which led to a compromise and eventually a treaty
between the two.16 Duke Robert returned to Normandy, and Robert of
Bellêum;me and his friends found themselves without a cause.
13Orderic Vitalis, "Historiae Ecclesiasticae libri XIII in partes
tres divisi," in Patrologia Latina, ed. J. P. Migne, Vol.
CLXXXVIII, cols. 794-795
14Brut y Tywysogion, pp. 66-69.
15 Orderic Vitalis, col. 787
16 Ibid., col. 788.
120 The Normans in South Wales
The terms of the treaty which had been concluded seem to have guaranteed
that no retaliation would be visited upon Duke Robert's adherents for their
espousal of his cause. It soon became evident, however, that Henry intended to
circumvent this agreement if at all possible and to destroy the power and
fortunes of those who had opposed him. In the next few months the lesser
members of the dissident party were haled into court on trivial or trumped-up
charges, and saddled with ruinous fines and forfeitures. A group of royal spies
meanwhile haunted the footsteps of Robert of Bellêum;me, compiling reports
on his activities. By Easter of 1103, Henry had gathered enough evidence to
summon Robert to the Easter assembly to answer to a series of no less than
forty-five separate charges.17
Robert was probably fully aware that the outcome of his trial was
predetermined. Rather than answering the royal summons, he attempted to stall
for time, and meanwhile made preparations for war. His castles and those of his
brother Arnulf were repaired and strengthened. Mercenaries were hired, and the
two brothers' vassals were called on for service. A special reliance was placed
upon those Welsh with whom Robert had allied himself.18 Most of the earl's movable wealth was delivered into the hands of the Welsh for safekeeping
and was transported by them into the mountain fastnesses of central Wales.
Cadwgan, Maredudd, and Iorwerth gathered large war bands and, led by the earl,
raided deep into the heart of Staffordshire. Once again the dilemma of border
defense had been raised. A border lord strong enough to ensure peace and
stability to the frontier had also proven strong enough to use the enemy for
his personal ends. The alliance of a fierce enemy and an equally fierce border
captain was a formidable combination.
Henry's strategy was twofold; first, to reduce Robert's strongholds piecemeal,
and, second, to dislodge the Welsh from their alliance with the earl. Both
programs were eminently successful. Arundel was speedily invested and soon
surrendered to royal authority. Tickhill, in Yorkshire, quickly followed, and
Henry marched upon Robert's newly constructed castle of Bridgenorth, in
Shropshire. The menace of the Welsh allies of Robert who were roving in this
region seriously interfered with Henry's siege of Bridgenorth. He quickly sent
William Pantulph, a holder of extensive lands in Shropshire, to arrange an
audience between the king and Iorwerth, one of the rebellious
17Ibid., col. 791
18Brut y Tywysogion, pp. 66-69.
The Welsh Reaction 121
Welsh chieftains.19 He offered Iorwerth dominion over all of South
and Central Wales, with the exception of the marcher lordships of
Brecknockshire, Gwent, Glamorgan, and part of Pembrokeshire, and the offer was
quickly accepted. Iorwerth took command of the Welsh bands and began to harry
Earl Robert's lands. This defection broke Robert's resistance. Bridgenorth soon
surrendered, and Robert forestalled a royal siege of Shrewsbury only by his
prompt submission to the king. The rebel was deported to Normandy, and the
power of the house of Montgomery came to an end in England.
With the end of Robert of Bellêum;me's power the Norman political system
along the border took on a vastly different aspect. The great semi-independent
earldoms which had hitherto dominated the border, and had provided the primary
direction and power for the conquest of Wales, had come to an end. Hugh of
Chester, one of the great warriors of marcher tradition, was dead; Hereford and
Shrewsbury were escheated to the crown; and Gloucester lay in the hands of Robert
Fitz-Hamon, a man increasingly involved in the continental struggles between
King Henry and Duke Robert.20 No power existed along the frontier
sufficient to challenge the authority of the king. Henceforth, expansion and
conquest were to be directed from the royal court, and freedom of opportunity
was to be strictly limited in the royal interest. The great earls and the
border barons who had achieved the successes of the previous century, had
proved incapable of consolidating and holding what they had won, and, what is
more, had proven extremely dangerous to the peace of the realm of England.
