2: Underlying Causes of the Great European War
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What brought on the mighty war which so suddenly sprang forth?
What evident, what subtle, what deep-hidden causes led to this
sudden demolition of the temple of peace? What pride of power,
what lust of ambition, what desire of imperial dominion cast the
armed hosts of the nations into the field of conflict, on which
multitudes of innocent victims were to be sacrificed to the
insatiate hunger for blood of the modern Moloch?
Here are questions which few are capable of answering. Ostensible
answers may be given, surface causes, reasons of immediate
potency. But no one will be willing to accept these as the true
moving causes. For a continent to spring in a week's time from
complete peace into almost universal war, with all the great and
several of the small Powers involved, is not to be explained by
an apothegm or embraced within the limits of a paragraph. If not
all, certainly several of these nations had enmities to be
unchained, ambitions to be gratified, long-hidden purposes to be
put in action. They seemed to have been awaiting an opportunity,
and it came when the anger of the Servians at the seizure of
Bosnia by Austria culminated in a mad act of assassination.
ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN CROWN PRINCE
The immediate cause, so far as apparent to us, of the war in
question was the murder, on June 29, 1914, of the Austrian Crown
Prince Francis Ferdinand and his wife, while on a visit to
Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, the assassin being a Servian
student, supposed to have come for that purpose from Belgrade,
the Servian capital. The inspiring cause of this dastardly act
was the feeling of hostility towards Austria which was widely
entertained in Servia. Bosnia was a part of the ancient kingdom
of Servia. The bulk of its people are of Slavic origin and speak
the Servian language. Servia was eager to regain it, as a
possible outlet for a border on the Mediterranean Sea. When,
therefore, in 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
had been under her military control since 1878, the indignation
in Servia was great. While it had died down in a measure in the
subsequent years, the feeling of injury survived in many hearts,
and there is little reason to doubt that the assassination of
Archduke Ferdinand was a result of this pervading sentiment.
In fact, the Austrian government was satisfied that the murder
plot was hatched in Belgrade and held that Servian officials were
in some way concerned in it. The Servian press gave some warrant
for this, being openly boastful and defiant in its comments. When
the Austrian consul-general at Belgrade dropped dead in the
consulate the papers showed their satisfaction and hinted that he
had been poisoned. This attitude of the press evidently was one
of the reasons for the stringent demand made by Austria on July
23d, requiring apology and change of attitude from Servia and
asking for a reply by the hour of 6 P.M. on the 25th. The demands
were in part as follows:
- An apology by the Servian government in its official journal
for all Pan-Servian propaganda and for the participation of
Servian army officers in it, and warning all Servians in the
future to desist from anti-Austrian demonstrations.
- That orders to this effect should be issued to the Servian
army.
- That Servia should dissolve all societies capable of
conducting intrigues against Austria.
- That Servia should curb the activities of the Servian press in
regard to Austria.
- That Austrian officials should be permitted to conduct an
inquiry in Servia independent of the Servian government into the
Sarajevo plot.
An answer to these demands was sent out at ten minutes before 6
o"clock on the 25th, in which Servia accepted all demands except
the last, which it did not deem "in accordance with international
law and good neighborly relations." It asked that this demand
should be submitted to The Hague Tribunal. The Austrian Minister
at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, refused to accept this
reply and at once left the capital with the entire staff of the
legation. The die was cast, as Austria probably intended that it
should be.
AUSTRIA'S MOTIVE IN MAKING WAR
It had, in fact, become evident early in July that the military
party in Austria was seeking to manufacture a popular demand for
war, based on the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand and his
wife. Such was the indication of the tone of the Vienna
newspapers, which appeared desirous of working up a sentiment
hostile to Servia. It may be doubted if the aged emperor was a
party to this. Probably his assent was a forced one, due to the
insistence of the war party and the public sentiment developed by
it. That the murder of the Archduke was the real cause of the
action of Austria can scarcely be accepted in view of Servia's
acceptance of Austria's rigid demands. The actual cause was
undoubtedly a deeper one, that of Austria's long-cherished
purpose of gaining a foothold on the Aegean Sea, for which the
possession of Servia was necessary as a preliminary step. A
plausible motive was needed, any pretext that would serve as a
satisfactory excuse to Europe for hostile action and that could
at the same time be utilized in developing Austrian indignation
against the Servians. Such a motive came in the act of
assassination and immediate use was made of it. The Austrian war
party contended that the deed was planned at Belgrade, that it
had been fomented by Servian officials, and that these had
supplied the murderer with explosives and aided in their transfer
into Bosnia.
