IN THE WEST OF ENGLAND the rich and rolling fields of the
Midlands gradually give way to a rougher and less hospitable
terrain. By the time one has reached the border shires of
Shropshire, Herefordshire, and Monmouthshire, the aspect of the
countryside has altered considerably. The rolling slopes and the
deep soils of the Midlands have disappeared. Instead, the region
consists of a series of low foothills deeply cut by many rivers
and streams. The tilled fields which seem so characteristic of
the lands lying to the east are here replaced by meadows and by
tracts of the ubiquitous oaks which do so much to lend a special
flavor to the border shires.
Perhaps the dominant characteristic of the border is the ever
present mass which the Cambrian Mountains rear to the west. This
rampart, because of its constant presence, often fades from the
visitor's consciousness. And yet, by always lying at the edge of
one's vision, and by effectively delimiting the western horizon,
these mountains help to maintain a frontier flavor in the region.
One seems constantly aware that these shires are the edge of
England and that on the western horizon one can see the beginning
of another and quite different land.
The country beyond this steep slope in many ways fulfills the
promise of its eastern border. It consists of a high plateau upon
which massive peaks alternate with deep and narrow valleys. This
rugged region forms the mountainous heartland of the peninsula of
Wales, today the home of over two million people.
The Welsh dairy and
4 The Normans in South Wales
sheep-raising industries, together with extensive coal deposits,
make a significant contribution to the British economy. A growing
tourist trade continues to open up large areas of the peninsula
to an even closer and more profitable connection with England.
Despite its small size and scanty population, Wales plays a
well-integrated and important role in the life of the United
Kingdom.1
It is obvious to even the most casual visitor to Wales that such
was not always the case. The Welsh countryside abounds with
fortifications - prehistoric hill-forts, Roman castra, and
Norman castles. The native heroes- Caratacus, Owen Glendower, and
King Arthur- echo this martial note. These and many other things
serve to remind the visitor of the long struggle of the Welsh
to avoid domination and absorption by their wealthier and more
numerous neighbors to the east.2 It was a bloody and
lengthy battle, but it was one in which the Welsh were foredoomed
to failure. Although their mountainous isolation afforded them
great defensive advantages, it also condemned them to a poverty
which made it impossible for them to compete with their more
favorably situated neighbors. In the course of time it was
inevitable that the superior wealth and numbers of their enemies
should succeed in bringing the independence and isolation of
Wales to an end.3
The final stages of this process began almost nine hundred years
ago, when the tide of Norman conquest rolled into the border
shires and reached the frontier of the old Anglo-Saxon state. It
soon became clear to the conquerors that the existence of an
independent Wales posed a serious problem. Sudden descents by the
turbulent Welsh tribesmen had terrorized the border for years,
and Norman control over the region would never be secure as long
as this threat remained unchecked. Nor were hands wanting for the
task of subduing the Welsh. For some of the invaders, at least,
Wales represented not so much a threat as an opportunity. Beyond
the border lay
1A number of books and articles pertaining to the
geography and economy of Wales have been included in the
Bibliography. For an excellent introduction to these subjects,
see E. G. Bowen (ed.), Wales: A Physical Historical and
Regional Geography.
2Also included in the Bibliography are some selected
books and articles covering the earlier periods of Welsh history.
The best general account of the history of Wales up to 1212 is
provided by J. E. Lloyd, A History of Wales from the
Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest.
3This is not to say that Wales' defeat in this
struggle was complete. The Welsh people have managed to retain a
high degree of cultural integrity and national consciousness,
even in a world dominated by their English neighbors.
6 The Normans in South Wales
lands to be had for the taking; lands that were, to all intents
and purposes, free and empty. Impelled by twin considerations of
political expediency and personal gain, the Norman conquest of
Wales began.
The first century of their endeavor was to prove crucial to the
invaders of South Wales. During these years the conquerors were
forced to adapt to the new circumstances in which they found
themselves. The nature of the land, the personality of their
adversaries, and even the act of conquest itself all combined to
transform the character of the invaders. As the century came to a
close, a distinctive Cambro-Norman society had emerged in South
Wales. Neither purely Welsh nor wholly Norman, it was a society
peculiarly suited to the endemic warfare and incessant
land-hunger which characterized the Welsh frontier.