Under Henry, these freebooters disappeared, and, with them, much of the dynamic
character of Norman society. The strength of the Anglo-Normans was still so
overwhelming that expansion continued, but it was vastly different in
character.
King Henry's regard for organization and stability was too great, however, to
allow the marches of Wales to remain in a leaderless state for long. In the
years that followed, a new leadership developed along the border as Henry
introduced a new personnel into the region and established and regularized
their position there.
The death of the Welsh chieftain, Hywel ap Gronw, in 1106, offered Henry his
first opportunity to make basic readjustments in the situation in South Wales.
In the general settlement which had followed the fall of Robert of
Bellêum;me, Hywel had been granted do
19Orderic Vitalis, col. 793; Brut y Tywysogion, pp.
70-71
20See Chapter V above.
122 The Normans in South Wales
minion over the vale of Towy, Kidwelly, and Gower, and his death released these
areas for reassignment. Kidwelly was now granted to Roger, bishop of Salisbury
and justiciar of England. A castle was soon constructed and a borough sprung up
under the castle's walls. The old commote soon became a regular marcher
lordship. Much the same fate awaited Gower, which was granted to the powerful
Henry, earl of Warwick. Warwick began the pacification of the area from the
great castle which he built at Swansea.21
Consolidation and expansion now continued in other regions. By 1108, Norman
control was re-established in Pembrokeshire, and a colony of Flemish weavers
and mercenaries was established in the region by royal order.22 A
new and increased royal interest was shown to the lower vale of Towy. By 1109 a
new castle had been constructed at Carmarthen which replaced the old fortress
of Rhydygors. The area was governed by Walter, sheriff of Gloucester, in the
royal interest.23 In 1110, the king awarded the plains of Ceredigion
to Gilbert Fitz-Richard of Clare, a member of a noble family that had firmly
supported Henry in his first steps to the throne. Gilbert brought a group of
followers with him into the region, and divided the area into a series of
dependent lordships, much upon the model of Glamorgan. Two great Clare castles
arose at Cardigan and Aberystwyth, while smaller castles in each of the
dependent lordships provided local protection.24 By 1119, the
lordship of lower Gwent, which had escheated to the crown as a result of the
rebellion of Roger of Breteuil in 1075, was revived and was granted to Walter
Fitz-Richard of Clare, brother of the lord of Ceredigion.25 The
lesser lordships of Abergavenny and Monmouth were strengthened by being placed
in the hands of active supporters of the king.
Perhaps the most important element in Henry's work of reorganization, though,
lay in the marriages which he arranged. The earldom of Gloucester, which lay in
royal hands after the death of Fitz-Hamon in 1107, finally passed to Henry's
illegitimate son, the able Robert of
21For the Anglo-Norman settlement of Gower, an interesting
commentary is provided by D. T. Williams, "Gower: A Study in Linguistic
Movements and Historical Geography," Archaeologia Cambrensis,
LXXXIX (1934), 302-327.
22See H. Owen, "The Flemings in Pembrokeshire," Archaeology
Cambrensis, Series It, Vol. XII (1895), pp. 96-106.
23 For an excellent history of the Norman settlement of
Carmarthenshire, see J. E. Lloyd, A History of Carmarthenshire.
24See J. E. Lloyd, The Story of Ceredigion
(400-1282).
25See J. H. Round, "The Family of Clare," The Archaeological Journal, LVI ( 1899) Series II, Vol. VI, 221-231.
