5: Party Policy in Congress
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While President Cleveland was successfully asserting his
executive authority, the House of Representatives, too, was
trying to assert its authority; but its choice of means was such
that it was badly beaten and was reduced to a state of humble
subordination from which it has never emerged. Its traditional
procedure was arranged on the theory that Congress ought to
propose as well as to enact legislation, and to receive
recommendations from all quarters without preference or
discrimination. Although the Constitution makes it the right and
duty of the President to "recommend to their consideration such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," measures
proposed by the Administration stand on the same footing under
the rules as those proposed by the humblest citizen of the United
States. In both cases, they are allowed to reach Congress only in
the form of a bill or resolution introduced by a member of
Congress, and they go on the files without any distinction as to
rank and position except such as pertains to them from the time
and order in which they are introduced. Under the rules, all
measures are distributed among numerous committees, each having
charge of a particular class, with power to report favorably or
adversely. Each committee is constituted as a section of the
whole House, with a distribution of party representation
corresponding to that which exists in the House.
Viewed as an ideal polity, the scheme has attractive features. In
practice, however, it is attended with great disadvantages.
Although the system was originally introduced with the idea that
it would give the House of Representatives control over
legislative business, the actual result has been to reduce this
body to an impotence unparalleled among national representative
assemblies in countries having constitutional government. In a
speech delivered on December 10, 1885, William M. Springer of
Illinois complained: "We find ourselves bound hand and foot, the
majority delivering themselves over to the power of the minority
that might oppose any particular measures, so that nothing could
be done in the way of legislation except by unanimous consent or
by a two-thirds vote." As an instance of legislative paralysis,
he related that "during the last Congress a very important bill,
that providing for the presidential succession... was reported
from a committee of which I had the honor to be a member, and was
placed on the calendar of the House on the 21st day of April,
1884; and that bill, which was favored by nearly the entire
House, was permitted to die on the calendar because there never
was a moment, when under the rules as they then existed, the bill
could be reached and passed by the House." During the whole of
that session of Congress, the regular calendar was never reached.
"Owing to the fact that we could not transact business under the
rules, all business was done under unanimous consent or under
propositions to suspend the rules upon the two Mondays in each
month on which suspensions were allowed." As a two-thirds
majority was necessary to suspend the rules, any considerable
minority had a veto power.
The standing committees, whose ostensible purpose was to prepare
business for consideration, were characterized as legislative
cemeteries. Charles B. Lore of Delaware, referring to the
situation during the previous session, said: "The committees were
formed, they met in their respective committee rooms day after
day, week after week, working up the business which was committed
to them by this House, and they reported to this House 8290
bills. They came from the respective committees, and they were
consigned to the calendars of this House, which became for them
the tomb of the Capulets; most of them were never heard of
afterward. From the Senate there were 2700 bills.... Nine tenths
of the time of the committees of the Forty-eighth Congress was
wasted. We met week after week, month after month, and labored
over the cases prepared, and reported bills to the House. They
were put upon the calendars and there were buried, to be brought
in again and again in succeeding Congresses."
William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania bluntly declared: "No
legislation can be effectually originated outside the Committee
on Appropriations, unless it be a bill which will command
unanimous consent or a stray bill that may get a two-thirds vote,
or a pension bill." He explained that he excepted pension bills
"because we have for several years by special order remitted the
whole subject of pensions to a committee who bring in their bills
at sessions held one night in each week, when ten or fifteen
gentlemen decide what soldiers may have pensions and what
soldiers may not."
The Democratic party found this situation extremely irritating
when it came into power in the House. It was unable to do
anything of importance or even to define its own party policy,
and in the session of Congress beginning in December, 1885, it
sought to correct the situation by amending the rules. In this
undertaking it had sympathy and support on the Republican side.
The duress under which the House labored was pungently described
by Thomas B. Reed, who was just about that time revealing the
ability that gained for him the Republican leadership. In a
speech, delivered on December 16, 1885, he declared: "For the
last three Congresses the representatives of the people of the
United States have been in irons. They have been allowed to
transact no public business except at the dictation and by the
permission of a small coterie of gentlemen, who, while they
possessed individually more wisdom than any of the rest of us,
did not possess all the wisdom in the world."