This remarkable process took place in a setting quite different
from that which confronts the modern visitor to
Wales.4 The lowlands, which are today the richest and
most fertile portion of the peninsula, were untilled and
undrained nine hundred years ago. Dense forests and deep swamps
covered what are today well-tilled fields. Great oaks dominated
the forest growth, except in dales where primroses and bluebells
brought a touch of color. The undergrowth was composed for the
most part of gorse and bramble, presenting an almost impenetrable
obstacle to communication and travel. Much of the region was the
habitat of creatures which have long since disappeared from
Wales. Beavers, bears, wolves, wildcats, boars, and wild oxen
infested the forests, adding to the difficulties the early
inhabitants must have faced.5
A somewhat less formidable landscape lay along the upper slopes
of the interior, where forest growth thinned out under the
influence of the increased elevation. Although relatively
pleasant, these areas were rather small. The trees came to an
end at about a thousand-foot elevation, and above this point lay
the moorlands. Here was an environment far different from the
forests of the lowlands. The moors and ridges were subjected to
the full force of the moisture-laden
4It must always be remembered in such discussions,
that human activity often works great changes, for good or evil,
on the land and its capacity to produce. For a well-written essay
which illustrates this factor, see Christopher Trent, The
Changing Face of England: The Story of the Landscape through the
Ages.
5See Colin Matheson, Changes in the Fauna of
Wales Within Historic Times
7 The Land and the People
westerly winds. The soil was poor and thin, and the
characteristic vegetation of the region was low bracken, gorse,
bilberry, and moss. Then, as now, the climate was cool and
extremely damp, and the ground was soggy underfoot. Bogs were
common, and in the valleys and hollows of the highlands, peat
beds were being laid down.
Thus early Wales was composed of two quite distinct environments,
and the early inhabitants of the peninsula were forced to choose
between them. Both contained great obstacles to settlement. The
fertile lowlands were covered by dense forests, tenanted by wild
beasts, and blocked by impenetrable undergrowth. The uplands, on
the other hand, were incapable of supporting agriculture. In a
process beginning in the Mesolithic era, if not earlier, the
Welsh chose the highlands.6 By this choice they
determined the direction in which their culture was to travel,
and also set a limit on the degree of development they could hope
to achieve.7 They settled the moor and ridges, and
only very slowly moved down into the valley floors They left the
potentially rich and fertile lowlands to be the prize of the more
complex and dynamic societies which were developing in the
lowland zone of Britain and in the plains of northern Europe.
Restricting themselves to their highland environment, the Welsh
developed a pastoral society, depending upon the cattle for which
the region was suited, rather than upon the agriculture for which
it was not. Their basic diet was not bread, but meat, milk, and
cheese; and their drink was distilled from the honey their bees
drew from the gorse and anemones of the moors. Relying upon their
cattle, they
6See H. J. Fleure and W. E. Whitehouse, "Early
Distribution and Valley-Ward Movement of Population in South
Britain," Archaeologia Cambrensis, Series VI, Vol.
XVI (1916), pp. 101-140, H. J. Fleure and T. C. James,
"Geographical Distribution of Anthropological Types Found
in Wales," The Journal of the Royal Anthropological
Institute, XLVI (1916): 35-153; C. F. Fox, The
Personality of Britain: Its Influence on Inhabitants and Invader
in Prehistoric Times, especially page 94.
7It seems difficult to dispute the point that the
Welsh uplands are incapable of supporting any highly developed
material culture. For a general discussion of the role of
physical environment in limiting social achievement, see B. J.
Meggers, "Environmental Limitation on the Development of
Culture," The American Anthropologist,
LVI (1954), 801-824.
This provocative essay suggests some general factors which may
well have played a role in determining the overall pattern of the
Norman conquest of Wales, especially the Norman failure to take
and hold the highlands. See also R. I. Hirshberg and J. F.
Hirshberg, "Meggers' Law of the Environmental Limitation of
Culture," The American Anthropologist, LIX (1957),
890-892.
8 The Normans in South Wales
were self-sufficient in matters of food and clothing, while their
simple way of life awakened little need or desire for the
importation of foreign manufactured goods.
These free tribesmen were semi-nomadic herdsmen, reckoning their
wealth in cattle, and practicing only the simplest agriculture.
