11: Chapter XI.
<< 10: Chapter X. || 12: Chapter XII. >>
The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico
was over Río Frío mountain, the road leading over which, at the
highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water.
The pass through this mountain might have been easily defended,
but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in
three days after leaving Puebla. The City of Mexico lies west
of Río Frío mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six
miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and
south. Between the western base of Río Frío and the City of
Mexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left
and Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City
of Mexico. Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of
land over which the direct road to the city runs. Xochimilco is
also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance
south of it, and is connected with Lake Chalco by a narrow
channel. There is a high rocky mound, called El Penon, on the
right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground
dividing the lakes. This mound was strengthened by
intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct
attack impracticable.
Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other
points near the eastern end of Lake Chalco. Reconnaissances
were made up to within gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers
were seeking a route by the south side of Lake Chalco to flank
the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. A way
was found around the lake, and by the 18th of August troops were
in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south
from the plaza of the capital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpam and
the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of
Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras. All these
points, except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and
strongly garrisoned. Contreras is situated on the side of a
mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great
confusion, reaching nearly to San Antonio. This made the
approach to the city from the south very difficult.
The brigade to which I was attached—Garland's, of Worth's
division—was sent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles
from St. Augustin Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the
City of Mexico. The ground on which San Antonio stands is
completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a
little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the
south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. To
the south-west is the Pedregal—the volcanic rock before spoken
of—over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and
infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an
enemy. From the position occupied by Garland's brigade,
therefore, no movement could be made against the defenses of San
Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over
perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the
enemy's artillery and infantry. If Contreras, some three miles
west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there
could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the
enemy between us and the city. Under these circumstances
General Scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy
without making an attack until further orders.
On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam,
Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the
advanced intrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were
protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for
some other purpose than defense. General Scott at once set his
engineers reconnoitering the works about Contreras, and on the
19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from
which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that
place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the
mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the
enemy's defenses difficult, for their work stood exactly between
those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day
and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west
of the enemy.
This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in
which the officers of the engineer corps won special
distinction. In fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed
difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that
had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary
field. The very strength of each of these positions was, by the
skill of the engineers, converted into a defense for the
assaulting parties while securing their positions for final
attack. All the troops with General Scott in the valley of
Mexico, except a part of the division of General Quitman at San
Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of Garland (Worth's division)
at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle of Contreras, or were
on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to
reinforce those who were engaged. The assault was made on the
morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the
sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many
prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. The
brigade commanded by General Riley was from its position the most
conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers
and regulars.
From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the
progress made at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the
flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the
way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct
showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. We moved out
at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. Clarke's
brigade of Worth's division now moved west over the point of the
Pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to
clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading
to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. When he approached
Churubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a
tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. About
an hour after, Garland was ordered to advance directly along the
causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. San
Antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken
place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes
waving over Contreras.
The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on
their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west
of, and parallel to the one by way of San Antonio and
Churubusco. It was expected by the commanding general that
these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the
enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turning east to
reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this,
and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in
the valley of Mexico. General Scott coming upon the
battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under
Shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. This
Shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. The
enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners,
artillery and small arms. The balance of the causeway held by
the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like
manner. I recollect at this place that some of the gunners who
had stood their ground, were deserters from General Taylor's
army on the Río Grande.
Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in
these various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were
faultless as I look upon them now, after the lapse of so many
years. As before stated, the work of the engineer officers who
made the Reconnaissances and led the different commands to their
destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his
orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he
could use on an ordinary march. I mean, up to the points from
which the attack was to commence. After that point is reached
the enemy often induces a change of orders not before
contemplated. The enemy outside the city outnumbered our
soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized
by the succession of defeats this day, that the City of Mexico
could have been entered without much further bloodshed. In
fact, Captain Philip Kearney—afterwards a general in the war of
the rebellion—rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates
of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little
force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several
of his officers. He had not heard the call for a halt.