What evidence Austria possessed leading to this opinion we do not
know. While it is not likely that there was any actual evidence,
the case was one that called for investigation, and Austria was
plainly within its rights in demanding such an inquiry and due
punishment of every one found to be connected with the tragic
deed. But Austria went farther than this. It was willing to
accept nothing less than a complete and humiliating submission on
the part of Servia. And the impression was widely entertained,
whether with or without cause, that in this Austria was not
acting alone but that it had the full support of Germany. That
country also may be supposed to have had its ends to gain. What
these were we shall consider later.
SERVIA ACCEPTS AUSTRIA'S DEMANDS
Imperious as had been the demand of Austria, one which would
never have been submitted to a Power of equal strength, Servia
accepted it, expressing itself as willing to comply with all the
conditions imposed except that relating to the participation of
Austrian officials in the inquiry, an explanation being asked on
this point. If this reply should be deemed inadequate, Servia
stood ready to submit the question at issue to The Hague Peace
Tribunal and to the Powers which had signed the declaration of
1909 relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The subsequent action of Austria was significant. The Austrian
Minister at Belgrade, as before stated, rejected it as
unsatisfactory and immediately left the Servian capital. He
acted, in short, with a precipitancy that indicated that he was
acting under instructions. This was made very evident by what
immediately followed. When news came on July 28th that war had
been declared and active hostilities commenced, it was
accompanied by the statement that Austria would not now be
satisfied even with a full acceptance of her demands.
That the intention of this imperious demand and what quickly
followed was to force a war, no one can doubt. Servia's nearly
complete assent to the conditions imposed was declared to be not
only unsatisfactory, but also "dishonorable," a word doubtless
deliberately used. Evidently no door was to be left open for
retrogressive consideration.
THE IRONIES OF HISTORY
It is one of the ironies of history that a people who once played
a leading part in saving the Austrian capital from capture should
come to be threatened by the armies of that capital. This takes
us back to the era when Servia, a powerful empire of those days,
fell under the dominion of the conquering Turks, whose armies
further overran Hungary and besieged Vienna. Had this city been
captured, all central Europe would have lain open to the
barbarities of the Turks. In its defense the Servians played a
leading part, so great a one that we are told by a Hungarian
historian, "It was the Serb Bacich who saved Vienna." But in 1914
Servia was brought to the need of saving itself from Vienna.
WHAT AUSTRIA HAD TO GAIN
If it be asked what Austria had to gain by this act; what was her
aim in forcing war upon a far weaker state; the answer is at
hand. The Balkan States, of which Servia is a prominent member,
lie in a direct line between Europe and the Orient. A great power
occupying the whole of the Balkan peninsula would possess
political advantages far beyond those enjoyed by Austria-Hungary.
It would be in a position giving it great influence over, if not
strategic control of, the Suez Canal, the commerce of the
Mediterranean, and a considerable all-rail route between Central
Europe and the far East. Salonika, on the AEgean Sea, now in
Greek territory, is one of the finest harbors on the
Mediterranean Sea. A railway through Servia now connects this
port with Austria and Germany. In addition to this railway it is
not unlikely that a canal may in the near future connect the
Danube with the harbor of Salonika. If this project should be
carried out, the commerce of the Danube and its tributary streams
and canals, even that of central and western Germany, would be
able to reach the Mediterranean without passing through the
perilous Iron Gates of the Danube or being subjected to the
delays and dangers incident to the long passage through the Black
Sea and the Grecian Archipelago.