Their dwellings were crude and simple, since they served only a
temporary purpose. Archaeological excavations have revealed much
about the daily life of these people. One series in particular,
that on Gelligaer Common, well illustrates the basic patterns of
their activities.8
There were three houses in this little settlement on the steep
slope of the common. These were of the rather common type known
as platform construction. The slope had been prepared for the
structures by a combination of excavation and terracing which had
formed a building platform cut partially into the hill. Upon
this platform had been raised a rude wall of unmortared stone,
perhaps supplemented with turf or wattle. Roof construction was
of the ridgepole type, with interior uprights, and most probably
a thatch covering. Two doors pierced the long walls of the
rectangular buildings, and there were no windows. The hearth
consisted of a flat stone placed near one end of the building,
behind which rubbish had been allowed to accumulate. An open
fire was the only source of heat for this extensive
structure,9 and smoke was apparently left to escape
through the roof. An Internal drainage gutter lay along the walls
of the upper end of the house, indicating that
the buildings were quite damp, in addition to being cold and
dark.
The major occupation of the two or three families living here was
most probably grazing. Goats, sheep, and cattle could have been
maintained, and the woods of the valley below would have provided
8The results of the excavations were summarized or
noted in the following articles: Aileen Fox, "Dinas Noddfa,
Gelligaer Common Excavations in 1936," Archaeologia
Cambrensis, Series VII, Vol. XCII (1937), pp. 247-268-
Aileen Fox, "Early Welsh Homesteads on Gelligaer Common,
Glamorgan, Excavations in 1938," Archaeologia
Cambrensis, Series VII, Vol. XCIV (1939), pp. 16399;
Aileen Fox, "Excavations on Gelligaer Common," The Bulletin
of the Board of Celtic Studies, IX (1937-1939), 297-299,
C. F. Fox, "Dinas Noddfa, Gelligaer Common, Glamorgan," The
Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies, IX (1937-1939),
295-297. The site excavated in 1938, from which most of the
information in the text is drawn, dates from considerably later
than the period under discussion. All evidence indicates,
however, that modes and standards of living remained relatively
unchanged for long periods of time in the Welsh Highlands.
9 The largest building at the site under discussion
measured sixty by eighteen feet.
The Land and the People 9
excellent pannage for swine.10 Near the building platforms
were found a series of low, wide banks, ranging in length from fifty to
two hundred feet. Excavation showed that these banks were composed of
loose stones, and that the soil in their vicinity was unusually deep for
the area. The conclusion is obvious that these patches represented arable
land which had been laboriously created by the removal of the stones which
formed the banks. Agriculture must have been important, judging from the
labor invested in it, but it could not have been very intensive, even in
the small patches. Finally, numerous nodules of low quality iron were
found in and about the homestead sites. The inhabitants must have smelted
their own iron, but the poor quality of the nodules, and the numerous
stone tools found in the same vicinity, indicate that the process was both
crude and expensive.
These homesteads on Gelligaer Common
were not representative of all Welsh settlements. Permanent peasant
communities did exist in some areas where a more intensive agriculture was
practicable, but their population was generally restricted to the non-free
tribesmen, or taeogs. In time such settlements became a more
important aspect of Welsh society, and many free tribesmen settled down to
a sedentary existence. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however,
the typical free Welshman was a semi-nomadic herdsman, and only the lower
classes, who had little choice, worked the soil.11 Thus the
settlement perched on the slope of Gelligaer Common characterizes the life
of the mass of early Welsh society-self-sufficient, but lonely, rude, and
uncomfortable.
Generally speaking, Welsh society was semi-nomadic, lacked a firm agricultural
base, but was economically self-sufficient. It can easily be seen that these
three factors acted against the necessity for, and the possibility of, the growth
of any concentrations of population like the farming villages and trading towns
which were developing in England. The Welsh lived in scattered pastoral
townships, such as that on Gelligaer Common, or even in isolated family
homesteads.
The activities of life were almost completely restricted to the local level. Thus
the factors which discouraged urbanization also acted to protect Welsh society
from those forces which elsewhere in western
10 A. Fox, "Early Welsh Homesteads," pp. 198-199. These
woods have long since disappeared, but charcoal remains indicate that the Gelligaer
inhabitants had a large supply of oak and hazel nearby. This can only have
been in the valley.
11 E. G. Bowen, The Settlements of the Celtic Saints in
Wales, p. 144.
10 The Normans in South Wales
Europe were antiquating tribal structures as adequate bases for
social organization. The ancient tribal structure of society
lived on in isolated Wales, and was fundamental to every aspect
of Welsh life.
Property rights, inheritance, citizenship, and marriage were
regulated by the kindred, and law was enforced primarily by the
family feud. Most other governmental functions were unnecessary
in view of the decentralized and primitive character of the
society. Despite this fact, much of Welsh life centered around
the eighty political bodies into which the country was divided.