The Welsh Reaction 123
Caen, by his marriage to Fitz-Hamon's heiress, Mabel. The honor of Gloucester
was reconstituted an earldom, and Robert emerged as the paramount leader of the
marcher lords of South Wales. Bernard of Neufmarché, the first of the
original conquerors of Wales, was perhaps the last to leave the scene, dying
sometime around 1125. His place was taken by Miles, son of Walter, the sheriff of
Gloucester. Miles had been married to Bernard's daughter, Sybil, in the spring
of 1121, and the succession had been assured to him at that time.26
The remainder of Henry's reign saw the slow, but steady, consolidation of
Norman power in South Wales. The overall pattern of settlement in the region
was relatively uniform, and seems almost consciously based upon the
organization of Glamorgan, the only lordship to endure the rebellions of the
close of the eleventh century with any degree of stability. It seems strange
that such advances could have been made under the direction of an authority
which was as we have said, more interested in stability than in conquest The
reason for this peculiarity lies partly in the character of the settlement, and
partly in the political situation of the times. The Normans took, held, and
settled only those areas which were capable of supporting the agrarian society
necessary to maintain a feudal structure Everywhere the pattern was similar to
that observable in Glamorgan; the Normans were content to exercise only a vague
suzerainty over such lands as were not capable of sustaining intensive
agriculture. Since it was exactly these relatively barren regions which the
Welsh valued most highly, the friction between Welsh natives and Norman
settlers was minimized. Secondly, throughout this period the Welsh were
politically paralyzed by disastrous feuds between the ruling
families.27 They could present no united front against the invaders,
and time and again the Normans were able to use jealousies and rivalries to
prevent the growth of unity and able leadership among their enemies.
The history of South Wales during the reign of Henry I then is one of apparent
Norman success. Under the directing authority of the great king, the second
generation of conquerors achieved much of what the first generation had sought.
Two major elements were missing, however. In the first place, the original
attacks had aimed at the political conquest and eventual absorption or complete
subjugation
26Calendar of Documents Preserved in France, Illustrative of
the History of Great Britain and Ireland, ed. J. H. Round, pp. 8-9
27Lloyd, A History of Wales, II, 417 ff
124 The Normans in South Wales
of the Welsh. The new program had more limited objectives. It was in the royal
interest that certain Welsh communities and political groups be maintained
intact to act as a counterbalance to the marcher lords. This was a program
which had most serious consequences. In such areas as were protected by royal
authority, Welsh society was allowed to develop unhindered, to the point where
it was capable of supporting a sense of national identity which was to make the
ultimate conquest of Wales extremely difficult. In the second place, the
initial conquest had brought power and a large measure of independence to those
nobles who had led the advance. This aspect of the process of conquest had
changed greatly. The precedents established in the earlier period were not
discarded, but, under Henry, the trend was not allowed to continue. The
security and success which royal leadership brought to the marcher lords had
been purchased by a distinct limitation in the opportunities which the Welsh
frontier afforded.
Henry's ascendancy in Wales established an era of relative peace which was
unparalleled in the history of the region. In the long run, however, the royal
policy which secured this peace worked against the interests of the Norman
invaders. Peace brought an increase of wealth and population to the Welsh
people; and peaceable contact with the Normans brought them knowledge of new
techniques in military and political affairs. Peace also afforded them an
opportunity to absorb these new techniques at their leisure and to integrate
them into the native culture.28 Throughout this period Welsh society
grew more dynamic and developed a greater sense of nationality.
This process occurred in many spheres of Welsh life, but a single example may
suffice for the many trends which can be observed. Nowhere was cultural
borrowing more dramatically illustrated than in the Welsh adoption of the
typically Norman process of castle building. A total of 123 castles were
constructed in Wales prior to 1189, and of these no less than 14 were built by
the native Welsh princes.29 Of these, 8 are mentioned in
contemporary sources, and, for this reason, something is known concerning their
foundation. The earliest known, Cymmer in Merioneth, was constructed in 1115 by
Uchtred ab Edwin, a man whose name suggests strong English connections. In the
1140's, the castles of Cynfael and Llanrhystud were built at the
28Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera, eds. J. S. Brewer et al.,
Part VI (Itinerarium Kambriae), pp. 217-218.
29 See Beeler, "Castles and Strategy in Norman and Early Angevin
England."