We can see in all this a powerful motive for Austria to seek to
gain possession of Servia, as a step towards possible future
control of the whole Balkan peninsula. The commercial and
manufacturing interests of Austria-Hungary were growing, and
mastership of such a route to the Mediterranean would mean
immense advantage to this ambitious empire. Possession of
northern Italy once gave her the advantage of an important outlet
to the Mediterranean. This, through events that will be spoken of
in later chapters, was lost to her. She apparently then sought to
reach it by a more direct and open road, that leading through
Salonika.
Such seem the reasons most likely to have been active in the
Austrian assault upon Servia. The murder of an Austrian archduke
by an insignificant assassin gave no sufficient warrant for the
act. The whole movement of events indicates that Austria was not
seeking retribution for a crime but seizing upon a pretext for a
predetermined purpose and couching her demands upon Servia in
terms which no self-respecting nation could accept without
protest. Servia was to be put in a position from which she could
not escape and every door of retreat against the arbitrament of
war was closed against her.
But in this retrospect we are dealing with Austria and Servia
alone. What brought Germany, what brought France, what brought
practically the whole of Europe into the struggle? What caused it
to grow with startling suddenness from a minor into a major
conflict, from a contest between a bulldog and a terrier into a
battle between lions? What were the unseen and unnoted conditions
that, within little more than a week's time, induced all the
leading nations of Europe to cast down the gage of battle and
spring full-armed into the arena, bent upon a struggle which
threatened to surpass any that the world had ever seen? Certainly
no trifling causes were here involved. Only great and
far-reaching causes could have brought about such a catastrophe.
All Europe appeared to be sitting, unknowingly or knowingly, upon
a powder barrel which only needed some inconsequent hand to apply
the match. It seems incredible that the mere pulling of a trigger
by a Servian student and the slaughter of an archduke in the
Bosnian capital could in a month's time have plunged all Europe
into war. From small causes great events may rise. Certainly that
with which we are here dealing strikingly illustrates this homely
apothegm.
HOW THE WAR BECAME CONTINENTAL
We cannot hope to point out the varied causes which were at work
in this vast event. Very possibly the leading ones are unknown to
us. Yet some of the important ones are evident and may be made
evident, and to these we must restrict ourselves.
Allusion has already been made to the general belief that the
Emperor of Germany was deeply concerned in it, and that Austria
would not have acted as it did without assurance of support, in
fact without direct instigation, from some strong allied Power,
and this Power is adjudged alike by public and private opinion to
have been Germany, acting in the person of its ambitious war
lord, the dominating Kaiser.
It may be stated that all the Powers concerned have sought to
disclaim responsibility. Thus Servia called the world to witness
that her answer to Austria was the limit of submission and
conciliation. Austria, through her ambassador to the United
States, solemnly declared that her assault upon Servia was a
measure of "self-defense." Russia explained her action as
"benevolent intervention," and expressed "a humble hope in
omnipotent providence" that her hosts would be triumphant.
Germany charged France with perfidious attack upon the unarmed
border of the fatherland, and proclaimed a holy war for "the
security of her territory." France and England, Belgium and Italy
deplored the conflict and protested that they were innocent of
offense. So far as all this is concerned the facts are generally
held to point to Germany as the chief instigator of the war.
Russia, indeed, had made threatening movements toward Austria as
a warning to her to desist from her threatened invasion of
Servia. Great Britain proposed mediation. Germany made no
movement in the direction of preventing the war, but directed its
attention to Russia, warning it to stop mobilization within
twenty-four hours, and immediately afterward beginning a similar
movement of mobilization in its own territory. On August 1st
Germany declared war against Russia, the first step towards
making the contest a continental one. On the 2d, when France
began mobilization, German forces moved against Russia and France
simultaneously and invaded the neutral states of Luxembourg and
Belgium. It was her persistence in the latter movement that
brought Great Britain into the contest, as this country was
pledged to support Belgian neutrality. On August 4th, Great
Britain sent an ultimatum to Germany to withdraw from the neutral
territory which her troops had entered and demanded an answer by
midnight. Germany declined to answer satisfactorily and at 11
o'clock war was declared by Great Britain.