The fundamental unit in this organization was the tref, the
residence of a single kindred. Numbers of such trefs were grouped
into the territorial unit known as the cantref (one hundred
trefs), or, at a later date, the commote
(neighborhood).13
The commote was much more than simply a territorial unit. It was,
to all intents and purposes, the highest element in the Welsh
political structure. Regional groupings of commotes did
exist, and Wales was traditionally divided into four "kingdoms."
In each of these a single leader usually held some ascendancy,
but his power was only a matter of force, prestige, or tradition.
Real political power lay in the commote, and was there
concentrated in the hands of the tywysog.14
12Studies dealing with early Welsh political and
social institutions are numerous and sometimes confusing. The
basis for most treatments is the Cyereithiau Hywel
Dda, or "Laws of Hywel the Good." This early codification
of Welsh law may be found in Ancient Laws and Institutes of
Wales . . ., ed. A. Owen. Some important secondary works
drawing primarily on this source are H. Lewis, The
Ancient Laws of Wales . . ., and T. P. Ellis, Welsh
Tribal Law and Custom in the Middle Ages. Also see William
Rees, South Wales and the March, 1284-1415: A Social and
Agrarian Study. Rees evaluates the "Laws of Hywel the
Good," and finds that the picture of Welsh society they reflect
is in all probability seriously distorted. The student Drioedd Dyvnwal Moelmud. These works were
long accepted by many as genuine, and were included by Aneurin
Owen in his definitive collection. It has been shown that these
triads are spurious, and were written by a Welsh antiquarian
writing under the name of Iolo Morganwg. See G. J. Williams,
Iolo Morgannwg, a Chywyddau'r Ychwanegiad, and
Lloyd, A History of Wales, I, 318-319.
13See Lloyd, A History of Wales, I,
229-282. Lloyd here attempts to enumerate the various cantrefs of
Wales, describe them, and define their boundaries. Also see the
excellent map included in the second volume of the same work.
14For an excellent summary of the position and powers
of the tywysog, see A. J. Otway-Ruthven, "The
Constitutional Position of the Great Lordships of South Wales,"
The Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,
Series V, Vol. VIII (1958), pp. 1-20.
11 The Land and the People 11
This word is traditionally translated "prince," but the
translation tends to obscure rather than reveal the true nature
of the institution. Welsh law itself defined the tywysog
as simply the possessor of one or more commotes.
In each of the commotes he possessed, the tywysog
erected at some central location his llys, or court. This
court was housed in a great timber hall built to shelter and
protect the tywysog, his retainers, and bard, and the
teulu, or armed band, which was necessary to his dignity
and safety. Quite frequently the hall and the area around it were
fortified against sudden attack. Huddled close to the hall,
and often within the fortified area, were the numerous huts and
houses of the tywysog's servants and administrative
officials, the serfs who tilled the nearby fields, and the few
artisans required by the economic life of the commote. Here also
were located the warehouses in which was stored the tribute which
custom required of every tref. The llys acted as the capital of
the commote, and was the nearest thing to an urban center most
Welshmen ever saw.
It was here the tywysog held his judicial court, and
decided all cases, civil and criminal, high and low, which might
be referred to him. There was no appeal from this court. In this,
as in all other governmental functions, the tywysog was
the final source of authority within the commote. Within his own
territory the tywysog exercised all of those powers which
are customarily associated with kingship. He might fortify when
and where he pleased; his legal competence was all-inclusive; he
might conduct war against anyone toward whom he conceived an
enmity; and all fees, dues, fines, and perquisites were his to
dispense. As long as the tywysog remained in possession of
his commote, he was truly a king within its precincts and was
accorded a large measure of respect outside it.
These extensive powers, however, were entirely dependent upon his
continued possession of his commote. Envious brothers, hostile
tywysogion, and unscrupulous adventurers represented a
constant source of danger to the authority and security of the
lord of a commote. Any of these enemies could kill or overpower
him and thus gain possession of the commote. To all intents and
purposes, the usurper then became the rightful tywysog,
and few questions of legitimacy were ever raised. From the
frequency with which such forcible seizures are recorded in Welsh
chronicles, one may conclude that plotting and sedition of this
sort were endemic to Welsh society. This situation contributed
much to the disunity and the shifting
12 The Normans in South Wales
alliances of expediency which formed the characteristic pattern
of Welsh political history.
This instability helped to develop a society in which such petty
warfare became a way of life rather than simply a necessity or a
duty. The free Welsh tribesman was a warrior born and bred.