General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at
Puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital
commenced. He had consequently not been in any of the
engagements of the war up to the battle of Contreras. By an
unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he
was painfully injured. The next day, when his brigade, with the
other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the
flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the
road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce
attempted to accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered
to do so, and fainted. This circumstance gave rise to
exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a
candidate for the Presidency. Whatever General Pierce's
qualifications may have been for the Presidency, he was a
gentleman and a man of courage. I was not a supporter of him
politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did any other
of the volunteer generals.
General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time,
because Mr. Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of
the United States to negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico,
was with the army, and either he or General Scott
thought—probably both of them—that a treaty would be more
possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the
capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of
an invader. Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time.
The army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains
south of the city, as far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were
at once entered into with Santa Anna, who was then practically
THE GOVERNMENT and the immediate commander of all the troops
engaged in defense of the country. A truce was signed which
denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or
to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the
armistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for
his army from the city in the meantime.
Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously
between Mr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of
Mexico, until the 2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed
in his ultimatum. Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico,
and New Mexico and California ceded to the United States for a
stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. I do not suppose
Mr. Trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries.
The war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution,
and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the
acquisition of territory out of which new States might be
carved. At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at the
terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defense,
without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. The
terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been
sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. The first
train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob.
This, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all
responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting
the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts
were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the
citizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and
negotiations continued. As soon as the news reached General
Scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of
September, he wrote a vigorous note to President Santa Anna,
calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory
reply, declared the armistice at an end.
General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying
Tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the City of
Mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the
distance of half a mile. More than a mile west, and also a
little above the plain, stands Molino del Rey. The mill is a
long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in
length. At the period of which I speak General Scott supposed a
portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of
guns. This, however, proved to be a mistake. It was valuable
to the Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained.
The building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the
outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defense for
infantry. Chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to
the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct
line between Molino del Rey and the western part of the city. It
was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous
sides.
The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts,
resting on strong stone arches. One of these aqueducts draws
its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or
near Molino del Rey, and runs north close to the west base of
Chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it
reaches the road running east into the city by the Garita San
Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to
the city. The second aqueduct starts from the east base of
Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to
the city. This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a
broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. The arches
supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops
as well as to those engaged defensively. At points on the San
Cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a
single piece of artillery in each. At the point where both road
and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was
not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry
supports, but the houses to the north of the San Cosme road,
facing south and commanding a view of the road back to
Chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets
made of sandbags. The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San
Cosme and Belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were
strongly intrenched. Deep, wide ditches, filled with water,
lined the sides of both roads. Such were the defenses of the
City of Mexico in September, 1847, on the routes over which
General Scott entered.
Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to
General Worth—indeed he continued so up to the close of
hostilities—but, for some reason, Worth had become estranged
from his chief. Scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to
heart. He did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary
showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. It was
understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan and
execute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or
interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring
their former relations. The effort failed, and the two generals
remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if
not actually hostile.
The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of
September. The night of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and
regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters
to receive instructions for the morrow. These orders
contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the
Mills before daylight. The engineers had reconnoitered the
ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information
necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack.
By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged
at Molino were all at the places designated. The ground in
front of the Mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery
from the summit of Chapultepec as well as by the lighter
batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was
over. Worth's troops entered the Mills by every door, and the
enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec. Had this
victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and
Mexicans would have gone over the defenses of Chapultepec so
near together that the place would have fallen into our hands
without further loss. The defenders of the works could not have
fired upon us without endangering their own men. This was not
done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to
carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the
8th. I do not criticize the failure to capture Chapultepec at
this time. The result that followed the first assault could not
possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected
advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and
given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops
must have kept on without orders. It is always, however, in
order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise
directed. The loss on our side at Molino del Rey was severe for
the numbers engaged. It was especially so among commissioned
officers.
I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills. In
passing through to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec,
I happened to notice that there were armed Mexicans still on top
of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. Not
seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the
building, I took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to
be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the
wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back,
used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or
four feet of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the
building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had
preceded me by some other way. There were still quite a number
of Mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six
officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away
before our troops occupied the building. They still had their
arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry,
guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all by himself. I
halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned
officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now
with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge
of the wall, and throw them to the ground below.
Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with
the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position
and property, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya.
The engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and
wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged.