AN EDITORIAL OPINION
As regards the significance of these movements, in which Germany
hurled declarations of war in rapid succession to east and west,
and forced the issue of a continental war upon nations which had
taken no decisive step, it may suffice to quote an editorial
summing up of the situation as regards Germany, from the
Philadelphia North American of August 7th:
"From these facts there is no escape. Leaving aside all questions
of justice or political expediency, the aggressor throughout has
been Germany. Austria's fury over the assassination of the heir
to the throne was natural. But Servia tendered full reparation.
So keen and conservative an authority as Rear Admiral Mahan
declares that 'the aggressive insolence' of Austria's ultimatum
'and Sevia's concession of all demands except those too
humiliating for national self-respect' show that behind Austria's
assault was the instigation of Berlin. He adds:
"Knowing how the matter would be viewed in Russia, it is
incredible that Austria would have ventured on the ultimatum
unless assured beforehand of the consent of Germany. The
inference is irresistible that it was the pretext for a war
already determined upon as soon as plausible occasion offered.'
"Circumstantial evidence, at least, places responsibility for the
flinging of the first firebrand upon the government of the
Kaiser. Now, who added fuel to the flames, until the great
conflagration was under way?
"The next move was the Czar's. 'Fraternal sentiments of the
Russian people for the Slavs in Servia,' he says, led him to
order partial mobilization, following Austria's invasion of
Servia. Instantly Germany protested, and within forty-eight hours
sent an ultimatum demanding that Russia cease her preparations.
On the following day Germany began mobilizing, and twenty-four
hours later declared war on Russia. Mobilization in France,
necessitated by these events, was anticipated by Germany, which
simultaneously flung forces into Russia, France, Luxembourg and
Belgium.
"It was Germany's historic policy of "blood and iron" that fired
Austria to attempt the crushing of Servia. It was Germany that
hurled an ultimatum, swiftly followed by an army, at Russia. It
was Germany that struck first at the French frontier. It was
Germany that trampled upon solemn treaty engagements by invading
the neutral states of Luxembourg and Belgium. And it was Germany
that, in answer to England's demand that the neutrality of
Belgium be protected, declared war against Great Britain.
"Regardless, therefore, of questions of right and wrong, it is
undeniable that in each succeeding crisis Germany has taken the
aggressive. In so doing she has been inspired by a supreme
confidence in her military might. But she has less reason to be
proud of her diplomacy. The splendid audacity of her moves cannot
obscure the fact that in making the case upon which she will be
judged she has been outmaneuvered by the deliberation of Russia,
the forbearance of France and the patience of Great Britain. She
has assumed the role of international autocrat, while giving her
foes the advantage of prosecuting a patriotic war of defense.
"Particularly is this true touching the violation of neutral
territory. For nearly half a century the duchy of Luxembourg has
been considered a 'perpetually neutral state,' under solemn
guarantee of Austria, Great Britain, Germany and Russia. Since
1830, when Belgium seceded from the Netherlands, it, too, has
been held 'an independent and perpetually neutral state,' that
status being solemnly declared in a convention signed hy Great
Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia. Yet the first war
move of Germany was to overrun these countries, seize their
railroads, bombard their cities and lay waste their territories.
"For forty years Germany has been the exemplar of a progressive
civilization. In spite of her adherence to inflated militarism,
she has put the whole world in her debt by her inspiring
industrial and scientific achievements. Her people have taught
mankind lessons of incalculable value, and her sons have enriched
far distant lands with their genius. Not the least of the
catastrophes inflicted by this inhuman war is that an unbridled
autocracy has brought against the great German empire an
indictment for arrogant assault upon the peace of nations and the
security of human institutions."
IS THE KAISER RESPONSIBLE?