Giraldus Cambrensis remarked of the Welsh that "The husbandman
rushes as eagerly from the plow as the courtier from his court"
at the call of battle.15 Since they did not engage in
extensive agriculture, the Welsh were able to devote themselves
to year-round military activity if they chose to do so. As a
consequence of frequent opportunities and mass participation,
they became expert in sudden raids and masterly ambushes. Pitched
battles and protracted campaigns, on the other hand, were beyond
their capabilities, and the intricacies of siege warfare were
foreign to their experience. Within the limits of their training,
however, and in the terrain in which they operated, there were no
better warriors.
In religion, as in politics and warfare, the Welsh favored
decentralization and localism. The center of activity of the
Church in Wales lay in a type of monastic body known as the
clas. The typical clas consisted of a mixed group
of clergy and laymen, living together under the rule of an abbot,
but observing no regular order of discipline. This
lack of regulation allowed the development of a wide range of
local usages, and the clas was capable of excesses of both
piety and corruption. It is true that a series of episcopal sees
existed in Wales but even these had originally been monastic in
character, and only began to assume their
regular episcopal functions under Norman influence in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries.
During most of the medieval period, the concept of the
clas dominated religious affairs in Wales. Instead of
being the center of a duly organized and regularly functioning
parish, the typical Welsh church was a chapel closely connected
with a nearby clas.
Wales lay far on the fringe of western Europe, and had been
protected by her position and her poverty from the forces of
change which were afoot in the tenth and early eleventh
centuries. As a consequence, Welsh society in the late eleventh
and twelfth centuries was still dominated by institutions of an
early and more primitive era- kindred, clas, blood-feud,
and the like. These archaic institutions
15Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera, eds.
J. S. Brewer et Itinerarium
Kambriae), p. 72.
13 The Land and the People
embodied and perpetuated the decentralization and disorder which
characterized Welsh society.
Welsh society was not static, however, and new social and
political institutions were evolving. Especially important were
the tentative movements toward a political organization which
would transcend the localism of the commote. This continuing
development can best be seen in the growth of the traditional
kingdoms of Gwynedd, Powys, Deheubarth, and Gwent. The name
"kingdom" is, in this case, something of a misnomer, for these
bodies bore little resemblance to he more fully developed
kingdoms of the era. They had few clearly defined governmental
institutions and their responsibilities and functions were
sharply limited. They were little more than conglomerations
of commotes recognizing a traditional affinity. The ties
between the commotes were weak and fluid, and the
boundaries of the kingdoms were, as a consequence, vague and
fluctuating.
Within each kingdom some individual was usually recognized as
king, but the title brought with it no grant of authority or
jurisdiction. It carried prestige, and little more. The base of
the Welsh king's power consisted of his authority as
tywysog within the commotes he possessed. What
additional power he exercised depended primarily upon the support
he could obtain from the other tywysogion of his
Kingdom. He had few legal guarantees of such support, and had to
secure it as best he could.Military strength, ruthlessness, or
personal magnetism could gain him such support, but only
continued vigilance and success could maintain his control over
his following. While some Welsh kings were able to command and
retain much support, and to create at least the semblance
of a powerful state, others were kings in name only and were
actually weaker than many of the tywysogion of their
kingdom. The strength of these kingdoms depended ultimately upon
the forcefulness and continued good fortune of their kings. A
single misfortune could destroy the prestige of the monarch, and
the tywysogion would withdraw their support of him. The
kingdom would then dissolve once again into an ineffectual
collection of independent states.
Wales' greatest weakness lay in the fact that there were no
stable and effective political institutions beyond the level of
the commote. Under this decentralized political system, the Welsh
wasted their strength in petty wars, desultory cattle raids, and
fruitless intrigue. This weakness made little difference as long
as they faced no greater treats than Irish
pirates or an occasional band of Scandinavian raid-
14 The Normans in South Wales
ers. The high plateau - the heartland of Welsh society - remained
secure from such attacks, and the Welsh could afford to continue
to defer the development of any real unity. The emergence of a
strong and united Anglo-Saxon state made it quite a different
matter; the question of unity became crucial to the continued
independence of Wales. A growing Anglo-Saxon pressure on the
eastern border of the peninsula was only a forerunner of the
crisis the Welsh would eventually face.