The coterie alluded to by Mr. Reed was that which controlled the
committee on appropriations. Under the system created by the
rules of the House, bills pour in by tens of thousands. A member
of the House, of a statistical turn of mind, once submitted
figures to the House showing that it would take over sixty-six
years to go through the calendars of one session in regular
order, allowing an average of one minute for each member to
debate each bill. To get anything done, the House must proceed by
special order, and as it is essential to pass the appropriations
to keep up the government, a precedence was allowed to business
reported by that committee which in effect gave it a position of
mastery. O. R. Singleton of Mississippi, in the course of the
same debate, declared that there was a "grievance which towers
above all others as the Alps tower above the surrounding hills.
It is the power resting with said committee, and oftentimes
employed by it, to arrest any legislation upon any subject which
does not meet its approval. A motion to go into committee of the
whole to consider appropriation bills is always in order, and
takes precedence of all other motions as to the order of
business."
The practical effect of the rules was that, instead of remaining
the servant of the House, the committee became its master. Not
only could the committee shut off from any consideration any
measure to which it was opposed, but it could also dictate to the
House the shape in which its own bills should be enacted. While
the form of full consideration and amendment is preserved, the
terms of a bill are really decided by a conference committee
appointed to adjust differences between the House and the Senate.
John H. Reagan of Texas stated that "a conference committee, made
up of three members of the appropriations committee, acting in
conjunction with a similar conference committee on the part of
the Senate, does substantially our legislation upon this subject
of appropriations." In theory, the House was free to accept or
reject the conference committee's report. Practically the choice
lay between the bill as fixed by the conference committee or no
bill at all during that session. Mr. Reagan stated the case
exactly when he said that it meant "letting six men settle what
the terms are to be, beyond our power of control, unless we
consent to a called session of Congress."
To deal with this situation, the House had refused to adopt the
rules of the preceding Congress; and after electing John G.
Carlisle as Speaker and authorizing the appointment of a
committee on rules, it deferred the appointment of the usual
legislative committees until after a new set of rules had been
adopted. The action of the Speaker in constituting the Rules
Committee was scrupulously fair to the contending interests. It
consisted of himself, Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, and
William R. Morrison of Illinois from the Democratic side of the
House; and of Thomas B. Reed of Maine and Frank Hiscock of New
York from the Republican side. On the 14th of December, the
committee made two reports: a majority report presented by Mr.
Morrison and a minority report presented by Mr. Randall and
signed by him alone.
These reports and the debates which followed are most
disappointing. What was needed was a penetrating discussion of
the means by which the House could establish its authority and
perform its constitutional functions. But it is a remarkable
circumstance that at no time was any reference made to the only
way in which the House can regain freedom of action—namely, by
having the Administration submit its budget demands and its
legislative proposals directly to the committee of the whole
House. The preparatory stages could then be completed before the
opening of the legislative session. Congress would thus save the
months of time that are now consumed in committee incubation and
would almost certainly be assured of opportunity of considering
the public business. Discrimination in legislative privilege
among members of the House would then be abolished, for every
member would belong to the committee on appropriations. It is
universally true in constitutional governments that power over
appropriations involves power over legislation, and the only
possibility of a square deal is to open that power to the entire
membership of the assembly, which is the regular practice in
Switzerland and in all English commonwealths. The House could not
have been ignorant of the existence of this alternative, for the
whole subject had been luminously discussed in the Senate Report
of February 4,1881. It was, therein, clearly pointed out that
such an arrangement would prevent paralysis or inaction in
Congress. With the Administration proposing its measures directly
to Congress, discussion of them and decisions upon them could not
be avoided.