How much reliance is to be placed on the foregoing newspaper
opinion, and on the prevailing sentiment holding Kaiser Wilhelm
responsible for flinging the war bomb that disrupted the ranks of
peace, no one can say. Every one naturally looked for the
fomenter of this frightful international conflict and was
disposed to place the blame on the basis of rumor and personal
feeling. On the other hand each nation concerned has vigorously
disclaimed responsibility for the cataclysm. Austria - very
meekly - claimed that Servia precipitated the conflict. Germany
blamed it upon Russia and France, the former from Slavic race
sentiment, the latter from enmity that had existed since the loss
of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870. They, on the contrary, laid all
the blame upon Germany. In the case of England alone we have a
clear vista. The obligation of the island kingdom to maintain the
neutral position of Belgium and the utter disregard of this
neutrality by Germany forced her to take part and throw her
armies into the field for the preservation of her international
obligations.
Many opinions were extant, many views advanced. One of these,
from Robert C. Long, a war correspondent of note, laid the total
responsibility upon Austria, which, he said, plunged Europe into
war in disregard of the Kaiser, who vigorously sought to prevent
the outbreak, even threatening his ally in his efforts to
preserve peace. In his view, "All the blood-guiltiness in this
war will rest upon two Powers, Austria and Russia. It rests on
Austria for her undue harshness to Servia and on Russia for its
dishonesty in secretly mobilizing its entire army at a time when
it was imploring the Kaiser to intervene for peace, and when the
Kaiser was working for peace with every prospect of success."
We have quoted one editorial opinion holding Germany wholly
responsible. Here is another, from the New York TIMES, which,
with a fair degree of justice, distributes the responsibility
among all the warring nations of Europe:
"Germany is not responsible; Russia is not responsible, or
Austria, or France, or England. The pillars of civilization are
undermined and human aspirations bludgeoned down by no Power, but
by all Powers; by no autocrats, but by all autocrats; not because
this one or that has erred or dared or dreamed or swaggered, but
because all, in a mad stampede for armament, trade and territory,
have sowed swords and guns, nourished harvests of death-dealing
crops, made ready the way.
"For what reason other than war have billions in bonds and taxes
been clamped on the backs of all Europe? None sought to evade
war; each sought to be prepared to triumph when it came. At most
some chancelleries whispered for delay, postponement; they knew
the clash to be inevitable; if not today, tomorrow. Avoid war!
What else have they lived for, what else prepared for, what else
have they inculcated in the mind of youth than the sureness of
the conflict and the great glory of offering themselves to this
Moloch in sacrifice?
"No Power involved can cover up the stain. It is indelible, the
sin of all Europe. It could have been prevented by common
agreement. There was no wish to prevent it. Munition
manufacturers were not alone in urging the race to destruction,
physical and financial. The leaders were for it. It was policy. A
boiling pot will boil, a nurtured seed will grow. There was no
escape from the avowed goal. A slow drift to the inevitable, a
thunderbolt forged, the awful push toward the vortex! What men
and nations want they get."
GERMANY'S STAKE IN THE WAR
What had Germany to gain in the war in the instigation of which
she is charged with being so deeply involved? Territorial
aggrandizement may have been one of her purposes. Belgium and
Holland lay between her and the open Atlantic, and the possession
of these countries, with their splendid ports, would pay her well
for a reasonable degree of risk and cost. The invasion of Belgium
as her first move in the war game may have had an ulterior
purpose in the acquisition of that country, one likely to be as
distasteful to France as the taking over of Alsace-Lorraine.
Perhaps the neutral position taken by Holland, with her seeming
inclination in favor of Germany, may have had more than racial
relations behind it. Considerations of ultimate safety from
annexation may have had its share in this attitude of neutrality.
The general impression has been that Germany went to war with the
purpose of establishing beyond question her political and
military supremacy on the European continent. Military despotism
in Germany was the decisive factor in making inevitable the
general war. The Emperor of Germany stood as the incarnation and
exponent of the Prussian policy of military autocracy. He had
ruled all German States in unwavering obedience to the militarist
maxim: "In times of peace prepare for war." He had used to the
full his autocratic power in building up the German Empire and in
making it not only a marvel of industrial efficiency, but also a
stupendous military machine. In this effort he had burdened the
people of Germany with an ever-increasing war budget. The limit
in this direction was reached with the war budget of the year
1912 when the revenues of the princes and of all citizens of
wealth were specially taxed. No new sources of revenue remained.