The Welsh Reaction 125
command of Cadwaladr ap Gruffydd ap Cynan, who had, for some time, been
an ally and protege of the Normans.30 The remainder of the
list includes Aberdovey (1155), Caernion (1155), Walwen (before 1163),
Abereinion (1169), and Rhaidrgwy (1177).31 This list is
assuredly incomplete. Many castles were probably constructed by the
Welsh the existence of which is unrecorded in the sources. At the same
time, the list is restricted to those castles whose original
foundations were Welsh, and thus omits many castles rebuilt and
occupied by the Welsh princes. On the other hand, the list does
indicate that the Welsh castles were constructed mostly by chieftains
who were subject to unusually heavy Anglo-Norman influences. Secondly,
the remains of these native Welsh works show that the original
construction was of the typically Norman motte-and-bailey type. Taken
together, these facts provide sufficient indication that such castles
represent a technology which the Welsh were borrowing directly from the
Normans, and turning to their own advantage.
At the same time a continuous influence of Anglo-Norman legal and
political techniques is observable in the development of Welsh
institutions.32 The Welsh quickly borrowed many of the
institutions of the typical feudal state of the times. This development
was not of such a magnitude as to allow the Welsh to compete with the
other states of western Europe in terms of organization, but it did
become possible for the Welsh to unify and coordinate their activities
with a degree of efficiency hitherto impossible.
One can see the immediate results of this when the strong hand of Henry
was removed from Wales. Shortly after Henry's death, when Stephen, his
successor, had been crowned, the Welsh of Western Brycheiniog rose in
revolt. They raided into Gower and inflicted a stunning defeat upon the
Anglo-Norman forces defending the region.33 Old names soon
rose to haunt the Normans as Gruffydd ap Rhys ap Tewdwr appealed to
Owain ap Gruffydd ap Cynan to join in a general revolt. The uprising
received another stimulus when Iorwerth ab Owain ap Caradog ap Gruffydd
managed to ambush Richard Fitz-Gilbert of Clare, and to kill this
powerful lord of Ce-
30Lloyd, A History of Wales, II, 491, n. 18
31E. S. Armitage, The Early Norman Castles of the
British Isles, pp. 299-301.
32 For details of this process, see T. Jones-Pierce, "The
Age of Princes," The Historical Basis of Welsh
Nationalism, pp. 42-59; T. P. Ellis, Welsh Tribal Law and
Custom in the Middle Ages, I, 11
33Gesta
Stephani, ed. and trans. K. R. Potter, p. 10.
126
The Normans in South Wales
redigion. Soon again the countryside was at the mercy of the Welsh.
Faced by this danger, King Stephen took vigorous measures to meet the
challenge. Large sums were expended upon two expeditions sent into
Wales but both attempts to subdue the rebellious Welsh failed. After
these two fiascos, the Gesta Stephani states,
It seemed to the king that he was striving in vain, in vain
pouring out his vast treasure to reduce them to peace; and so, advised
by more judicious counsel, he preferred to endure their insolent
rebellion for a time, in order that, with fighting at a standstill and
disagreement setting them all at variance, they might either suffer a
famine or turn on each other and be exterminated by mutual
slaughter.34
What Stephen's apologist is trying to say, of course, is that the king
had abdicated royal leadership in Wales, and left the marcher lords to
their own devices.
This loss need not have been so disastrous to the Norman settlers in
Wales had it not been for the political conflict that arose concerning
King Stephen's right to the English throne. The only son of Henry I had
preceded his father in death, leaving only a daughter, Matilda, as heir
to that king. Henry's intention appears to have been that the crown
should pass through Matilda to his infant grandson, Henry of Anjou. In
accordance with this desire, Henry had had most of his nobles swear
fealty to Matilda before his death. Stephen, however, had acted swiftly
when Henry died, renounced his oath, and, with the aid of a number of
other nobles, seized the throne. A rival party soon developed among the
Normans, however, which saw advantages in supporting the rival claims
of Matilda. A lengthy civil war was the result, which almost completely
absorbed the energies of the nobility and devastated large areas of
England. The paramount leader of the dissident party was Robert, earl
of Gloucester, and virtually all of the marcher lords joined him. This
had the result of protecting the marches and South Wales from the full
effects of the anarchy which the civil war caused. At the same time, by
diverting their energies eastward, this solidarity of allegiance among
the border barons left South Wales almost defenseless against the
encroachments of the Welsh.
