51: Chapter LI.
<< 50: Chapter L. || 52: Chapter LII. >>
More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent
than that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in
having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the
face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit.
We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it
had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. In the
evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily
repulsed. As we stood at the close, the two armies were
relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as
when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely
crossed was a victory.
Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of the
Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of
speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge
was transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of
the wounded to Washington.
It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things
connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac: first,
in every change of position or halt for the night, whether
confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the
men intrenched themselves. For this purpose they would build up
piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and
dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. Thus the
digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and
increased the elevation in front of them. It was wonderful how
quickly they could in this way construct defence of
considerable strength. When a halt was made with the view of
assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be
strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of
engineer officers. The second was, the use made of the
telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could be more complete than
the organization and discipline of this body of brave and
intelligent men. Insulated wires—insulated so that they would
transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water—were
wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire
to each reel. Two men and one mule were detailed to each
reel. The pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided
with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and
raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve
freely. There was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator,
battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps,
each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons also
loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall
tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold
the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not
run over them. The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades,
and always kept with the command they were assigned to. The
operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and
never changed except by special orders.
The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all
the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to
put up their wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be
led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged
to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man
would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led
off. When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it
would be on the ground. This would be done in rear of every
brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then
be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole
army. The men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all
commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles.
This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over
the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. At
intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other
permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. In
the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at
intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its
place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would
take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged
to were to be established, and would connect with the wire.
Thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk
the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be
effected between all the headquarters of the army. No orders
ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.
The signal service was used on the march. The men composing
this corps were assigned to specified commands. When movements
were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize
upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the
country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest
points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the
positions of different parts of our own army, and often the
movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of
the enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a
time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to
receive any benefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful
information.
On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington
announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day,
and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by
surprise on the 5th. I had given orders for a movement by the
left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to
crush Butler before I could get there.
My order for this movement was as follows:
Headquarters Armies of the U. S.,
May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.
MAJOR-General MEADE,
Commanding A. P.
Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take
position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's
Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney
Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to Old
Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown
forward early in the morning to the Ny River.
I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave
Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then
follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move
to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to
Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move
on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and
Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of
destination.
All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before
the troops move, and then move off quietly.
It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy
attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be
prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain,
with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify
these instructions.
All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.
During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at
Todd's Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the
troops that were to go by that route at night. Soon after dark
Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon
followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march carried him immediately
behind the works where Hancock's command lay on the Brock
Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded
the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest
enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No
doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south.
It indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning
of the end" in the battle just fought. The cheering was so lusty
that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. At all
events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and
musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.
Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way
beyond our left when the road forked. We looked to see, if we
could, which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the
day. It seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took
it. We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock,
of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that
we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the
enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop
and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported that
Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into
his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the
road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of
Warren's column when it should come up, and continued our
journey to Todd's Tavern, where we arrived after midnight.
My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did
not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush
Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between
his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into
the open field. But Lee, by accident, beat us to
Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of
the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement
commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army
of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his
government. Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps—now
commanded by Anderson—to move in the morning (the 8th) to
Spottsylvania. But the woods being still on fire, Anderson
could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his
destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession of
Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been
the result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is
certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between
him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a
race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond
first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter
line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near
closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the
Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was
caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's
corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the
second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make
a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to
commence on the morning of the 8th. But accident often decides
the fate of battle.
Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the
afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after
night, with the field his at the close. He issued the necessary
orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the
Po River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get to
Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's orders to
Merritt—who was holding the bridge—on his arrival at Todd's
Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came
up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his
division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the
Confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of
the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in
Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to execute the orders
Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades
of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to
cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren
to reinforce Wilson and hold the town.
Anderson soon intrenched himself—if indeed the intrenchments
were not already made—immediately across Warren's front. Warren
was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the
cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day. He
assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He soon organized his men,
as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack,
this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded in
gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he
intrenched. His right and left divisions—the former
Crawford's, the latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by
Cutler—drove the enemy back some distance.
At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch
Church. I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a
force to his support. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney
Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who
was at Todd's Tavern, was notified of Warren's engagement, and
was directed to be in readiness to come up. Burnside, who was
with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our extreme left, received
the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some
reason—probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when
serious work was to be done—so that it was near night before the
combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of
Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led
the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it
failed.
Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to
do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the
balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to
co-operate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he
would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of
others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did
get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent
instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one
division, holding the others in reserve until he could
superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that
division commanders could execute an order without his
presence. His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his
control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick
perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that
could be done with a small command.
Lee had ordered Hill's corps—now commanded by Early—to move by
the very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in
the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my
move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to
Fredericksburg. Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond
he had possession of Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson
was in possession of Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee,
however. Early only found that he had been following us when he
ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His coming detained
Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsylvania for that day; but
he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by
another route.
Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left
flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also
have given us an hour or earlier start. It took all that time
for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock
after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the
enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity to use his whole force
when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush
Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made
was tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible
assault by the enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while
the two corps to the right passed. If an attack had been made by
the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position,
fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position
as reserves, until his entire front was passed. By a left flank
movement the army would have been scattered while still passing
the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by
it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet
learned the special qualifications of the different corps
commanders. At that time my judgment was that Warren was the
man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to
that gallant soldier to take him from the field. As I have
before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he
was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance
of the duty he had to perform.
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