Anglo-Saxon expansion first reached the borders of Wales proper
sometime about the middle of the seventh century.16 At
any rate, the border regions of Shropshire and Herefordshire were
in Mercian hands by this time. The momentum of Mercian expansion
to the west apparently came to an end with these
conquests. Little information about the period has survived, but
the failure of the Mercians to advance further indicates that
Welsh resistance stiffened. The Mercians halted short of the
Cambrian Mountains, and contented themselves with the
exploitation of those lands lying in the shadow of the heights.
The barren uplands of Wales were apparently not worth the price
the Mercians would have to pay for them.
This pause created a great problem for the kings of Mercia.
Hitherto the Anglo-Saxons had been on the offensive, and the
question of defense had not arisen. They had now reached the
natural limit of their expansion, and possessed a large
indefensible border stretching from the Severn to the Dee. What
had been a question of westward expansion became a problem of
frontier defense. This problem was finally faced by the Mercian
king, Offa (757-796). His answer was to construct a boundary dyke
stretching completely across the neck of the Welsh peninsula.
This work generally marked the western limits of Anglo-Saxon
settlement, although numerous later exceptions might be
noted.17 It seems clear that Offa's Dyke was intended
to define and stabilize Mercia's western border.
This new Mercian frontier policy probably made little actual
difference in Saxon-Welsh relations. The Mercians had previously
fought to conquer and to settle; now they fought to terrorize and
overawe. At least this appears to have been Mercian policy in the
period following Offa's death. Raids deep into Welsh territory
can be noted for the years 796, 816, 818, and 822. It was not
until the decline of
16Lloyd, A History of Wales, I,
195-196.
17See C. F. Fox, Offa's Dyke: A Field Survey of
the Western Frontier Works of Mercia in the Seventh and Eighth
Centuries A.D.
15 The Land and the People
Mercia's power, and the increase of Viking attacks on England,
that this fierce Saxon pressure on Wales' eastern border was
relaxed.18
By this time the traditional political structure of Wales had
emerged. The four kingdoms were gaining prominence, perhaps
partially as a result of the pressure and example of the
Anglo-Saxons. Even with this somewhat more sophisticated
organization, however, the Welsh were still far weaker
than their eastern neighbors. Only on occasions when two or more
of these kingdoms were united were the Welsh capable of defending
themselves adequately. Such occasions were rare, and the
hegemonies thus established rarely outlived
their founders. Each time such an event occurred, however, the
power of the Welsh was increased immeasurably, and the security
of the English border was severely threatened.
The first time this happened was in the year 942, when Hywel Dda,
king of Deheubarth, succeeded in uniting almost all of Wales
under his control. On this occasion, however, English security
was not threatened. Hywel maintained close and friendly relations
with the English court, and spent his time
and energies in attempting to lay the foundations of a stable
kingdom. His aims were in advance of his time, and the attempt
failed. With his death in 950, the kingdom quickly disintegrated
into its constituent parts. Over a hundred years elapsed before
the second such hegemony was established; one which was to prove
far more dangerous to the security of the English frontier. Its
founder was Gruffydd ap Llewelyn, a man who lacked the English
affinities which, in Hywel's time, had prevented an open clash.
Gruffydd seized the throne of Gwynedd in 1039, and united it to
that of Powys. He immediately led the united forces of his two
kingdoms against an unsuspecting Mercian army encamped on the
Severn. He crushed his enemy completely, and served effective
notice that the Welsh were now masters of the border.
Rather than following up the advantage he had gained on the
frontier, Gruffydd immediately turned his attention to the
conquest of Deheubarth. He was unable to force a decisive
encounter with Hywel ab Edwin, king of Deheubarth, until 1041.
When the encounter did occur, Hywel was badly defeated, and seems
to have lost most of his power within the kingdom. He did manage
to retain control of his commotes of Dyfed and Ystrad
Tywy, however, and was able to continue to frustrate Gruffydd's
plan for the conquest of
18Lloyd, A History of Wales, I, 201-202.
16 The Normans in South Wales
Deheubarth. It was not until 1044 that the two met in battle once
again. On this occasion, Hywel was defeated and killed. Gruffydd
was now able to unite the crown of Deheubarth with that of
Gwynedd of Powys.