Thus the disorders of Stephen's reign
meant that the English, Flemish, and Norman settlers were left to
provide their own defense against the resurgent Welsh. This was a time
of trouble and fear for
34 Ibid., p. 13.
The Welsh Reaction 127
the settlers, and during this period many of them abandoned their homes
and returned to more secure estates.35 The Welsh of Cantref
Mawr, organized under Gruffydd ap Rhys and his sons, began extending
their control in every direction and soon dominated all of southwest
Wales. They gained control of the lower vale of Towy in 1137 by
capturing the royal fortress of Carmarthen. Some years later
Llanstephan fell, and the Welsh were able to move into Pembrokeshire.
In 1153, Gower fell before their attack; and shortly after, they were
able to press an attack on the western border of Glamorgan Other Welsh
chieftains were similarly successful. Hywel ap Maredudd ap Rhydderch
managed to expel the Clifford family from Cantref Bychan, while Morgan
ab Owain, grandson of Caradog ap Gruffydd, was able to take the castle
of Usk and to erect a lordship centered on Caerleon, in the heart of
Norman Wales.36 The political events in Wales during the
reign of Stephen are complex and confusing, but one fact stands out
clearly-the Welsh were everywhere on the offensive. Under Henry, the
limits of Norman settlement had been greatly extended, and Norman
political power had embraced all of South Wales. The resurgence of
Welsh power caused the frontier of Norman authority to shrink rapidly,
until it coincided exactly
35Very few documents remain to attest to the problems these
early settlers faced, an, for this reason, the one extensive document
which does remain is worth quoting in full
Frater G. Gilbert Foliot Gloucestriae dictus abbas, dilecto
filio suo Osberno, 'non trepidare ubi non est timor (Psal.
LII) .
Moneo te, fili charissime, aedificare et plantare, et terram tuam eo
vomere quo tu seis exercere et diligenter excolere. Satis hactenus
spinas et tribulos germinavit (Gen. III), sed, sieut bene
coepisti, si labori bono et exercitio instanter incubueris, scio, scio
quod fructu bono non fraudabit te Dominus. Volo vera vasa omnia domus
tuae salva et munda custodias, et ipsam domum tuam qua potens
supellectile munda et honesta munias et exornes. Laudo etiam te seras
portarum tuarum confortare, domum tuam vallo bono et muro inexpugnabile
circumdare, ne scilicet gens illa quae, sicut tu dicis, hirsuta fronte
et torvis oculis respicit, irrumpat in eam et omnes labores tuos et
sudores impetu uno diripiat. Nolo vasa transmigrationis sint apud te,
nec quod in aliquo praetendas transmigrationus habitum, sed
stabilitatis in terra vestra quam dedit vobis Dominus Deus et mansionis
diuturnae propositum. Dices vero amicis nostris Wallensibus vos de hoc
quod audierunt nihil penitus illis inconsultis acturos. Videmus vero
gentem vestram timorem Domini et reverentiam sanctuarii parvipendere,
et illos audimus Deum et loca sancta at personas eonsecratas Domino
diligenter honorare. Propter haec omnia durum est nobis illis qui fere
non curant vos magnis inseri et ab his qui vos venerantus avelli. Vale
et noveris nos malle stationarum vel progressionarum te esse quam
retrogradum. (Gilbert Foliot, "Epistola XXIX, in Gilbertus Foliot, ex
abbate Gloucestriae episcopus primum Herefordensis . . .,"
Patrologia Latina, ed. J. P. Migne, vol. CXC, cols.
766-767.
36Lloyd, A History of Wales, II, 476-479.
128 The Normans in South Wales
with the frontier of actual Norman settlement. Furthermore, under the
pressure of continuous Welsh attack, both frontiers were moving
backward.