During the night of the 11th batteries were established which
could play upon the fortifications of Chapultepec. The
bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but
there was no further engagement during this day than that of the
artillery. General Scott assigned the capture of Chapultepec to
General Pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment.
Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed
of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. They were commanded
by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively. The assault was
successful, but bloody.
In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del
Rey and Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly
unnecessary. When the assaults upon the garitas of San Cosme
and Belen were determined upon, the road running east to the
former gate could have been reached easily, without an
engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west of
them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the
road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking
columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east
so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from
Chapultepec. In like manner, the troops designated to act
against Belen could have kept east of Chapultepec, out of range,
and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of Chapultepec.
Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both have been necessarily
evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have
been turned.
General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who
stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man,
commanded the column acting against Belen. General Worth
commanded the column against San Cosme. When Chapultepec fell
the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. I was on
the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most that took place on
that route. When opposition was encountered our troops
sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the
aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. We encountered no
serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the
road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the
point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. I have
described the defenses of this position before. There were but
three commissioned officers besides myself, that I can now call
to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached.
One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the Marine
Corps. I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th
infantry, were the others. Our progress was stopped for the
time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads
and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it.
West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the
south-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were
moving upon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of
these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it
joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. I watched my
opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south
wall. Proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the
enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still
cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. I
then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. All that
were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their
services. Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I
watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under
cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our
men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the
intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond,
and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would
fire at it. Our crossing was thus made practicable without loss.
When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command
again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy
until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following
me until the San Cosme road was reached; we would then be on the
flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no
obstruction between us and them. When we reached the south-west
corner of the enclosure before described, I saw some United
States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who
had come up since my reconnaissance. This was the company of
Captain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. I
explained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was
about to do. He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I
might go on and he would follow. As soon as we got on the road
leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet
retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men
went after them in such close pursuit—the troops we had left
under the arches joining—that a second line across the road,
about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. No
reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks's company, and the
position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a
force. It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some
loss.
Worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to
it. Later in the day in reconnoitering I found a church off to
the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would
command the ground back of the garita San Cosme. I got an
officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to
work it, to go with me. The road being in possession of the
enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the
church. This took us over several ditches breast deep in water
and grown up with water plants. These ditches, however, were
not over eight or ten feet in width. The howitzer was taken to
pieces and carried by the men to its destination. When I
knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while
extremely polite, declined to admit us. With the little Spanish
then at my command, I explained to him that he might save
property by opening the door, and he certainly would save
himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and
besides, I intended to go in whether he consented or not. He
began to see his duty in the same light that I did, and opened
the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special
pleasure to do so. The gun was carried to the belfry and put
together. We were not more than two or three hundred yards from
San Cosme. The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the
enemy and created great confusion. Why they did not send out a
small party and capture us, I do not know. We had no infantry
or other defenses besides our one gun.
The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the
city was so marked that General Worth saw it from his position.
3 He was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant
Pemberton—later Lieutenant-General commanding the defenses of
Vicksburg—to bring me to him. He expressed his gratification
at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing,
saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of
voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed
along with the one already rendering so much service. I could
not tell the General that there was not room enough in the
steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked
upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second
lieutenant. I took the captain with me, but did not use his gun.
The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under
General Worth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line
confronting the general line of the enemy across to Belen. The
troops that I was with were in the houses north of the road
leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in
cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the
town. During the night Santa Anna, with his army—except the
deserters—left the city. He liberated all the convicts
confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict
upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after
Santa Anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a
delegation to General Scott to ask—if not demand—an armistice,
respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the
supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal
affairs. General Scott declined to trammel himself with
conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain
within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved
themselves properly.
General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on
the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same
position at Belen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme. After
the interview above related between General Scott and the city
council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both
columns in the morning. The troops under Worth were to stop at
the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city. Quitman was
to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of the
Palace—a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress
has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public
offices are all located, the President resides, and much room is
left for museums, receptions, etc. This is the building
generally designated as the "Halls of the Montezumas."
_________
3Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and
General Worth.—PUBLISHERS.
<< 10: Chapter X. || 12: Chapter XII. >>