Despite this victory, localism remained strong in Deheubarth,
especially in Dyfed and Ystrad Tywy. A leader soon arose to use
this localism in an attempt to displace Gruffydd. This man was
Gruffydd ap Rhydderch, no less forceful a man than Gruffydd ap
Llwewlyn himself. The movement soon became dangerous, and the
king was forced to conclude an alliance with the English border
earl, Swegen Godwinson. The alliance was obviously directed
against the southern independence movement, for, in 1046, an
allied Welsh and English army invaded Deheubarth, and devastated
the countryside. This course of action played into the hands of
Gruffydd ap Rhydderch by solidifying public opinion against the
northern king. In 1047, Gruffydd ap Llewelyn and his teulu
were ambushed by the men of Ystrad Tywy, and suffered a crushing
defeat. He escaped with his life, but this defeat lost him
whatever
In his place, Gruffydd ap Rhydderch emerged as the paramount
leader of the region, and was able to amass a considerable amount
of power and support. He proved to be an active ruler, and no
better a neighbor to the English than his predecessor had been.
In 1049 he struck a bargain with a force of Danish pirates, and
led them, together with his native supporters,
into Herefordshire. Here he plundered the manor Tidenham, and
slaughtered an English force which the bishop of Worcestershire
led against him.19 He returned to Wales unscathed, and
laden with booty. This was but the first of a series of raids
into Herefordshire and Gloucestershire - raids which no doubt
discomfited their English inhabitants greatly.
It may have been due to this discomfiture and to the exposed
position of Herefordshire that a colony of Normans warriors was
established in the region. It may, on the other hand, simply have
been the result of English royal politics. Norman influences had
been prominent in Edward's court for some time, and a number
Norman immigrants had risen to high position with the benefit of
royal in-
19The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, According to the
Several Original Authorities, ed, and trans. Benjamin
Thorpe, Part I, p. 302.
17 The Land and the People
fluence. A group of these immigrants had established themselves
in Herefordshire. Here they distinguished themselves, and gained
the hatred of the local populace by erecting the new type of
fortress which had been perfected in Normandy.20
Norman influence was increased in the area in the year 1051. In
this year King Edward found an opportunity to break, at least for
a time, the power of the house of Godwine. Earl Godwine and his
adherents were banished from England. This sentence included
Swegen Godwinson, earl of a border region which took in both
Herefordshire and Gloucestershire. He successor proved to be a
Norman, Ralph, the son of the count of the Vexin and of Goda,
King Edward's sister. Herefordshire had become, to all intents
and purposes, a Norman colony.21
Earl Ralph apparently continued the Herefordshire Normans'
preoccupation with defense. It is recorded that he made an effort
to convert his English levies into a cavalry force by ordering
them to join combat on horseback, rather than afoot as was their
custom. This was later to prove a worthless innovation. The
Normans' concern with Herefordshire's defensive strength was well
founded, however. A new threat had been added to that posed by
Gruffydd ap Rhydderch. Released from his alliance with Earl
Swegen, Gruffydd ap Llewelyn was now free to resume his ravages
on the border. He was quick to use this new freedom, and advanced
into Herefordshire to test Ralph's new forces. The battle, fought
in 1052, found the Normans unprepared to meet the impetuous
charges of the Welsh. The Normans and English were defeated. Once
again, however Gruffydd ap Llewelyn failed to exploit a military
victory. He was content to retire with his spoils and heightened
prestige, and to turn his attention to Welsh affairs.
In the following year a number of events were to conspire to
place the English borderlands in even greater danger. Gruffydd ap
Llewelyn was at last able to eliminate Gruffydd ap Rhydderch, and
to reunite Deheubarth to his realms. He soon received a powerful
ally from an unexpected source. An exiled English noble, Aelfgar
20For the location and identity of these castles, see
J.H. Round, Feudal England: Historical Studies on the XIth
and XIIth Centuries, pp. 317-331. For an intriguing essay
on the development of the Norman castle, see Brian Hope-Taylor,
"The Norman Motte at Abinger, Surrey, and its Wooden castle,"
Recent Archaeological Excavations in Britain, ed. R.
L. S. Bruce-Mitford, pp. 223-249.
21Florence of Worcester, Chronicon ex
Chronicis..., ed. Benjamin Thorpe, s.a. 1051, I, 205.
18 The Normans in South Wales
had gathered a fleet and army from the Dansk towns of Ireland,
and had returned to England to recoup his fortunes. He was quick
to strike an alliance with the Welsh chieftain, and the new
allies immediately marched on Herefordshire.
This allied Welsh, Danish, and Irish force met the Norman and
English defenders of Herefordshire a few miles from the city of
Hereford itself. The battle was quickly decided. The chronicles
intimate that the Normans, with Ralph at their head, took flight
even before the battle was joined. In any event, the English
levies, unaccustomed to the mounted combat to which Ralph had
ordered them, broke before the Welsh attack. The battle became a
rout, and Aelfgar and Gruffydd were able to enter Hereford, which
they burned and plundered.