As soon as strong government replaced anarchy in England, these Welsh
successes came to an end. Henry II dedicated himself to the task of
restoring the stable rule which had characterized his grandfather's
reign. He quickly took active measures against the Welsh. By 1158 he
succeeded in overawing Rhys ap Gruffydd, the paramount prince of
Deheubarth, and in restoring royal authority in South Wales. The Norman
barons returned to their possessions and attempted to repair the
damages of the previous twenty years. Rhys proved to be irrepressible,
however, and broke the king's peace time and time again. Operating from
the wilderness of Cantref Mawr, his bands kept southwest Wales in a
continual state of apprehension. But as long as royal power remained
strong, Rhys could achieve little lasting success. Henry's growing
controversy with the archbishop of Canterbury, however, soon caused his
authority to wane. Rhys sensed this weakness and seized on the
opportunity to conclude a firm alliance with Owain Gwynedd, the leader
of North Wales. Lesser chieftains quickly joined this coalition, and a
Welsh alliance of unprecedented proportions marked the end of the peace
which the king had enforced in Wales.
Even in the midst of his difficulties Henry realized the danger which
these Welsh developments presented. Great and expensive preparations
were made for a large-scale invasion of the rebellious areas of
Wales.37 This Anglo-Norman expedition entered Wales in the
summer of 1165 and pursued approximately the same course as had that of
William Rufus, striking directly toward the heart of Welsh resistance
in Gwynedd. Again the entire campaign proved a fiasco. Welsh ambushes
made movement difficult, and an unseasonably wet summer finally made
further progress impossible. Henry was forced into an ignominious
retreat without having struck a single blow against the insurgents.
Welsh tactics and the topography of their homeland had once again
proven more than a match for the feudal levies of England.
By defeating this royal expedition, the Welsh gained what proved to be
more than a temporary respite. There is every indication that Henry
regarded this expensive and ill-fated expedition as the final
37This is especially apparent in a perusal of Pipe Roll 11
Henry II, particularly membrane 31.
The Welsh Reaction 129
blow to his unprofitable attempts to maintain royal supremacy over all
Wales.38 He seems to have determined not to try to conquer
the Welsh princes again in such a manner. On the other hand, he was not
willing to relinquish royal control over his Anglo-Norman border
barons. What Henry did in effect was to return to the policy which
William the Conqueror had established to maintain an equilibrium along
the border. Time had shown that the Welsh could be conquered only
through a long and profitless war. At the same time, Henry recognized
that the border barons presented a far greater danger to the peace of
the realm than the Welsh. He jealously maintained his ascendancy over
the barons by limiting their power and opportunities, often with the
aid of the Welsh princes, whose favor and support he actively
sought.
The events of the reigns of Stephen and Henry II thus clearly indicate
how the Norman frontier-in a Turnerian sense-came to an end in Wales.
Opportunities for wealth, power, and independence had lured the early
invaders to their conquests. In the face of determined resistance,
however, the first generation of conquerors had lacked the cohesiveness
and organization to hold what they had gained. The second generation of
conquerors-those established under Henry I-had such cohesiveness and
organization, but it had been purchased at a price. They had accepted
immediate royal direction in frontier affairs and had given up the hope
of independent power which Wales offered them. Under Henry, however,
this loss was more than balanced by the success which the Norman
magnates enjoyed in those limited areas in which the king allowed them
to act. The events of the reigns of Stephen and Henry II showed the
weakness of this arrangement. Royal direction of frontier affairs was
only effective when the king was strong and willing to take an active
personal role. The paralysis of royal authority which had attended
Stephen's reign inaugurated a period of Norman weakness in Wales which
proved almost disastrous. During this period the Welsh developed a
capacity for resistance which made the task of the next king even
greater. Even so, the energetic measures taken by Henry II in the early
years of his reign showed some signs of effectiveness. As Henry's power
and authority diminished, however, Norman supremacy was once again
threatened. The final blow to the hopes of the Normans came with
Henry's abandonment of aspirations toward
38Lloyd, A History of Wales, II, 518.
130 The Normans in South Wales
royal supremacy in Wales. The border barons still found themselves
subject, in large measure, to the restrictions of royal overlordship
but without enjoying any of the benefits of royal leadership. The
forward progress of the Normans in South Wales and the frontier
conditions which attended this progress were completely arrested by the
curious combination of a suspicious and troubled English monarch and a
resurgent and dynamic Welsh people.
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