But such a public forum could not be established without sweeping
away many intrenchments of factional interest and private
opportunity, and this was not at all the purpose of the committee
on rules. It took its character and direction from an old feud
between Morrison and Randall. Morrison, as chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee in 1876, had reported a tariff reform measure
which was defeated by Randall's influence. Then Randall, who had
succeeded to the Speakership, transferred Morrison from the
chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee to the chairmanship
of the committee on public lands. But Morrison was a man who
would not submit to defeat. He was a veteran of the Civil War,
and had been severely wounded in leading his regiment at Fort
Donelson. After the war, he figured in Illinois politics and
served as Speaker of the State Legislature. He entered Congress
in 1873 and devoted himself to the study of the tariff with such
intelligence and thoroughness that his speeches are still an
indispensable part of the history of tariff legislation. His
habitual manner was so mild and unassuming that it gave little
indication of the force of his personality, which was full of
energy and perseverance.
Randall was more imperious in his mien. He was a party leader of
established renown which he had gained in the struggles over
force bills at the close of the reconstruction period. His
position on the tariff was that of a Pennsylvania protectionist,
and upon the tariff reform issue in 1883, he was defeated for the
Speakership. At that time, John G. Carlisle of Kentucky was
raised to that post, while Morrison again became chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee. But Randall, now appointed chairman of
the Appropriations Committee, had so great an influence that he
was able to turn about forty Democratic votes against the tariff
bill reported by the Ways and Means Committee, thus enabling the
Republicans to kill the bill by striking out the enacting clause.
Only this practical aim, then, was in view in the reports
presented by the committee on rules. The principal feature of the
majority report was a proposal to curtail the jurisdiction of the
Appropriations Committee by transferring to other committees five
of the eleven regular appropriation bills. What, from the
constitutional point of view, would appear to be the main
question—the recovery by the House of its freedom of action—was
hardly noticed in the report or in the debates which followed.
Heretofore, the rules had allotted certain periods to general
business; now, the majority report somewhat enlarged these
periods and stipulated that no committee should bring more than
one proposal before the House until all other committees had had
their turn. This provision might have been somewhat more
effective had it been accompanied by a revision of the list of
committees such as was proposed by William M. Springer. He
pointed out that there were a number of committees "that have no
business to transact or business so trifling and unimportant as
to make it unnecessary to have standing committees upon such
subjects"; he proposed to abolish twenty-one of these committees
and to create four new ones to take their place; he showed that
"if we allow these twenty useless committees to be again put on
our list, to be called regularly in the morning hour... forty-two
days will be consumed in calling these committees"; and, finally,
he pointed out that the change would effect a saving since it
would "do away with sixteen committee clerkships."
This saving was, in fact, fatal to the success of Springer's
proposal, since it meant the extinction of so many sinecures
bestowed through congressional favor. In the end, Springer
reduced his proposed change to the creation of one general
committee on public expenditures to take the place of eight
committees on departmental expenditures. It was notorious that
such committees did nothing and could do nothing, and their
futility, save as dispensers of patronage, had been demonstrated
in a startling manner by the effect of the Acts of July 12, 1870,
and June 20, 1874, requiring all unused appropriations to be paid
into the Treasury. The amounts thus turned into the Treasury
aggregated $174,000,000 and in a single bureau there was an
unexpended balance of $36,000,000, which had accumulated for a
quarter of a century because Congress had not been advised that
no appropriation was needed. Mr. Springer remarked that, during
the ten years in which he had been a member of Congress, he had
observed with regard to these committees "that in nearly all
cases, after their appointment, organization, and the election of
a clerk, the committee practically ceased to exist, and nothing
further is done." William R. Morrison at once came to the rescue
of the endangered sinecures and argued that even although these
committees had been inactive in the past they "constituted the
eyes, the ears, and the hands of the House." In consequence,
after a short debate Mr. Springer's motion was rejected without a
division.