A crisis had come.
That crisis, as sometimes claimed, was not any menace from
Britain or any fear of the British power. It was rather the very
real and very rapidly rising menace of the new great Slav power
on Germany's border, including, as it did, the Russian Empire and
the entire line of Slav countries that encircled Germanic Austria
from the Adriatic to Bohemia. These Slav peoples are separated
from the governing Teutonic race in the Austrian Empire by the
gulfs of blood, language, and religion. And in Europe the Slav
population very largely outnumbers the Teuton population and is
growing much more rapidly.
Recent events, especially in the Balkan wars, had made it plain,
not to the German Emperor alone, but to all the world, that the
growth into an organized power of more than two hundred millions
of Slav peoples along nearly three thousand miles of
international frontier was a menace to the preservation of Teuton
supremacy in Europe. That Teuton supremacy was based on the
sword. The German Emperor's appeal was to "My sword." But when
the new sword of the united Slav power was allowed to be
unsheathed, German supremacy was threatened on its own ground and
by the weapon of its own choosing.
However all this be, and it must be admitted that it is to a
degree speculative, there were in 1914 conditions existing that
appeared to render the time a suitable one for the seemingly
inevitable continental war. Revelations pointing to defects in
the French army, deficiencies of equipment and weaknesses in
artillery, had been made in the French Parliament. The debate
that occurred was fully dwelt upon in the German papers. And on
July 16th the organ of Berlin radicalism, the VOSSICHE ZEITUNG,
published a leading article to show that Russia was not prepared
for war, and never had been. As for France, it said: "A Gallic
cock with a lame wing is not the ideal set up by the Russians.
And when the Russian eagle boasts of being in the best of health
who is to believe him? Why should the French place greater
confidence in the inveterate Russian disorganization than in
their own defective organization?"
As regards the Kaiser's own estimate of his preparedness for war,
and the views of national polity he entertained, we shall let him
speak for himself in the following extracts from former
utterances:
"We will be everywhere victorious even if we are surrounded by
enemies on all sides and even if we have to fight superior
numbers, for our most powerful ally is God above, who, since the
time of the Great Elector and Great King, has always been on our
side." - At Berlin, March 29, 1901.
"I vowed never to strike for world mastery. The world empire that
I then dreamed of was to create for the German empire on all
sides the most absolute confidence as a quiet, honest and
peaceable neighbor. I have vowed that if ever the time came when
history should speak of a German world power or a Hohenzollern
world power this should not be based on conquest, but come
through a mutual striving of nations after a common purpose.
"After much has been done internally in a military way, the next
thing must be the arming ourselves at sea. Every German
battleship is a new guarantee for the peace of the world. We are
the salt of the earth, but must prove worthy of being so.
Therefore, our youth must learn to deny what is not good for
them.
"With all my heart I hope that golden peace will continue to be
present with us." - At Bremen, March 22, 1905.
"My final and last care is for my fighting forces on land and
sea. May God grant that war may not come, but should the cloud
descend, I am firmly convinced that the army will acquit itself
as it did so nobly thirty-five years ago." - At Berlin, February
25, 1906.
In the early days of the reign of William II war was prominent in
his utterances. He was the War Lord in full feather, and the
world at that time looked with dread upon this new and somewhat
blatant apostle of militarism. Yet year after year passed until
the toll of almost three decades was achieved, without his
drawing the sword, and the world began to regard him as an
apostle of peace, a wise and capable ruler who could gain his
ends without the shedding of blood. What are we to believe now?
Had he been wearing a mast for all these years, biding his time,
hiding from view a deeply cherished purpose? Or did he really
believe that a mission awaited him, that regeneration of the
world through the sanguinary path of the battle-field was his
duty, and that by the aid of a successful war he could inaugurate
a safer and sounder era of peace?