The situation on the border had become extremely serious, and
Harold Godwinson, a rising figure on the English scene,
determined to meet the threat which Gruffydd and Aelfgar had
posed. He invaded Wales, but was unable to make headway in the
difficult terrain and in the face of powerful opposition. In the
interests of peace, he was forced to come to terms with his
enemies. Under the terms of the treaty, Aelfgar was reinstated as
earl of East Anglia, and Gruffydd appears to have been allowed to
keep his border conquests.22 Gruffydd was content
under the circumstances. He had won great wealth, and even
greater prestige, and was happy for the opportunity to use both
in further consolidation of his Welsh realms.23 His
position became even better in 1057, when Aelfgar became earl of
Mercia. As friends, allies, and neighbors, Aelfgar and Gruffydd
were powerful enough to meet all threats to their position.
This situation changed drastically in the year 1062. The death of
Aelfgar deprived Gruffydd of a great source of strength, and
Harold decided to use this occasion to destroy him completely. In
the Christmas season, he launched a lightening attack upon
Gruffydd's capital of Rhuddlan, and the Welsh leader barely
escaped with his life. Harold then put into operation a
large-scale plan of attack. While Earl Tostig drove along the
northern coast of Wales, Harold ferried a special force of
light-armed troops into the heart of Gwynedd itself. Gruffydd was
unable to resist the superiority of his enemies and
22This is the view of Lloyd, A History of
Wales, II, 365.
23It may well be that is was during this period he
added Morganwg to his conquests. See Lloyd, A History of
Wales, II, 367.
19 The Land and the People
fled into the heights of Snowdonia. His power and prestige were
swiftly declining.
He was allowed no time to recuperate. Harold's light-armed troops
followed him into the mountains, harrying him and his supporters.
Continued reverses and a mounting English pressure began to tell,
and Gruffydd's followers began falling away from him. The end
came on the fifth of August, 1063, when his own men turned on
him, killed him, and sent his head to Harold as a pledge of their
submission. With this victory, Harold's immediate aims were
achieved. Gruffydd's hegemony disintegrated, and Wales fell back
into the disunity which for her spelled impotence. Harold
concluded favorable treaties with the lesser figures who
succeeded Gruffydd, and a measure of peace returned to the Welsh
frontier. With this threat to the security of England ended,
Harold was able to turn to the pursuit of his personal designs
for power.
These centuries of border warfare provide material for some
important generalizations. It is clear that the English were
unwilling or unable to fight to take and hold land which had
little value apart from strategic considerations. This being the
case, England's western border would continue to be vulnerable to
Welsh attack.
Little could be done to eliminate the threat of such raids. The
Welsh had no effective central government, and hence the English
could establish no stable relations with them, short of making a
treaty with every free Welsh tribesman. Even if the latter were
possible, a certain amount of perfidy was built into the Welsh
political system. Neither diplomacy nor terrorism could pacify
the decentralized and intensely localistic Welsh for any
length of time. Peace along the border could not be secured
unless a Welsh leader emerged who was strong enough to enforce it
among the turbulent tribesmen.
On occasions when such a leader emerged, however, the peace of
the Welsh frontier was threatened in a way far more serious than
desultory raids. Firmly united and properly directed, the Welsh
were formidable enemies, and were capable of threatening the
security of the entire West of England. Thus it was advantageous
for
20 The Normans in South Wales
the English to maintain the Welsh in a state of disunity. This
meant, on the other hand, that Welsh raids would continue to
disturb the peace of the border shires. The only effective
defense lay in the creation of a strong local force under capable
direction and with considerable freedom of action.
This was a dangerous expedient. The alliance of Aelfgar and
Gruffydd had shown that a powerful frontier lord and a Welsh king
made an extremely formidable combination. Any frontier force
strong enough to oppose Welsh attack effectively, could, in
alliance with it opponents, threaten the security of the entire
realm. The reliability of marcher troops is always
doubtful, and so this danger was very real.
This was, in essence, the dilemma of the Welsh frontier. The
English had found no solution after having wrestled with the
problem for almost three hundred years. They were no closer to an
effective and lasting frontier policy in 1066 than in 750. It was
to remain a dilemma for the Norman invaders, and much of the
history of the Welsh frontier turns upon their various attempts
to solve this problem.