The arrangements subsequently made to provide time and
opportunity for general legislation, turned out in practice to be
quite futile and indeed they were never more than a mere formal
pretense. It was quite obvious, therefore, that the new rules
tended only to make the situation worse than before. Thomas Ryan
of Kansas told the plain truth when he said: "You do not propose
to remedy any of those things of which you complain by any of the
rules you have brought forward. You propose to clothe eight
committees with the same power, with the same temptation and
capacity to abuse it. You multiply eightfold the very evils of
which you complain." James H. Blount of Georgia sought to
mitigate the evils of the situation by giving a number of other
committees the same privilege as the appropriation committees,
but this proposal at once raised a storm, for appropriation
committees had leave to report at any time, and to extend the
privilege would prevent expeditious handling of appropriation
bills. Mr. Blount's motion was, therefore, voted down without a
division.
While in the debate, the pretense of facilitating routine
business was ordinarily kept up; occasional intimations of actual
ulterior purpose leaked out, as when John B. Storm of
Pennsylvania remarked that it was a valuable feature of the rules
that they did hamper action and "that the country which is least
governed is the best governed, is a maxim in strict accord with
the idea of true civil liberty." William McKinley was also of the
opinion that barriers were needed "against the wild projects and
visionary schemes which will find advocates in this House." Some
years later, when the subject was again up for discussion, Thomas
B. Reed went to the heart of the situation when he declared that
the rules had been devised not to facilitate action but to
obstruct it, for "the whole system of business here for years has
been to seek methods of shirking, not of meeting, the questions
which the people present for the consideration of their
representatives. Peculiar circumstances have caused this. For a
long time, one section of the country largely dominated the
other. That section of the country was constantly apprehensive
of danger which might happen at any time by reason of an
institution it was maintaining. Very naturally, all the rules of
the House were bent for the obstruction of action on the part of
Congress." It may be added that these observations apply even
more forcibly, to the rules of the Senate. The privilege of
unrestricted debate was not originally granted by those rules but
was introduced as a means of strengthening the power of sectional
resistance to obnoxious legislation.
The revision of the rules in 1885, then, was not designed really
to facilitate action by the House, but rather to effect a
transfer of the power to rule the House. It was at least clear
that under the proposed changes the chairman of the committee on
appropriations would no longer retain such complete mastery as
Randall had wielded, and this was enough to insure the adoption
of the majority report. The minority report opposed this
weakening of control on the ground that it would be destructive
of orderly and responsible management of the public funds.
Everything which Randall said on that point has since been amply
confirmed by much sad experience. Although some leading
Republicans, among whom was Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, argued
strongly in support of Randall's views, the temper of the House
was such that the majority in favor of the change was
overwhelming, and on December 18, 1885, the Morrison plan was
finally adopted without a roll call.
The hope that the change in organization would expedite action on
appropriation bills, was promptly disappointed. Only one of the
fourteen regular appropriation bills became law before the last
day of the fiscal year. The duress to which the House was subject
became tighter and harder than before, and the Speakership
entered upon a development unparalleled in constitutional
history. The Speaker was practically in a position to determine
what business the House might consider and what it might not, and
the circumstances were such as to breed a belief that it was his
duty to use his discretion where a choice presented itself. It is
obvious that, when on the floor of the House there are a number
of applicants for recognition, the Speaker must choose between
them. All cannot be allowed to speak at once. There is no chance
to apply the shop rule, "first come first served," for numerous
applications for the floor come at the same time. Shall the
Speaker choose at random or according to some definite principle
of selection? In view of the Speaker's interest in the welfare of
the party which raised him to the office, he would naturally
inquire in advance the purpose for which the recognition of the
chair was desired. It was a manifest step towards orderly
procedure in session, however, when instead of crowding around
the clerk's desk bawling for recognition, members applied to the
Speaker in advance. In Speaker Blaine's time, this had become a
regular practice and ever since then, a throng of members at the
Speaker's office trying to arrange with him for recognition has
been a daily occurrence during a legislative session. Samuel W.
McCall, in his work on The Business of Congress, says that the
Speaker "usually scrutinizes the bill and the committee's report
upon it, and in case of doubt he sometimes refers them to a
member in whom he has confidence, for a more careful examination
than he himself has time to give."
Under Speaker Carlisle, this power to censor proposals was made
conspicuous through the factional war in the Democratic party.