We throw out these ideas as suggestions only. What the Kaiser
purposed, what deep-laid schemes of international policy he
entertained, will, perhaps, never be known. But if he was really
responsible for the great war, as he was so widely accused of
being, the responsibility he assumed was an awful one. If he was
not responsible, as he declared and as some who claim to have
been behind the scenes maintain, the world will be ready to
absolve him when his innocence has been made evident.
WHY RUSSIA ENTERED THE FIELD
In this survey of the causes of the great war under consideration
the position of Russia comes next. That country was the first to
follow Austria and begin the threatening work of mobilization.
Germany's first open participation consisted in a warming to
Russia that this work must cease. Only when her warning was
disregarded did Germany begin mobilization and declare war. All
this was the work of a very few days, but in this era of active
military preparedness it needs only days, only hours in some
instances, to change from a state of peace into a state of war
and hurl great armed hosts against the borders of hostile
nations.
The general impression was that it was the Slavic race sentiment
that inspired Russia's quick action. Servia, a country of Slavs,
brothers in race to a large section of the people of Russia, was
threatened with national annihilation and her great kinsman
sprang to her rescue, determined that she should not be absorbed
by her land-hungry neighbor. This seemed to many a sufficient
cause for Russia's action. Not many years before, when Austria
annexed her wards, Bosnia and Herzegovina, both Slavic countries,
Russia protested against the act. She would doubtless have done
more than protest but for her financial and military weakness
arising from the then recent Russo-Japanese War. In 1914 she was
much stronger in both these elements of national power and lost
not a day in preparing to march to Servia's aid.
But was this the whole, or indeed the chief, moving impulse in
Russia's action? Was she so eager an advocate of Pan-Slavism as
such a fact would indicate? Had she not some other purpose in
view, some fish of her own to fry, some object of moment to
obtain? Many thought so. They were not willing to credit the
Russian bear with an act of pure international benevolence. Wars
of pure charity are rarely among the virtuous acts of nations. As
it had been suggested that Germany saw in the war a possible
opportunity to gain a frontier on the Atlantic, so it was hinted
that Russia had in mind a similar frontier on the Mediterranean.
Time and again she had sought to wring Constantinople from the
hands of the Turks. In 1877 she was on the point of achieving
this purpose when she was halted and turned back by the Congress
of Berlin and the bellicose attitude of the nations that stood
behind it.
Here was another and seemingly a much better opportunity. The
Balkan War had almost accomplished the conquest of the great
Turkish capital and left Turkey in a state of serious weakness.
If Europe should be thrown into the throes of a general war, in
which every nation would have its own interests to care for,
Russia's opportunity to seize upon the prize for which she had so
long sought was an excellent one, there being no one in a
position to say her nay. To Russia the possession of
Constantinople was like the possession of a new world, and this
may well have been her secret motive in springing without
hesitation into the war. Her long-sought prize hung temptingly
within reach of her hand, the European counterpart of the "Monroe
Doctrine" could not now be evoked to stay her grasp, and it seems
highly probable that in this may have lain the chief cause of
Russia's participation in the war.
FRANCE'S HATRED OF GERMANY
The Republic of France was less hasty than Russia and Germany in
issuing a declaration of war. Yet there, too, the order of
mobilization was quickly issued and French troops were on the
march toward the German border before Germany had taken a similar
step. France had not forgotten her humiliation in 1870. So far
was she from forgetting it that she cherished a vivid
recollection of what she had lost and an equally vivid enmity
towards Germany in consequence. Enmity is hardly the word. Hatred
better fits the feeling entertained. And this was kept vitally
alive by the fact that Alsace and Lorraine, two of her former
provinces, still possessing a considerable French population,
were now held as part of the dominions of her enemy. The sore
rankled and hope of retribution lay deep in the heart of the
French. Here seemed an opportunity to achieve this long-cherished
purpose, and we may reasonably believe that the possibility of
regaining this lost territory made France eager to take part in
the coming war. She had been despoiled by Germany, a valued
portion of her territory had been wrested from her grasp, a
promising chance of regaining it lay before her. She had the men;
she had the arms; she had a military organization vastly superior
to that of 1870; she had the memory of her former triumphs over
the now allied nations of Austria and Germany; she had her
obligations to aid Russia as a further inducement. The causes of
her taking part in the war are patent, especially in view of the
fact that in a very brief interval after her declaration her
troops had crossed the border and were marching gaily into
Alsace, winning battles and occupying towns as they advanced.
GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY
We have suggested that in the case alike of Austria, Russia,
Germany and France the hope of gaining valuable acquisitions of
territory was entertained. In the case of France, enmity to
Germany was an added motive, the territory she sought being land
of which she had been formerly despoiled. These purposes of
changing the map of Europe did not apply to or influence Great
Britain. That country had no territory to gain and no great
military organization to exercise. She possessed the most
powerful navy of any country in the world, but she was moved by
no desire of showing her strength upon the sea. There was no
reason, so far as any special advantage to herself was concerned,
for her taking part in the war, and her first step was a generous
effort to mediate between the Powers in arms.
Only when Belgium - a small nation that was in a sense under the
guardianship of Great Britain, so far as its nationality and
neutrality were concerned - was invaded by Germany without
warning, did Britain feel it incumbent upon her to come to its
aid. This may not have been entirely an act of benevolence. There
was a probability that Germany, once in control of Belgium, could
not readily let go. She might add it to her empire, a fact likely
to seriously affect British sea-power. However this be, Great
Britain lost no time after the invasion in becoming a party to
the continental war, sending her fleet abroad and enlisting
troops for service in the aid of her allies. France and Belgium.
Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance, the other members of
which were Germany and Austria, was the only one of the great
Powers that held aloof. She had absolutely nothing to gain by
taking part in the war, while her late large expenses in the
conquest of Tripoli had seriously depleted her war chest. As
regards her alliance with Germany and Austria, it put her under
no obligation to come to their aid in an offensive war. Her
obligation was restricted to aid in case they were attacked, and
she justly held that no such condition existed. As a result,
Germany and Austria found themselves at war with the three
powerful members of the Triple Entente, while Italy, the third
member of the Triple Alliance, declined to draw the sword.
The defection of Italy was a serious loss to the power of the
allies, so much so that Emperor William threatened her with war
if she failed to fulfil her assumed obligations. This threat
Italy quietly ignored. She gave indications, in fact, that her
sympathies were with the opposite party. Thus Germany and Austria
found themselves pitted against three great Powers and a possible
fourth, with the addition of the two small nations of Servia and
Belgium. And the latter were not to be despised as of negligible
importance. Servia quickly showed an ability to check the forward
movements of Austria, while Belgium, without aid, long held a
powerful German army at bay, defending the city and fortresses of
Liege with a boldness and success that called forth the admiring
acclamations of the world.
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE
This review of causes and motives may be supplemented by a brief
statement of what is meant by the Triple Alliance and Triple
Entente, terms which come into common prominence in discussing
European politics. They indicate the division of Europe, so far
as its greater Powers are concerned, into two fully or partially
allied bodies, the former consisting of Germany, Austria and
Italy, the latter of Great Britain, France and Russia. These
organizations are of comparatively recent date. The Alliance
began in 1879 in a compact between Germany and Austria, a Dual
Alliance, which was converted into a Triple one in 1883, Italy
then, through the influence of Bismarck, joining the alliance. In
this compact Austria and Germany pledged themselves to mutual
assistance if attacked by Russia; Italy and Germany to the same
if attacked by France.
The Triple Entente - or Understanding - arose from a Dual
Alliance between France and Russia, formed in 1887, an informal
understanding between Britain and France in 1904 and a similar
understanding between Britain and Russia in 1907. Its purpose, as
formed by Edward VII, was to balance the Triple Alliance and thus
convert Europe into two great military camps. When organized
there seemed little probability of its being called into activity
for many years.
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