For several sessions of Congress, a bill had been pending to
repeal the internal revenue taxes upon tobacco, and it had such
support that it might have passed if it could have been reached
for consideration. On February 5, 1887, a letter was addressed to
Speaker Carlisle by three prominent Democrats: Samuel J.
Randall of Pennsylvania, George D. Wise of Virginia, and John S.
Henderson of North Carolina, saying: "At the instance of many
Democratic members of the House, we appeal to you earnestly to
recognize on Monday next, some Democrat who will move to suspend
the rules for the purpose of giving the House an opportunity of
considering the question of the total repeal of the internal
revenue taxes on tobacco." The letter went on to argue that it
would be bad policy to let a Republican have credit for a
proposal, which it was declared "will command more votes than any
other measure pending before the House looking towards a
reduction in taxation; and favorable action on this proposition
will not interfere with other efforts that are being made to
reduce the burden of the people."
Speaker Carlisle, however, refused to allow the House to consider
the matter on the ground that negotiations with Randall and his
friends for concerted party action had so far been fruitless.
"Among other things," he wrote, "we proposed to submit the entire
subject to a caucus of our political friends, with the
understanding that all parties would abide by the result of its
action.... We have received no response to that communication,
and I consider that it would not be proper under the
circumstances for me to agree to a course of action which would
present to the House a simple proposition for the repeal of the
internal revenue tax on tobacco, snuff and cigars, to the
exclusion of all other measures for the reduction of taxation."
The letter closed by "sincerely hoping that some plan may yet be
devised which will enable the House to consider the whole subject
of revenue reduction."
No one was less of an autocrat in temper and habit of thought
than Speaker Carlisle, and he assumed this position in deference
to a recognized function of his office, supported by a long line
of precedents. The case was, therefore, a signal illustration of
the way in which the House has impaired its ability to consider
legislation by claiming the exclusive privilege of proposing
legislation. If the rules had allowed the President to propose
his measures directly to the House, then the way would have been
opened for a substitute or an amendment. As it was, the House was
able to act only upon matters within the control of a few persons
advantageously posted, and none of the changes of rules that have
been made from time to time have seriously disturbed this
fundamental situation.
Notwithstanding the new rules adopted in December, 1885, nothing
of importance was accomplished by the House. On February 15,
1886, William R. Morrison introduced a tariff bill making a
moderate reduction in rates of duty, which, after considerable
amendment in the committee of ways and means, was reported to the
House on the 12th of April; but no further action was taken until
the 17th of June, when Morrison moved that the House go into
committee of the whole to consider the bill. Thirty-five
Democrats voted with the Republicans against the motion, which
was defeated by 157 nays to 140 yeas. No further attempt was made
to take up the bill during that session, and in the ensuing fall
Morrison was defeated as a candidate for reelection. Before
leaving Congress he tried once more to obtain consideration of
his bill but in vain. Just as that Congress was expiring, John S.
Henderson of North Carolina was at last allowed to move a
suspension of the rules in order to take a vote on a bill to
reduce internal revenue taxes, but he failed to obtain the
two-thirds vote required for suspension of the rules.
That the proceedings of the Forty-ninth Congress were not
entirely fruitless, was mainly due to the initiative and address
of the Senate. Some important measures were thus pushed through,
among them the act regulating the presidential succession and the
act creating the Interstate Commerce Commission. The first of
these provided for the succession of the heads of departments in
turn, in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of
both the President and the Vice-President.
The most marked legislative achievement of the House was an act
regulating the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, to which
the Senate assented with some amendment, and which was signed
with reluctance by the President, after a special message to the
House sharply criticizing some of the provisions of the act. A
bill providing for arbitration of differences between common
carriers and their employees was passed by the Senate without a
division, but it did not reach the President until the closing
days of the session and failed of enactment because he did not
sign it before the final adjournment. Taken as a whole, then, the
record of the Congress elected in 1884 showed that while the
Democratic party had the Presidency and the House of
Representatives, the Republican party, although defeated at the
polls, still controlled public policy through the agency of the
Senate.
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